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ABSTRACT 
This is a theoretical and empirical study of China's inter- and 
intra-industry trade in manufactured goods with special reference to the 
market-oriented reform. It focuses on the impact of expanding market 
forces in the China's industrial sector on the determination of inter-
and intra-industry trade and their implications for the adjustment in the 
economy. This area forms a crucial component of China's effort to achieve 
rapid and sustained growth, and improve living standards through 
efficiency improvement and technology upgrade since the late 1970s. 
For the purpose of the analysis, the study first looks at the 
extent to which market mechanism is operating in the Chinese industry and 
the changing role of foreign trade in the country. It is shown that 
foreign trade decentralization combined with the expanding market forces 
brought about the breakdown of the institutional apparatuses for the 
insulation of the Chinese economy from world market. And it is argued 
that the changes in the economy estabilished an organic linkage between 
domestic economy and external trade. The study also shows that, from the 
historical perspective, China's reform strategy which entailed such a 
fundamental transformation of the economy was an imperative rather than 
the result of the country's choice among possible alternatives. 
Based on this foundation, the study conducts a theoretical and 
empirical analysis of the determinants of China's inter- and intra-
industry trade in manufactured goods. Adopting the generalized factor 
proportions theory and relatively robust methodology for empirical 
testing of the tenet, the study finds that economic forces which gave 
birth to Heckscher-Ohlin's view of international trade flows are also 
working in the Chinese economy. In relation with intra-industry trade, 
the study makes some observations on the trend’ inter-country group 
pattern, and inter-industry pattern of China's intra-industry trade in 
manufactures. Then, in view of the diversity of theoretical explanations 
and models for intra-industry trade, the study attempts to identify 
sources of such type of trade in the Chinese industry. On the basis of 
the observations and theoretical inference, a simple international trade 
model is provided. Econometric analysis of the determinants of 
intra-industry trade in the Chinese manufactures validates the economic 
rationale used in the discussion^  
Then, the study moves on to a consideration of the consequences of 
inter- and intra-industry trade and specialization for adjustment in the 
Chinese economy in terms of gains from trade, adjustment costs, and 
implications for commercial policy in a comparative manner. As the 
Chinese economy is situated in a transitional period, the result of the 
cost and benefit analysis for inter- and intra-industry trade is in 
favour of the latter. Under some appropriate assumptions, commercial 
policies which have negative welfare-implications in the context of 
traditional factor proportions model have some positive welfare-
implications in relation with intra-industry trade. Thus, it is argued in 
the study that the development of such type of trade in China provides 
the government with additional degree of freedom for policy-making. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER PAGE 
1. INTRODUCTION 1 
1-1 General scope and the approach 1 
1-2 Outline of the study 7 
2. THE EXPANSION OF MARKET MECHANISM IN THE CHINESE INDUSTRY.12 
2-1 Marketization as the main approach to industrial reform 12 
2-2 Expanding markets and market conditions 19 
2-3 Price adjustment mechanism in the Chinese industry 38 
2-4 Changing behavioral pattern of the industrial enterprise 48 
2-5 Concluding remark 59 
3. FOREIGN TRADE DECENTRALIZATION IN CHINA 61 
3-1 Organizational reform in China's foreign trade system 63 
3-2 Reforms in foreign trade planning system 66 
3-3 Determination of prices in foreign trade 74 
3-4 Changing role of foreign trade in China 80 
. 3-5 Concluding remark 93 
4. FACTOR PROPORTIONS THEORY AND INTER-INDUSTRY TRADE IN CHINA 95 
4-1 Realization of comparative advantage in China 95 
4-2 Extension of Heckscher-Ohlin theorem and implications 
for empirical testing 100 
4-3 Determinants of inter-industry trade in the Chinese 
industry 107 
4-4 Concluding remark 122 
5. INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE IN THE CHINESE INDUSTRY - 123 
5-1 Background 123 
5-2 Theoretical explanations for intra-industry trade 129 
5-3 Quantitative significance and patterns of intra-industry 
trade in China 142 
5-4 Sources of intra-industry trade in the Chinese industry 155 
5-5 Determinants of intra-industry trade in China 170 
5-6 Concluding remark 190 
6. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INTER- AND INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE 
FOR ADJUSTMENT IN THE CHINESE INDUSTRY 192 
6-1 Gains from trade 192 
6-2 Cost of adjustment in the Chinese industry 204 
6-3 Implications for commercial policy in China 215 
6-4 Concluding remark 228 
7. CONCLUSIONS 230 
APPENDICES 236 
BIBLIOGRAPHY - 251 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1-1 General scope and the approach 
This dissertation is a study of China's inter- and intra-industry 
trade in manufactured goods with foreign countries in conjunction with 
its market—oriented industrial reform. The relationship between 
market-oriented reform in the Chinese industrial sector and its external 
commodity trade is in the midst of the country‘s attempt to integrate its 
economy into world economy. And the attempt has been one of the basic 
strategy to promote modernization and growtli of the economy through 
improvement in allocative efficiency and utilization of foreign 
technology. For the purpose of the study, the effort is focused on the 
theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of expanding market in 
the economy on the determination of inter- and intra-industry trade in 
manufactured goods. In addition, their consequences for the adjustment in 
the Chinese industry in terms of gains from trade, adjustment costs, and 
implications for commercial policy are analyzed in a comparative manner. 
The importance of foreign trade for the economy to accerlerate its 
development, especially by means of importing technologically advanced 
capital goods, has been well understood in China since the foundation of 
the People's Republic, But, its adoption of the Soviet type central 
planning as the framework of the economic system allowed only the 
residual role for external trade throughout the prereform period. Thus， 
the traditional view about foreign trade in a centrally planned economy 
could be applied in the analysis of China's trade pattern and its 
implications for the rest of the econmy without any serious modification. 
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Such a system intrinsically reduces gains realized from trade as it tends 
to restrict the volume of trade relative to national output and insulate 
domestic price structure from that of world market. 
Despite some attempts to improve foreign trade performance, under 
strong influence of socialist ideology, the basic characteristics of 
China's foreign trade system remained untouched until the adoption of 
open door policy in combination of market-oriented general economic 
reform. In fact, the adoption of market force as a coordinator of 
economic activities in China distinguishes recent economic reform from 
its previous efforts to improve the performance of the economy through 
transfer of part of decision-making authority to local governments. 
Nevertheless, the change in the economic development strategy in China 
cannot be seen as based on the careful theoretical development. Rather it 
was forced by the three decades of experiences in the adaptation of 
Soviet type central planning to the reality of the Chinese economy. 
By the end of 1970s, weak material basis of the Chinese economy 
neither with detailed central planning nor efficient horizontal 
coordination mechanism made it inevitable for China to introduce market 
mechanism into the economy in pursuance of intensive growth rather than 
extensive growth. Thereby implied logical coherence of reform measures 
induced the foreign trade reform in the country to take the course of its 
decentralization relying on market forces rather than to devise more 
sophisticated ‘indicators' intended to guide trade planners in accordance 
with the policy objectives. After its experimental stage, as the 'Report 
of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade on Reform of the 
Foreign Trade System' was approved by the State Council and the 'Decision 
of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Reform of the 
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Economic Structure' was adopted by the Twelfth Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party at its third Plenary Session almost 
simultaneously in 1984, the new approach to economic development was 
formalized. With expanding market and foreign trade decentralization， the 
role of foreign trade has experienced a fundamental change and the 
interrelationship between external trade and internal economy quite close 
to that of developing market economies was established in China. As 
China's economic reform proceeds, thus, it is no more desirable or even 
possible to deal with the pattern of commodity trade separately from 
general economic conditions in the country. 
In the past ten years or so，the volume of China's foreign trade 
has grown more rapidly than its national product, and its share of world 
trade increased also. There has been sharp shift in the composition of 
trade, especially that of exports, and industrial products comprised over 
two thirds of total exports and over four fifths of imports by the end of 
the eighties. Moreover, contrary to the experience of centrally planned 
economy of socialist type, absolutely large share of China's foreign 
trade was conducted with the market economies. All the changes indicate 
that China's foreign trade can no longer be described and analyzed with 
the approaches based on the traditional view of foreign trade in the 
centrally planned economies. Therefore, in order to understand the impact 
of the entry of the Chinese economy into world market from the viewpoint 
of China's trade partners and to assess its feedback effects on the 
Chinese economy, there is urgent need for more quantitative analysis and 
for the application of analytical approaches found useful in the research 
on foreign trade in the market economies. 
Indeed, despite the profound changes in the Chinese economic system 
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experienced in the past decade, among those studies about the 
determinants of composition and direction of China's foreign trade and 
its implications for structural adjustment and commercial policy, few 
have considered the influence of expanded market forces in the economy in 
an impartial manner. As discussions on foreign trade reforms often 
conducted separately from the general economic reform, there has been 
substantial gap between the actual advancement of the economy and the 
contents of the discussions on China's foreign trade. Hence, in 
discussions on po1icy-oriented and practical issues of foreign trade, the 
reform-minded often blames the unreformed features of other areas of the 
economy for the problems encountered. On the contrary, those keep more 
conservative stance are .used to attributing those problems to unregulated 
market forces already fostered it the economy. There has been the lack of 
the objective macroeconomic perspectives based on serious theoretical and 
quantitative analyses of the interre1atxonship between market forces and 
foreign trade pattern and its implications for trade policy. Thus, policy 
instruments suggested as tlie guidlines, means for conducting trade as 
well as the measures for tackling possible problems generated by the open 
door policy were often inadequately confined to those familiar with in a 
traditional centrally planned economy. 
The dissertation is an attempt to fill in the gap with description, 
theoretical discussion and empirical estimation of the impact of 
expanding market mechanism in the Chinese industrial sector and foreign 
trade reform on the pattern of trade in manufactured goods. The 
analytical framework adopted is the complementary character of inter- and 
intra-industry trade for the explanation of China's foreign trade 
performance to the extent that it reflects the operation of market forces 
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in the Chinese economy due to economic reform. 
It should be noted that some studies conducted earlier about trade 
patterns in the centrally planned economies of socialist type suggest 
that their trade flows have factor proportions which make sense in terms 
of Heckscher-Ohlin model. But, in view of the deficient methodology 
applied for the studies and the lack of theoretical justification for the 
mechanism operating behind, at best they can be regarded as some warnings 
against overemphasis of the inefficiency of centrally planned foreign 
trade in resource allocation. Even with correct methodology applied, 
simple consistency of factor proportions of their trade flows with 
Heckscher-Ohlin model's prediction cannot be used as an excuse for the 
inefficiency of an economic system which insulates planned domestic 
economy and world market perfectly. Without the theoretical power in 
interpreting the market phenomena and policy implications what the model 
is expected to provide in market econoinies, simple-minded application of 
it in the analysis of foreign trade behavior of centrally planned economy 
is meaningless. 
In relation with the problem, the level and pattern of 
intra-industry trade more clearly reflects the influence of market forces 
on the trade flows in so far as we share the view of intra-industry of 
theoretical literature which sees it as a result of the unlimited 
operation of market forces, And some empirical analyses show apparently 
low level of such type of trade in the centrally planned economies. Here, 
however, we also have the same kind of problem as in the case of 
inter-industry trade. That is, regardless the recorded level of 
intra-industry type of trade in the economy, without consideration about 
the economic mechanism operating in the economic system, the result 
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obtained by simple application of the analytical method developed for the 
market economies has limited implication. Therefore, in order to provide 
legitimacy for the approach used in the dissertation to analyze China's 
external commodity trade, I start it with the effort to understand the 
expanding market mechanism in China. 
In contrast with the ‘tidiness' of factor proportions theoretical 
explanation of trade, theoretical explanations and models for 
intra-industry trade are substantially diversified. Moreover, due to the 
motives and short history of its theoretical development, theoretical and 
empirical discussions about intra-industry trade are concentrated on the 
analysis of industrialized countries' trade flows. Thus, in the 
dissertation, considerable effort is made to identify sources of 
intra-industry trade in the Chinese industry situated in a transitional 
period and to model them in a meaningful way. The study also attempts to 
provide a s:im|Dle international trade model based on the market forces 
thought to be important in the determination of intra-industry level and 
pattern in the Chinese industry. 
In the process of the economic reform in China, the emergence, 
expansion, functioning, and impact of goods fflarkets have perhaps been the 
most crucial development. In combination with the Chinese government's 
reform measures in other areas such as greater autonomy for enterprise 
decision-making, profit retention for state enterprises, bonuses for 
workers and managers, price reform, tax reform, changes in internal 
enterprise organization, the expansion of the role of the market 
mechanism in the distribution of industrial goods brought about 
fundamental changes in the coordination mechanism of economic activities 
in the economy. But the asymmetry of reform process among different 
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sectors of the economy made the pattern of enterprises' response to 
changing market conditions rather complicated. Especially, the apparently 
lagging process of reform in the mobility of production factors has 
fostered diversified enterprise behavior in their adjustment process 
aimed for circumvent of the constraints they were faced with. Structural 
problems in the Chinese industry as the legacy of economic system and 
polices in prereform period add more complexity to the picture of the 
economy. Therefore, In order to assess the consequences of inter-industry 
and intra-industry trade and specialization in the Chinese industry, the 
study also pays attention to the influences of the complicated features 
of the Chinese industrial system in terns of gains from trade, adjustment 
costs, and policy implications in a comparative manner^  
1-2 Outline of the study 
A short chapter-by-chapter outline of the rest of the dissertation 
is as follows: 
Chapter 2 starts with the description of the imperativeness of 
market-oriented reform in the Chinese econamy in the historical context. 
It also mentions the main components of the reform and their interrela-
tionship from the perspective of comparative economic system. Then the 
chapter presents available evidences on the quantitative significance of 
markets for industrial products in China and makes a preliminary attempt 
to evaluate how they function. The discussion leads into a question of 
the conditions under which the quantitatively significant markets will 
bring about effectively functioning market mechanism. To answer this 
question, I try to define the general market conditions in the Chinese 
industry. A brief description of price adjustment mechanism and a 
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preliminary assessment about flexibility and responsiveness of prices to 
changing supply and demand conditions also are provided. Finally, the 
chapter looks at Chinese industrial enterprise's behavioral pattern in 
response to competitive pressure from markets, where technical, financial 
and other aspects which influence enterprise response are considered. It 
is argued that the competitive response of the Chinese industrial 
enterprise is based on the government's stable attitude towards different 
market conditions in favor of market mechanism. 
Chapter 3 first looks at the institutional reforms which 
accompanied foreign trade decentralization in China from the perspectives 
of the changes in the organizations and planning system for external 
tradeThen, in conjunction with the reduction of mandatory planning and 
the decentralization of decision-making authority for trade, aspects 
related to the determination of foreign trade related prices including 
foreign exchange rate adjustment and pricing systems for exports and 
imports are discussed. The changes in this area provided the economy with 
a conduit for connection between the doisestic market and world market. In 
line with the focus of the study as a whole, the chapter also analyzes 
the changing role of foreign trade in the Chinese economy in the general 
context of the economic reform with the support of trade statistics. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to the investigation of the pattern of 
inter-industry trade in the Chinese manufacturing sector on the basis of 
the insights into market-oriented reform in the Chinese economy obtained 
in the previous chapters. First, in order to provide the legitimacy for 
the application of factor proportions theory for the analysis of China's 
trade pattern, I examine the extent to which the features characterizing 
the practice of foreign trade in a centrally planned economy are 
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irrelevant to the analysis of trade behavior in the Chinese industry. 
Then, for the assessment of China's inter-industry trade in manufactures 
from the viewpoint of factor proportions theory, some theoretical 
problems arising from the dimensionality and empirical application 
procedure of factor proportions theory are briefly dealt with. Finally, 
the econometric analysis for the determinants of inter-industry trade in 
manufactured goods with its 32 major trade partners is conducted. The 
analysis covers total 142 industries defined as the 3-digit level of 
classifications in the Standard Industrial Trade Classification section 
5-8 for the period of 1986-1989. The analysis is based on China's trade 
and industrial data from officially released Summary Surveys of China's 
Customs Statistics (中國海關統計摘要）and People's Republic of China 1985 
Industrial Census Data(中華人民共和國1985年工業普查資料）.Data for factor 
endowments for each country are from various sources of statistics 
published by United Nations. 
Chapter 5 moves to the analysis of intra-industry trade in the 
Chinese manufacturing sector. In view of the diversity of theoretical 
explanations and models for such type of trade as well as its ' newness ‘ 
in the analysis of China's foreign trade pattern, a brief sketch of the 
origin and the status quo of the theoretical development of intra-
industry trade is provided first. Then major theoretical explanations for 
intra-industry trade are reviewed and summarized. In the chapter, I 
measure the level of intra-industry trade in the Chinese industry using 
various measures proposed by relevant literature, and identify some 
stylized facts about the pattern of intra-industry trade in China's 
manufacturing sector from three perspectives： its level and trend through 
time, inter-country group comparison, and the inter-industry pattern of 
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it. The chapter also disscusses the applicability of theoretical concepts 
of intra-industry trade in the analysis of China's foreign trade pattern 
in conjunction with market-oriented reform in the economy and identifies 
possible sources of intra-industry trade in the Chinese industry. Then, a 
simple international trade model based on the main sources of 
intra-industry trade in the Chinese industry is developed. It is expected 
to be able to interpret the stylized facts observed in a meaningful way. 
Finally, the model is tested against China's trade flows for 142 
industries (the three digit level of classifications in SITC section 5-8) 
during the period of 1986-1989. Sources of the trade and industrial data 
used in the econometric analysis are the same with those for the analysis 
of inter-industry trade. 
Chapter 6 discusses the consequences of inter- and intra-industry 
trade for adjustment in the Chinese industry from the viewpoints of the 
gains from trade, adjustment e:�sts, and implications for commercial 
policy in a comparative manner. In order to assess the gains from two 
different patterns of international exchange of commodities, the concept 
of deadweight loss due to protection is applied first. Then, additional 
gains from intra-industry trade based on various theoretical consider-
ations are examined in relation with China's industrial environment. The 
adjustment costs accrue to the Chinese economy as a result of inter- and 
intra-industry specialization are compared in the next part of the 
chapter. For the purpose, in addition to the examination of the 
relationship between the level of intra-industry trade and the variation 
in relative factor requirements within industries, the unique character-
istics related to the industrial structure and factor mobility in China 
are analyzed. The chapter also discusses the implications for various 
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commercial policies from the viewpoint of the policy objectives of 
China's tariff and non-tariff interventions in trade. For the purpose, I 
focus my attention on the applicability of the results of theoretical 
developments in the related area of international economics in China, 
Chapter 7 summarizes the main conclusions of the dissertation and 
pulls together the arguments of different chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EXPANSION OF MARKET MECHANISM IN THE CHINESE INDUSTRY 
This chapter describes the evolution and operation of market 
mechanism in the Chinese industry in relation with comprehensive economic 
decentralization policy of the Chinese government since 1979. It begins 
with a brief discussion on the imperativeness of the market-oriented 
economic reform policy in China in the context of the reform objectives, 
and relate It to the main components of reform measures. This provides us 
the prospects for the emergence and durability of effectively functioning 
markets in the Chinese industry, and set the stage for the analysis in 
the rest of the dissertation. Second, it is attempted to describe the 
quantitative significance of markets in the Chinese industry as well as 
the general market conditions for industrial goods. Then, the functioning 
of dual pricing system and its limitations in the Chinese industry are 
described. Finally, non-price adjustment behavior of the Chinese 
industrial enterprises to the competitive market pressure will be 
discussed, and some conclusions from the discussion are to be drawn. 
2-1 Marketization as the main approach to the industrial reform 
Reform objectives and the imperativeness of markets 
In the Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh 
Central Committee in December 1978 (hereafter the Communique), which is 
often cited by economic literature as a critical turning point in China's 
economic reform process, rapid, sustained growth of the economy and 
improvement in living standards of people were stated as the ultimate 
objectives of economic policy. In the same document, some major imbalan-
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ces among sectors were blamed as a main source of economic instability. 
In order to achieve the objectives which are seemingly uneasy to 
compromise simultaneously, improvement in efficiency in the Chinese 
economy was urgently required, not just the massive resources 
mobilization and capital investments which generated growth under 
previous economic system.11 Therefore, improving economic efficiency 
itself became an interim goal of the reform process to achieve the 
ultimate objectives of economic polices in China.2} 
In addition, the recognition of the limitations of the previous 
cyclical alteration of administrative decentralization and recentrali-
zation3) as the main approach to adapt Soviet type central planning to 
China's economic conditions, together with favorable political environ-
ment provided ideological sanction for development and expansion of the 
market mechanism after 1978» In fact, this feature indicates major 
1) Using relatively robust methodology compared with the previous studies, 
Chen, Wang, Zheng, Jefferson, and Rawski (1988) calculated the average 
annual output growth rate in the Chinese industry during 1953-1978 as 
10.1%, which is by any standards impressive. But, the average annual 
growth rate of total factor productivity during the same period was only 
1.3%. This indicates the impressive growth has been achieved only through 
a rapid growth of inputs. 
2) Initially, the set of industrial reforms proposed by the Communique 
includes; (1) 'opening up，the Chinese economy to foreign technology and 
investment; (2) decentralization of managerial decision-making power in 
production and investment to local governments and enterprises; (3) 
reinstitution of finanancial/material incentives at the enterprise and 
individual level. 
3) We can identify two surges of the economic decentralization in China in 
the prereform period; the first one accompanied with the Great Leap 
Forward during the period of 1957-1958，and the second one throughout the 
Cultural Revolution period (1966-1976). Although the subsequent 
recentralization movements made the system unstable, such experiences had 
great impact on the Chinese economy in the sense that they have 
estabilished the principle outlines of planning and management system that 
endured until the reforms began in the end of the 70s. Nevertheless, since 
it was just the problem of the division of responsibility between 
administrative levels, there had been no genuine relaxation of control over 
the autonomy of enterprises so that enterprises were just shuttled back and 
forth between central and local authority. 
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departure of the approach for economic reform in 1979 from previous 
attempts to improve economic performance which were subjected to the 
constraints of Maoists' ideology.沿 Thus, even though the Chinese 
government did not start the reform process with a clear and well-defined 
blueprint, greater decentralization of microeconomic decision-making and 
subjecting it increasingly to market influences and material incentives 
constitute the vital part of the strategy. As the approach had emerged 
from the country's experience of three decades of economic development, 
and the actual implementation of the reforms crucially depended on the 
result of their experimentation, there has been implicit logical 
coherence of the reform measures4 
In the course of implementation of the market mechanism’:，although 
the deep-rooted fear of macroecanoniic Instability in China, particularly 
that of inflation and foreign trade deficit, put stops to the movement 
at times, market force in China has been expanded and deepened its role 
rapidly. Moreover, in some area, the market-oriented reform process moved 
well beyond the initial intention of the Chinese reformers as the process 
was given impetus by its own momentum. Despite the recognition among the 
reformers of the inter-dependefice and mutual ly reinforcing nature of the 
approaches to reform from the beginning of the reform process, 
4) Throughout most of prereform period, China's industrial development was 
characterized by its strong ideological tendency towards self-reliance and by 
extreme egalitarianism. Despite the positive effect of the development 
strategy based on the ideology of self-reliance for mobilization of local 
resources for its own development, the redundant construction and the 
shortage for basic materials as a consequence became major obstacles to 
efficient operation of the Chinese economy. Similarly, although the strong 
egalitarian ethic which emphasized the distributive role of planning was 
conducive to eliminate abject poverty in China, the resulting weak 
economic incentive system made the economy used to Inefficient operation 
as often compared to 'eating from the same pot，(大鍋飯).(The main 
features of China's prereform planning system are summarized in the 
Appendix A of the dissertation.) 
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formulation of comprehensive reform program had to wait till the issue of 
the Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 
Economic System Reform in October 1984 (hereafter the Decision). This 
reflects China's decidedly pragmatic and highly exprimental approach to 
economic reform. By then, more thorough measures of reform were urged by 
the limitations of many of the partial reforms already tried. To resolve 
faced problems, the market-oriented approach was also acceptable with 
more comfort for the Chinese Communist Party leaders as the ideological 
position of reformers could be clarified by the theoretical explorations 
by academics. 
With accelerating reform process and the promulgation of its 
comprehensive program, view of the relationship between plan and market 
was also changed. Market mechanism was accepted by reformers as 
1 complementary to plan' rather than ‘supplementary to plan' as the 
Decision in 1984 endorsed the argument that socialist economy was a 
‘planned commodity economy based on public ownership' „ In this context, 
it was argued that plan should be carried out through the law of value 
and the law should be utilized to serve implementation of the plan. 
Development of the situation reaffirmed the approach to reform which saw 
that greater use of markets as a resource allocation mechanism and less 
reliance on planning and administrative controls would be beneficial in 
improving the efficiency of the economic system. In the process, the 
scope of mandatory planning was reduced and that of guidance planning 
through economic levers was extended. Therefore, the role of market as a 
mechanism which provided favorable environment for enterprise autonomy 
and incentive system and as a coordinator for dynamic efficiency of the 
economy rather than as a simple equalizer of supply and demand was also 
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emphasized. Despite the still continuing controversy about the extent of 
mix of planned economy and market economy, well functioning market by 
itself has been an important goal of economic reform in the Chinese 
industry. 5) This aspect of the Chinese industrial reform has prevented 
the abrupt reversal of marketization of the economy, and the study is 
based on the perception of it. 
Main components of the industrial reform 
In the simple descriptive apparatus for economic systems developed 
by Neuberger and Duffy (1976) and elaborated by Conn (1984)’ any economic 
system has four key components： the decision-making structure； the 
information structure； the incentive structure； and the coordination 
structure. In this paradigm, the market mechanism is a means of 
coordinating economic activity and thus falls in the last category. We 
note that the first threa components of an economic system are 
characterized by the coordination structure adopted, and all the 
components are interrelated to one another. In order to have functioning 
markets, the economic system must be characterized by decentralization in 
decision-making authority. The market system is also characterized by 
decentralization and horizontal flows of infofmation, and the market 
transmits information to transactors through market prices. Finally， the 
transactors in markets are motivated primarily by self-interest, and act 
5) As a comprehensive programme for the enterprise reform in the Chinese 
industry, the Decision stipulates: (1) reducing the scope of mandatory planning 
and extending guidance planning; (2) rationalizing the price system to provide 
greater price flexibility, and reforming the tax, financial and banking systems to 
facilitate macroeconomic regulation; (3) ‘separation of government from 
enterprise functions'; (4) 'reform of the wage and labour system on the principle 
of distribution according to work' with the enterprise director assuming full 
responsibility of management; and (5) development of diverse forms of economic 
organization, including individual, collective and foreign ownership, but subject 
to the leading role of state enterprises.�Almanac of China's economy, 1985, 
summarized in Sung and Chan, 1987，pp, 14-15) 
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to further this objective in their transactions. In this context, 
considering effective functioning markets as the interim goal of China's 
economic reform to achieve the ultimate objectives of the economic 
policy, reform measures in the Chinese industry can be understood in the 
light of implicit logical coherence among them. 
Since the economic reform process has begun in the end of 1978， 
there has been considerable progress in the development and expansion of 
the role of the market mechanism in the allocation of industrial goods 
and corresponding reductions in the role of planning and administrative 
allocation. (For details, see section 2 of the chapter. China's reform 
effort in dee isi on-making structure has been directed towards increase in 
the autonomy in various aspects of enterprise management. Increase in the 
flexibility of prices due to the introduction of the ‘ two-track' price 
system and expansion of markets comprise the vital part of industrial 
reform in the information structure� finally, as the reform effort in 
incentive structure, financial/material incentives for enterprise and 
individual have been introduced. In view of the imperativeness of the 
market-oriented reform in Chin^ i and its commitment to the efficiency 
improvement of the economy, other reforms can be understood as the 
natural process following the initial reform package. For example, for 
the industrial goods markets to operate sffloothly, price reform is needed 
so that market price signals accurately reflect scarcity values in the 
economy. Financial incentives for enterprises do not work well unless 
there is a certain degree of enterprise autonomy in the use of retained 
profit and decision-making on production and investment, or if 
performance criteria for enterprises are distorted. 
On one hand, China's highly pragmatic approach to economic reform 
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and the tendency to rely on the results of policy experiments for 
implementation of reform measures made the reform process proceeded along 
the natural order without serious resistance. On the other hand, however, 
the practice brought about uneven progress of reform among different 
aspects within a sector of the economy as well as among differnt sectors. 
More rapid progress has been made where the resistance to reform was 
weakest from the related political power or the prevalent economic 
practices. For instance, the expansion of the role of the market 
mechanism in the allocation of industrial goods and the adoption of the 
enterprise profit retention scheme and worker's bonus system were among 
the greatest progress in the Chinese industrial reforms. In comparison, 
reforms in the factor allocation system have made much less progress than 
has occured in the development of product markets. Even within the same 
industry, marketization in the allocation of final goods compared with 
that of raw materials and semi finished goods for production has been 
proceeded more rapidly and easily, (see section 2 of the chapter) In terms 
of the components comprising an economic system, China's industrial 
reforms for effectively functioning markets have been relatively lagged 
behind in the areas of decision-making structure and the incentive 
structure. The situation can be explained by the fact that the legacies 
of the economic system in the pr ere form period in China and the 
incentives for keeping them have been rather stubborn in those areas. 
Neither with the comprehensive and detailed planning system nor the 
smoothly functioning horizontal coordination mechanism in China's economy 
on the eve of the reform, the market-oriented reform in the Chinese 
industry has been given impetus by its own momentum since the reform 
process began. Thus, overall progress has been in many aspects 
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considerably greater than it might have been expected. In terms of the 
analytical paradigm cited above, as the reform proceeded in China, the 
underlying logical coherence among reform measures moved the components 
of the economic system close to those of the economic system based on 
market forces. Even in the areas such as the factor allocation mechanism 
and the ownership system where reform process has been relatively lagged 
behind, considerable progress has been made due to the mutually 
reinforcing feature of the Chinese industrial reform. In the following 
section of the chapter, the quantitative significance of markets in the 
Chinese industry as the coordination mechanism is investigated. Then, the 
extent of its operation as the information structure through price 
adjustment, and as the incentive structure through the competitive 
response of industrial enterprises are analyzed in the rest of the 
chapter. 
2-2 Expanding markets and market conditions 
The quantitative significance of markets 
In this section, we examine various available quantitative 
evidences indicating expanding role of markets in the allocation of 
industrial goods and factors of production since 1979. Given ambiguous 
definitions used in statistical statement in China and transitional 
character of the economy, a sharp distinction between market and 
non-market transaction is difficult to make. And it is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to come up with a single indicator of the 
exact extent to which market mechanism is operating in the Chinese 
industry. Therefore, in this section’ we investigate the relevant aspects 
of resource allocation system in China to derive conclusions about the 
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significance of market mechanism in resource allocation in the different 
sphere of the Chinese industry. 
頂 LOW SHARE OF CENTRAL PLANNING: AS a result of a series of ad> 
hoc responses of the Chinese government to the evolving economic 
situation combined with a general desire on the part of the reformers to 
reduce the scope and importance of short-term mandatory planning, the 
Chinese planning system has been changed rapidly. And new planning 
policies and mechanisms were developed by reform and adjustment in the 
economy since the late 1970s. 
Among others， one of the most prominent changes is the sharp 
reduction in the number of commodities subject to central planning and 
allocation. Table 2-1 shows the sharp drop in the number of industrial 
commodities subject to the state mandatory planning between 1980 and 
1987. As a result, the share of industrial inputs allocated by mandatory 
state plan reduced from 70 percent of total demand of local governments 
and enterprises in 1980 to only 20 percent in 1987 (Guojia Jingji Tizhi 
Gaige Weiyuanhui, 1988, p.798) 
Table 2-1 
Change in the number of industrial commodities 
under the control of mandatory state plan 
1980 1987 
Industrial commodities 120 60 
subject to state plan 
Industrial inputs subject 256 27 
to the unified allocation 
Industrial commodities 188 22 
controlled by the ministry 
of commerce 
Source: Guojia Jingji Tizhi Gaige Weiyuanhui (1988，p.798) 
20 
At the same time, reduction in the share of virtually all producer 
goods subject to the allocation through central plan is another important 
evidence indicating reducing role of planning in the Chinese economy 
Table 2-2 
State allocation of key producer goods 
(as percentage of total domestic supply) 
Item 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Coal 57.9 50.4 42.3 47.2 41.0 
Rolled steel 73.4 56.9 53.1 47.1 45.0 
Timber 80.9 30.7 30.0 26.2 n. a. 
Cement 35.0 19.4 16.2 15.6' 15.0 
Source: Guojia Jingji Tizhi Gaige Weiyuanhui (1988，p.799) 
Zhongguo Wujia Nianjian 1989, p. 143 
Xu Feiqing (1988， p.203) 
since economic reforms began. Progressive decline over time in the share 
of the key producer goods allocated by state is evident from Table 2-2. 
Another indicator which provides more concrete view of reducing 
role of planning in resource allocation in relation with expanding market 
forces is the declining share of the products whose prices are fixed by 
the state. Table 2-3 clearly shows the trends of the declining share of 
retail sales carried out at state fixed price. In 1987, for manufactured 
consumer goods, the share of transactions conducted at free market prices 
or quasi-free market prices (state guidance price) reached 55 percent of 
total sales, and for inputs for production, the share reached about 40 
percent of total transactions. (Zhongguo Wujia Nian.iian 1989. p. 81) 
A smaller number and relatively low share of allocations by state 
planning is consistent with expanding role of maket mechanism in resourse 
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Table 2-3 
The share of various type of pricing practices 
in total social retail sales 
1985 1986 1987 1988 
(1) Fixed price by state 47.0 35.0 33.7 28.9 
(2) State guidance price 19.0 25.0 28.0 21.8 
(3) Free market price 34.0 40.0 38.3 49.3 
(2) + (3)： 53.0 65.0 66.3 71.1 
Source: Zhongguo Wujia Nianjian 1989. p.386 
Table 2-4 
Direct marketing of industrial products by enterprise and 
by industry in 1985 (as percentage of total value of sales) 
Distinctions Share 
Totala 54,1 
Large and medium: size enterprises 34.8 
Ownership 
State-owned enterprises 44. 5 
Collective-owned enterprises 85. 0 
Enterprises with other types 45. 6 
of ownership 
Light and Heavy Industry 
Light industry 61.1 
Heavy industry 49.1 
Excavating industry 23.9 
Raw material processing 32. 8 
industry 
Manufacturing industry 68. 2 
Source: PRC 1985 Industrial Census Data, Summary edition, pp. 122-127. 
a average for all independent accounting enterprises including 
small size enterprises as well as large and medium size 
enterprises 
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allocation. They, however, by no means necessarily imply it without any 
qualifications, since administrative allocation by provincial and local 
governments has been substantial. More direct indication of the 
importance of market in resource allocation is the share of direct 
marketing by producers. Table 2-4 shows the share of direct marketing of 
industrial products by enterprises with different scale (large and 
medium, whole independent industrial enterprises) and categories in the 
ownership (state, collective, others) ’ and in different sectors of the 
Chinese industry (heavy, light) in 1985. The comparison between large and 
medium size enterprises and all independent accounting enterprises 
indicates smaller plants probably directly market a higher share of their 
output. It also shows that the share of direct marketing is higher in 
collectively-owned enterprises, light industry, and manufacturing 
industry than others. 
In addition, available information about the expanding role of 
market for the allocation of producer goods and consumer goods indicates 
that the share of market allocation as opposed to lower-level 
administrative control is relatively large and growing. Overall, as a 
major effort for economic reform in China’ the share of planned 
allocation of resources has been reduced rapidly in Its variety and 
magnitude, and consequently such change set the stage for operating 
market. 
MARKET ALLOCATION OF PRODUCER GOODS; The substantial and growing 
share of the market for producer goods also can be seen clearly from the 
increasing share of direct marketing by producers. Table 2-5 presents 
available information on the direct marketing share of individual 
producer goods by producers. It shows a substantial and increasing share 
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of direct marketing by enterprises producing producer goods. 
For input side, According to Xu Feiqing (1988, p.204)， as early as 
in 1986, the share of some key producer goods such as steel , timber, and 
cement supplied through market took in turn 38, 46, and 61 percent of 
total consumption of them by local governments and enterprises. 
In addition to the expanding enterprise autonomy in the supply of 
inputs and the production and marketing of products as mentioned above, 
another explicit manifestation of the expanded role of the market 
mechanism in the allocation of product materials and commodity was the 
Table 2-5 
Direct marketing share of industrial producer goods 
(as percentage of total quantity of sales) 
Item 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Pig iron 12,8 45.1 48.5 52,5 
Steel products 22.5 29.1 32.0 37.3 
Sulphuric acid 23,3 49.7 51.7 55.7 
Caustic soda 27.5 29.8 39.9 41.2 
Soda ash 49.3 32.3 44,9 44.9 
cement 52.4 62.3 63.9 66.7 
Plate glass 62.3 61.6 72.6 79.9 
Timber 37.8 36.1 34.6 35.9 
Coal 20.0 20.5 21.8 20.1 
Fuel oil 9.5 1.6 14,3 14.1 
Motor Vehicles 53.3 51.8 48.2 54.5 
Metal cutting machines 70.7 75.6 70.0 75.9 
Altering current motors 79.9 80.8 86,1 86.3 
Source: Statistical Yearbook (1988; pp.406-418，1989; pp.379-380, 
1990; pp.421-422, 1991; pp.433-434.) 
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development of commercial institutions since 1979. For industrial 
producer goods and raw materials, 'markets for the means of production' 
have been introduced since 1979 and various types of 'material trade 
centers' have been estabilished since 1984. In 1988, there were 395 
material trade centers at regional and municipal level or above, and 
around 1000 at county level. By the end of 1988， for example, the number 
of steel markets established under governmentsr permission was 182 and 
located along 151 large and medium cities. Table 2-6 presents the shares 
of some important industrial goods and raw materials allocated through 
markets by state material supply system (the state commercial network 
responsible for industrial producer goods) in 1987 and 1988, and shows 
Table 2-6 
The importance of markets for state material supply 
organs 1987-1988 (percentage of total value of sales) 
Item 1987 1988 
Rolled steel 62 68 
Timber 62 72 
Trucks 63 78 
Source: Guojia Jingji Tizhi Gaige Weiyuanhui (1989，p. 174) 
important role played by markets, for sotm individual regions, the 
proportion of materials for production allocated through markets was 
higher than average. For example, in Jiangsu province, the value of sales 
through market for rolled steel was RMB 30400 million, and this amounted 
to 91.6 percent of total sales value of the product. (Guojia Jingji 
Tizhi Gaige Weiyuanhui, 1989, p.174) 
However, the growth and success of these markets hinged greatly on 
the presence or absence of administrative price controls. For this point, 
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in addition to the decreasing share of state fixed prices (see Table 
2-3), the adoption of two-track price system(價格雙軌制）for producers 
goods contributed to a substantial extent to the operation of market 
forces (see section 3). With increasing market share of material 
allocation by state material supply system and with room for price 
adjustments, the individual units of the system became more independent 
and profit-oriented in their commercial activity. As a result, the 
national scale cooperative bodies of commercial units for supply of 
producer goods began to appear. By the end of 1987， there were already 
8200 such bodies (including 470 with intimate relationship). In view of 
the fact that the interregional ‘cooperation' in various forms indicates 
another major market-like allocation for industrial producer goods, the 
change of value of materials traded through interregional cooperation 
from RMB 30 billion in 1980 to RMB 412 billion in 1987 also implies rapid 
development of market forces in the Chinese economy during the period. 
MARKET ALLOCATION OF CONSUMER GOODS： Consumer goods and industrial 
inputs into agriculture are handled by China's commercial system. The 
retail consumer goods market is largely free of direct quantity 
allocation, and the varying degrees of price controls also have been 
progressively relaxed. In the wholesale commerce, a major reform was 
implemented in 1981, which divided industrial consumer goods into four 
categories； (1) unified distribution, (2) planned procurement, (3) 
procurement according to orders, (4) selective procurement. Type (1) 
goods are entirely purchased and distributed by the state in a unified 
way. Type (2) goods are purchased according to plan of industrial and 
commercial department subjet to state quotas. Any above-plan products can 
be purchased by commercial system through further negotiations or 
26 
marketed directly by enterprises themselves. For type (3) goods, the 
procurement plans are outlined through consultation between the 
industrial and commercial departments, and producers sign purchase 
contracts on a voluntary basis. Type (4) goods are selectively purchased 
by the commercial system on a voluntary basis. Thus, the industrial 
consumer goods and agricultural inputs belong to the category (3),(4) are 
more market like transactions. In 1987, the share of type (4) goods in 
total value of purchase of large retail sales enterprises already reached 
around 80 percent.(Guojia Jingji Tizhi Gaige Weiyuanhui, 1988， p.416) 
As shown at the beginning of the section, the number of industrial 
goods subject to unified allocation under the Ministry of Commerce was 
reduced from 188 in 1980 to only 22 by the end of 1986. By that time, for 
industrial consumer goods, the share of transactions conducted in free 
market prices and state guidance prices reached 55 percent, and the share 
of the value of transactions subject to state plan was only 30 percent of 
total procurement of industrial consumer goods and agricultural 
inputs.(Xu Feiqing, 1988, p.194) In the process, the prices of minor 
industrial consumer goods have been continually liberalized； 180 
commodities in 1982, 350 commodities in 1983, and the prices of all the 
minor consumer goods were liberalized in 1984, In addition, in 1983, the 
State Council also allowed to differentiate prices in the same category 
of goods according to their quality. As in case of producer goods, Table 
2-7 shows substantial share of direct marketing of industrial consumer 
goods, and provides more concrete evidence of expanding markets in China. 
The average level of direct marketing share of industrial consumer goods 
in 1987 is believed to be over 50 percent of total sales. (Guojia Jingji 
Tizhi Gaige Weiyuanhui, 1988, p.416) 
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In the sphere of circulation and distribution of manufactured 
consumer goods and agricultural inputs, there also were significant 
changes since 1979. In relation with wholesale, the hierarchically 
controlled original system, where wholesale agencies were divided into 
Table 2-7 
Direct marketing share of industrial consumer goods 
(percentage of tatal quantity of sales) 
Item 1988 1989 1990 
Bicycles 64.0 62.0 69.8 
Sewing machines 55.0 40.5 45.7 
Watches 67.5 55.5 , 49,7 
Television sets 73.0 76.4 90.2 
Electric fans 74.5 73.2 66.8 
Cloths 51.9 50.7 52.2 
Leather Shoes 82.3 77.9 75.8 
Synthetic detergent 68.2 73.0 76.8 
Bulbs 66.2 73.4 72.2 
Source: Statistical Yearbook (1989; pp.379-380, 
1990; pp.421-422, 1991; pp.433-434.) 
the first, the second and the third levels according to the level of 
authority to which they were to report, was decentralized and 
corporationized to conduct their business according to economic 
incentives. Therefore, unlike the prereform period, the wholesale 
agencies no longer formed a closed system of domination and 
subordination, and there were horizontal transactions among wholesale 
agencies and between wholesalers and retailers. (Guojia Jingji Tizhi 
Gaige Weiyuanhui, pp. 435-436)6) 
6) Whereas in 1979, the reform was attempted by means of redefinition of 
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Emphasis was also placed on the development of the trade centers, 
which aimed at exchange and cooperation between regions and between rural 
and urban areas, the adjustment function in cases of scarcity and 
surplus, and providing facilities and servicies for goods transactions. 
(Taubmann and Widmer, 1986, p.352) The objective was trading industrial 
goods more freely and not granting a monopoly to a single wholesale 
organization. By the end of 1986, there were already 1588 trade centers 
for industrial consumer goods under auspices of Ministry of Commerce, and 
the role of providing facilities and services for goods transaction were 
more stressed than before.(Xu Feiqing, 1988, p.193) , 
In order to diversify the goods circulation system, the Chinese 
government also proposed the organization of horizontal economic 
cooperative system. It was supposed to breakdown the closed and 
eellularized commercial practice as well as departmental protectionism by 
promoting inter-regional transactions. In the end of 1987， reportedly 
there were 7200 horizontal economic cooperatives in affiliation with the 
Ministry of Commerce,(Guojia Jingji Tizhi Gaige Weiyuanhui, 1988, p.436) 
In addition,, for more intimate connection between supply of urban 
industry and rural demand, supply-sales cooperatives also were establi-
shed on the voluntary basis, which simplified the circulation of goods by 
direct connection between producers and consumers, and also reduced the 
transaction cost by unified purchase and sale. 
On the other hand, for the small-scale state owned commercial 
enterprises which coped with the major part of retail sales in industrial 
consumer goods, reform measures aimed at the transfer and leasing of them 
to collectives or individuals were implemented as the first stage of the 
economic regions, the whoesale system reform in 1984 focused on the level of 
cities. (Tauberman and Widen, 1986, p.350) 
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reform process. The proceedings took place in the following ways： (l) 
Transferee! to state-owned but collectively operated enterprises 
responsible for their own profits and losses.(改)(2) Transformed into 
collective ownership, i.e. enterprises were sold to collectives, and they 
might admit share holders,(轉）（3) Leased to individual operators.(租） 
As the second stage of the reform process, the government 
alleviated the financial burden of enterprises. For the state owned and 
collectively operated enterprises, the contracted profit target was 
reduced to a half of the previous level. The collectively owned 
enterprises were immuned to the user's fee for fixed capital and extended 
the refunding period for fixed capital and management funds. And the 
leased enterprises were allowed to pay the rent from pre-tax profit. 
Boosted by the policy* by the end of 1986， there were 62 thousand 
transferee!, trans formed or leased small-scale commercial enterprises, 
which comprise 66 percent of all small scale enterprises. Since 1987, 
further step was taken to expand the enterprises leased to individual 
operaters.(Guojia Jingji Tizhi Gaige Weiyuanhui, 1988， p.438) 
Table 2-8 
Share of retail sales by ownership 
(percentage of total sales value) 
Ownership 1987 1988 
State-owned uni ts 38,6 39.3 
Collective-owned 35» 7 34.7 
Individual-owned 25.4 25.7 
and others 
Source: Guojia Jingji Tizhi Gaige Weiyuanhui (1989，p. 173) 
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As an incentive, the leased enterprises were exempted from the bonus tax 
(獎金税）for two years. By the end of 1987’ the number of small scale 
state-owned enterprises leased to individual operater was reached 35000, 
which showed 192 percent increase from that of 1986. As a result of 
systematic reform in the commercial system for circulation and 
distribution of industrial consumer goods, as shown in Table 2-8, the 
share of state-owned units in total value of retail sales became to be 
rather limited. 
Market conditions 
Usually, different terms and classifications are u^ ed to describe 
market conditions in different economic systems. In general, analyses of 
market conditions in relation with market economy are conducted in terms 
of ‘ excess supply， and ‘excess demand' which in turn based on the 
assumption of the existence of ‘equilibrium’ situation where supply and 
demand is balanced. In this context, the distinction between the concepts 
of ‘ equilibrium' versus ‘disequilibrium’ and 4 excess supply' versus 
'excess demand' crucially depends on the existence of market-clearing 
price. On the other hand, in order to understand the market mechanism in 
centrally planned economies, a widely accepted approach is the 
distinction between buyer's market and seller's market.(Kornai, 1980) 
Contrary to the case of market economy, the concepts of buyer's market 
and seller's market do not rely on the existence of market-clearing 
prices. Therefore, in case of chronic shortage mainly due to the adapted 
economic behavior of individual economic agents to a certain institu-
tional arrangement in the planned economies, it is possible that no 
feasible price change will clear the market and seller's market prevails 
with strong upward pressures on prices. But in a buyer's market, as Byrd 
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(1987a, p. 241) puts it, producers act 4as if, there is excess supply and 
compete for and respond to the market, but the pressure for price 
adjustment is rather asymmetric with a seller's market case. In a stable 
buyer's market in the long run, there may be equilibrium in the sense 
that no producer has an incentive to offer a lower price, and buyers are 
free to buy all of any good they want at the going price. Thus, there may 
not be strong downward price pressure in a mature buyer‘s market. 
Kornai (1971, p.226) defined market in a more broad and comprehen-
sive manner, where the market is one of the system's complex decision 
processes and its operation constitutes a process overtime. Therefore, it 
is not only the price signal by which the sellers make their decision for 
production, but also is a complex information structure--the offers and 
orders of his clients. Following the argument, market condition in most 
of actual economic systems can be characterized by general 4pressure 
economy‘ or general ‘suction economy'f where buyer's market and seller's 
market prevail in turn. It should be noticed that the distinction refers 
to the situations when for the products accounting for the major part of 
social product ion there prevails general pressure (or suction) over the 
average of a longer per iod t ime. Therefore, the observations about market 
situations for individual products during short period of time cannot 
tell us general market conditions which affect individual economic 
agent's behavior pattern. Rather, general market conditions for an 
economy should be understood as a product of mutual reactions between 
resources endowments, Institutions, organizational forms, and control 
mechanisms of the system and the accustomed norms of behavior and 
characteristic responses of decision-makers. Furthermore, seller's market 
and buyer's market should not be regarded as necessary concomitants of 
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socialism and capitalism in a simple-minded manner, as Kornai (Kornai, 
1971, pp. 261-262) puts it "Suet ion or pressure do not follow from the 
«fact of social ism or capitalism； they arise from the comprehensive 
e//ect<s of a whole range of historical condit ions". Based on this 
framework, in order to analyze the impact of expanding market forces on 
the behavior of China's industrial enterprises, an essential procedure is 
to characterize the general market conditions since reform process began 
and the dynamic tendency of it. 
To provide empirical contents for this approach’ we should 
carefully examine the concepts used and the applicability of the 
available data in the Chinese industry for the purpose. In this 
conjunction, careful distinction should be made between buyer's market 
and seller's market as the symptoms of general market conditions with 
temporary excess supply and demand. In this context, Kornai (1980， ch.14) 
proposed to use the level of inventories held by users relative to those 
by producers as a key indicator of chronic shortage or a seller's market. 
And he suggested the ratio between the stock of inputs and the stock of 
output as the basic parameter determining the general market conditions 
of a country,Table 2-9 compares the ratios of stocks of inputs and 
outputs in China with those in other countries.(Zhang and Zhang, 1987, 
p. 51) According to the investigation, compared with other widely 
recognized seller's market economies, despite rapid growth rate and 
macroeconomic imbalance during 1983-85, the Chinese industry did not show 
7) The rationale for the use of the ratio as an indicator of market condition is 
that in the buyers' market, where buyers have a wide range of choices and 
sellers compete with each other for sales, the enterprise will find it easy to buy 
but hard to sell, and so the enterprise usually has a big stock of output as 
against a small stock of inputs, and the ratio is low. In the sellers' market, by 
analogy to the case of buyers，market there is a lower stock of output than of 
inputs, and the ratio would be high. 
33 
a strong hoarding tendency during the period. Although it shows that 
China's ratio of inventories of input and output is still distant from 
those of advanced market economies, the study (Zhang and Zhang, 1987) 
concludes that China's industrial enterprises have made extremely 
important progress in using market mechanism in recent years. 
Table 2-9 
The ratio of input inventories to output inventories； 
comparison between China and other countries 
Country Period Ratio 
Pressure economy： 
Austria 1972-1977 1.5 
Sweden 1968-1972 0.70-0.74 
USA 1960-1977 0.94-1.16 
Suction economy* 
USSR 1969-1977 9.2-12.3 
Poland 1975 10,3 
Hungary 1971-1980 7.26-8.52 
China 1983 4,6 
1984 4.5 
First half of 1985 3.8 
Source: Zhang and Zhang (1987, p.51) 
According to Byrd(1987a, p.244), interview information and 
quantitative data from a sample of 20 state owned industrial enterprises 
show that eight of them faced seller's market and ten enterprises faced 
buyer's market during the period 1982-1983. The result, however, failed 
to draw a distinction between shortages of individual commodities and an 
excess of aggregate demand over the supply of consumption goods as a 
whole, and could not tell us general market conditions for industrial 
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products in China which supposed to influence enterprise behavior. 
Therefore, we look at the problem from the perspectives of the market 
conditions in industrial consumer goods and industrial producer goods. 
MARKET CONDITIONS FOR CONSUMER GOODS： Since the late 1970s, in line 
with the policies to improve living standards of the people, consumer 
goods industry received more favorable allocation of resources in China. 
Moreover, its high profitability due to the price structure of the 
economy attracted large share of investment resources to expand product 
capacity in the industry. Sometimes, this resulted in over investment and 
duplicating in consumer goods industry. As a result’， rationing of 
consumer goods at the retail level has been largely eliminated as 
supplies became more plentiful. The anecdotal evidences of buyer‘s market 
in consumer goods are affluent since reform process began. Thus the 
retail consummer goods market is largely free of direct quantity 
allocation, and price controls also have been progessively relaxed. But, 
since various degree of price controls still exist make it difficult for 
price system to reflect quality and brand-name differences adequately, 
shortage and surplus can coexist for the same type of manufactured 
consumer goods with different quality and brand-name. This situation with 
strengthened authority of commercial units over selective purchase and 
increasing self-marketing ratio of products put considerable market 
pressure caused by intensive competition among producers on their 
managerial attitude. Under these conditions, industrial enterprises 
became to be more responsive to customer's needs, and price and non-price 
competition among them appear as common phenomenon. 
MARKET CONDITIONS FOR PRODUCER GOODS： Among producer goods, 
intermediate inputs such as machinary and electronics experienced similar 
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changes in their market conditions with consumer goods. But the 
transition from shortage to oversupply of such producer goods in China 
typically results from the reduction in demand caused by a abrupt cutback 
in government budgetary investment. This in turn causes decline in orders 
for capital goods from users with plan allocations and from the material 
allocation system. The impact of oversupply of some producer goods on 
their producers is felt even more quickly than in the case of consumer 
goods, and the magnitude of fluctuation in market conditions for them is 
generally larger than consumer goods. 
Nevertheless, market conditions for basic raw materials and some 
semifinished intermediate goods which have wide range of end-use is 
different from that of capital goods such as machinary and electronics. 
In this context, rather notable feature of the Chinese industrial 
enterprises is that usually they confront with different market 
conditions for thfeir outputs and inputs. A study based on the information 
from a sample of 20 state-owned industrial enterprises (Byrd, 1987a, 
pp. 251-253) shows that regardless whether they face buyer's market or 
seller's market for their products, the majority of the enterprises are 
facing a seller's market on the input side. Thus, a seller's market for 
output appears to be invariably associated with a seller's market for 
main inputs, but a shift to a buyer's market does not necessarily mean 
that a corresponding change will occur immediately on the input side. 
With the larger sample of 429 industrial enterprises, CESRRI (the Chinese 
Economic System Reform Research Institute) survey in 1985 also made 
similar findings, where a majority of enterprises sold their products in 
buyer's markets but were faced with seller's markets for their inputs. 
Thus, such a market condition was called as an ‘asymmetrical market' in 
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the analysis (Zhang and Zhang, 1987’ p.50). High ratio of stock of input 
to that of output in the Chinese industry compared with those in advanced 
market economies as shown in Table 2-9 may be explained partly by the 
'asymmetrical‘ market conditions for inputs and outputs. 
Causes for the lack of direct relationship between a buyer's market 
for outputs and inputs market conditions are diverse and intricately 
related. The most important ones are： First, the difference in adjustment 
ability among industrial sectors to changing economic environment. Due to 
the difference in initial structure of product capacity and underde-
velopment of funds market, there exist large differences in supply 
elasticity and duration period of investment in different industrial 
sectors. With other administrative obstacles in purchasing inputs through 
customary administrative channels, these make it slow for some industries 
to reflect changes in market conditions in their output structure and 
create various types of lags. Second, the uneven application of reform in 
different sectors of the Chinese industry and In enterprises under 
different ownership. Dividing the products of the enterprises into 
consumer goods, investment goods, intermediate goods, and basic raw 
materials and semifinished materials, CESRRI survey shows (Zhang and 
Zhang, 1987, pp.54-56) that planned control is the tightest for 
production and marketing of raw materials and semifinished products. The 
uneven application of reform means that the stimulation and pressure on 
enterprise for cost reduction are rather weak In thoses industries and 
they are sluggish in the adjustment for market conditions. Chronic 
seller's market for inputs also is due to the multiple uses many of them 
have as planning in China is conducted in highly aggregated manner. 
Thus, if there is heavy demand by some users of an input, they will take 
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up any slack caused by other users reducing their orders, thus preserving 
shortage for everyone, this in turn intensifies the governments' control 
by planning. Large difference in quality and specification among products 
also may be conducive to the shortage of adequate inputs despite overall 
excess supply in quantity terms. 
Although the prevalence of seller's market in the supply of raw 
materials and semifinished goods made the Chinese industrial enterprises 
somewhat passive in cost reduction and dampened the responsiveness of 
enterprises to the changes in input markets, it does not,seem to have a 
fundamental impact on enterprise response to a buyer's market of output. 
Thus’ as compared with a traditional overall seller's market economy, 
increasing market pressure on output market stimulates the enterprise's 
technical change, compels supply to conform to demand, and intensifies 
competition among producers. 
The disscussiori in the section has been proceeded without 
reference to the change in price adjustment mechanism in China. But 
undoubtedly, the possibility of existence of operating markets in the 
Chinese economy crucially depends on the characteristics of its price 
adjustment mechanism, and the next section will be devoted to the issues 
related to it. 
2-3 Price adjustment mechanism in the Chinese industry 
Reforms in the price system 
Since the growth and success of market-oriented reform hinged 
greately on the presence or absence of administrative price controls, 
there have been a number of pricing reforms aimed at encouragement and 
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accommodation of increasing market transactions. 
Reform in the price system first took the form of selective 
adjustment, then progressive relaxation of administrative controls on 
prices and even decontrol have followed. At the initial stage of price 
reform, effort was concentrated on the adjustment of relative prices 
according to the profit ratios of relevant industries and demand 
conditions for their products. Since 1979, the government made upward 
adjustment of prices of energy, raw materials and semifinished products 
and transportation cost first, where relatively lower prices prevailed 
throughout the pre-reform period. Then, as the major objective of reform 
in the price system was to allow flexibility in the system to adjust to 
the market conditions, decontrol of prices for minor commodities that 
were individually unimportant in affecting living standards were 
followed.8) Moreover, in October 1986，the prices of the entire supply of 
a number of important consumer durables such as bicycles, black and white 
TV sets, cassette tape recorders, washing machines, sewing machines, 
refrigerators, electric fans, and somes textile products were 
decontrolled, 
Progressive price reform inevitably introduced several innovative 
categories of pricing method into the Chinese price system, which added 
more flexibility in the system. They include floating prices, negotiated 
prices, and market determined prices. For the goods whose prices are 
allowed to float, initially institutions of the government in charge 
fixed their base prices and upper limit or lower limit of float allowed. 
After the experimental stage, the decision of the State Council "On 
8) In September 1982 and in September 1983, prices of 180 items and 350 items 
of minor consumer goods were decontrolled in turn, again in October 1984，all 
the prices of minor consumer goods were decontrolled. 
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Further Expansion of Decision-Making Power on the Part of State-Run 
Industrial Enterprises" in May 1984 stipulated that the prices of goods 
produced in the state plan system would be fixed by the state and the 
prices of the goods produced outside the state plan system could be 
manipulated within a range up to 20 percent higher or lower than state 
prices. In Feburary 1985, the State Price Bureau and the State Material 
Bureau jointly cancelled the 20 percent limit. At the same time, the 
‘two-track price system' was formally in place by completely freeing the 
market portion of materials for production from restriction on pricing.9) 
Since the end of 1983， it also was allowed to adjust the prices of higher 
quality products in upward direction within the limit of 5-20 percent 
compared to the same product otherwise. 
Negotiated price has the root in the prereform period, but it has 
proliferated since the late 1970s. Though the prices nominally are 
determined by direct, voluntary negotiations between buyers and sellers 
in consideration of supply and demand conditions and mtitual benefit, they 
are vulnerable to administrative pressure and intervention from local 
government. Hence, in practice, negotiated prices can be little different 
from prices set and controlled by local governfflents at one extreme, and 
they also may be not so different from genuine market price at the other 
extreme. As economic reform proceeds, there may have been some movement 
from the former extreme towards the latter extreme throughout the 1980s, 
Market price is less ambiguous than negotiated price in its characteris-
9) Formally, the two-track price system involves enterprises facing a vector of 
output plan targets, targets for compulsory procurement of output and input 
allocations, with input purchases, production, and output sales above these target 
levels occurring through the market at flexible prices. But, because of the 
pervasive interference of various level of governments for price determination 
and existence of subsidization schemes, actually two-track system is rather 
general phenomenon in China's market mechanism. 
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tics. Rapid growth of nonstate sector since the end of 1970s has helped 
to generate and nourish markets in the Chinese industry, and it also made 
the market portion of the two-track price system to assume increasingly 
important role in the resource allocation. 
The relevant Chinese literature usually categorize the way prices 
are determined into three groups according to the extent of government's 
interference. The prices of commodities under the category of state fixed 
price (國家定價）applied to some basic commodities and raw materials 
presumed to be important for the national economy. The prices pertaining 
to the category are determined by the relevant institutions of county or 
upper level of governments according to the state regulations about 
pricing authority. State guidance price (國家指導價）indicates that 
prices of goods under this category are subject to the control of 
relevant institutions of county or upper level of governments according 
to the regulations of state about pricing authority. The institutions in 
charge usually manipulate the prices through the decisions about base 
prices and floating range around them, allowable price differential due 
to quality difference， profit rate, and upper and lower limits of prices. 
In some cases the state guidance price may take the form of state fixed 
price, and in other cases, they may also be guided by the form of 
floating price, or market price. Nevertheless, in the later years, due to 
the general decontrol of prices of industrial producer goods produced and 
sold outside plan in late 1984 and early 1985, the flexibility of prices 
in this category and enterprises‘ influence in their determination 
enhanced rapidly. The pricing practice for the commodities under this 
category, thus, is more complicated compared with those under other 
categories. For the commodities pertaining to the category of market 
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adjusted price (市場調節價）,the prices are determined by producers or 
commercial institutions in charge according to the market conditions. 
The unreformed aspects of the price system 
Measures of price decontrol via innovative pricing practices and 
decentralization of the authority for price control in China 
substantially enhanced the economy's ability for adjustment to changing 
market conditions through flexible prices. In this respect, the reactions 
of the governments at various levels in charge of price control and those 
of enterprises to changes in prices as well as the flexibility of prices 
are vital to the effectiveness of the market mechanism in China. However, 
in spite of the Chinese government's enormous effort to reform China's 
price system still defective incentive system and behavioral inertia 
inherited from prereform period for both enterprise and local government 
are interwoven to make the latter to retain substantial informal price 
controls. 
The willingness of the local govern®ents to impose price control 
for goods whose prices have been officially decontrolled by the central 
government is mainly the consequence of their fear of economic 
disturbances and of negative impact on government revenue which might be 
caused by excessive price fluctuation. As mentioned ealier, there are 
deep-rooted fear of macroeconomic instability and particularly that of 
inflation in China. Therefore, local governments want to intervene in 
market pricing to avoid excessive fluctuation in the short-run and to 
smooth the price adjustment process. Furthermore, in China, large part of 
market prices are still list prices rather than the result of bidding up 
process, therefore sudden changes in the prices might be suspected as 
10) For the relative importance of each category of pricing, see section 2 of the 
chapter. 
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profiteering behavior of relevant enterprises or commercial institutions. 
Hence, there may be some voluntary intention of enterprise to avoid sharp 
increase in the price of its product, which also would contribute to 
their rigidities. 
More direct incentive for local governments to engage in price 
control is to hold down input costs to local enterprises, whose profit 
tax payments form an important part of local budget revenues. Similarly, 
local authorities have the incentive to hold down prices of investment 
goods for local projects financed through the local government budget, 
since this increases the amount of actual investment that can be financed 
with a. given nominal amount of budgetary resources. Related issue is that 
with price decontrol and increasing share of the out-of-plan economy the 
value of money circulating outside of the planned economy might be 
devalued actually. Since such a circumstance is not considered in the 
budgetary investment, enterprises often have incentives for selling their 
products at below market prices in return to the right to access to lower 
priced investment goods, which in turn might satisfy investment demand of 
enterprises with limited budget. Fundamentally, as long as there remains 
the practice of compartmentalization in enterprise finance and in control 
over nominal expenditures on particular items, particularly those 
involving workers benefits, the incentive for enterprise to rely on 
barter-like exchange will probably survive,出 In addition, as mentioned 
earlier, markets for main inputs in the Chinese industry are usually 
characterized as seller's market. Thus, enterprises cannot be so active 
in cost reduction behavior and sometimes there exist unnecessarily large 
11) This is because compartmentalized enterprise finance and accounting mean that 
profits from sales cannot automatically be transferred to whatever use the 
enterprise wishes. 
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stocks of inventories, which have negative impact on flexible price 
adjustment. 
Segmentation of markets as a result of local government administra-
tive intervention and local protectionism is another main obstacle to the 
flexible price adjustment to market conditions in general. To determine 
the extent of market segmentation in the Chinese industry, whether it is 
due to administrative barriers or natural barriers such as high 
transportation costs, is out of the scope of this study. But, repeated 
central government's directives condemning and prohibiting protectionism 
by regional and local authorities suggest that indeed this is a problem. 
This problem undoubtedly, impairs market functioning through price 
adjustments to some extent. Administrative barriers to the competitors 
from outside of a region will adversely affect the supply elasticity for 
goods in shortage and they also impose same difficulties for disposal of 
goods in excess supply. In the case, the ability of price adjustment for 
balancing demand and supply will be impaired to a considerable extent. 
Market segmentation also hinders the emergence of well integrated market 
in China based on the comparative advantages of regions. This 
considerably reduces the extent of price competition among enterprises in 
different regions and contributes to the coexistence of products with 
enormous gaps in quality, specification, and used technology. 
Notwithstanding all the negative aspects of the Chinese economy 
hindering the smooth operation of price adjustment mechanism, the extent 
to which they can cause prices to deviate greatly from underlying 
equilibrium levels is severely limited. Given financial and material 
incentives for enterprises, the larger the gap between locally controlled 
prices and their equilibrium levels, the greater the incentives for 
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producers to try to get around them. Rapid expansion of the outside state 
plan sector in the Chinese industry and above-plan transactions for their 
inputs and outputs which largely depend on markets also provided strong 
incentives and opportunities for both enterprises and governments to 
divert commodity flows from plan to market channels. Generally, such 
incentives are greater than the adverse impacts due to unreformed aspects 
of the economy in relation with the price adjustment mechanism. Thus, 
market forces in the Chinese industry considerably weakened the 
incentives for barter-like transactions between enterprises and price 
discrimination due to regional protectionism. 
The existence of market prices for industrial products 
Our major concern in the section is about the capability of China's 
evolving market pricing system for adjustment to changing market 
conditions. Thus, it is important for the analysis to tackle the price 
flexibility under China's partly decontrolled price system which still 
subject to the influences of various considerations of enterprises and 
local governments other than demand and supply conditions of relevant 
commodities. Fragmentary information about market prices for industrial 
products confirms the view that market prices exist and are widely used 
for reference and transactions in China. And the market prices of some 
important materials can be a multiple of the allocation prices set by the 
state. For example, the state fixed ex-factory price of No,6.5 steel wire 
was 610 Yuen per ton, but its market price in 1985 reached 1500 to 2000 
Yuen per ton. The price of coal under the state plan was 27 Yuen per ton 
while in the free market it was sold at 100 Yuen per ton. (Wu and Zhao, 
1987, p.313) And there were also great price differences in different 
regions and at different times. 
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In China, as a consequence of progressive price decontrol and 
expanding market, it is widely observed that market prices which in 
general differ considerably from official state prices are indeed in 
operation. Table 2-11 indicates that for consumer goods there also exist 
substantial differences among state prices, state guidance prices, and 
market adjusted prices for retail sales of some commodities. Though the 
Table 2-10 
Different types of pricing in retail sales (RMB Yuan)a 
State State guidance Market 
Item Unit price price price 
Towel piece 1.73 1.56 1.68 
Blended knitting wool kg 48.73 52.64 57.75 
Tooth paste tube 0.71 0.72 1.11 
Soap piece 0,74 0.71 1.02 
Detergent 500g 1.58 1.54 2.04 
Toilet paper roll 0„48 0,49 0.70 
Safety match 10 boxes 0.47 0.52 0.68 
Bulb piece 0.51 0.54 0.52 
Bicycle set 236.75 256,77 262.48 
Washing machine set 507.50 504.65 476.87 
Watch piece 50.00 48.08 53.48 
Refrigerator set 2255.00 1878.77 2283.67 
Colour TV receiver set 2162.73 2259.00 3098.33 
Black-white TV receiver set 478.00 511.56 517.64 
Source: Zhongguo Wujia Nianjian 1989 (pp.422-424) 
a National average in the end of 1988. 
interpretation of the price movements for different goods is ambiguous 
sometimes, as shown in Table 2-11, it also has been observed that there 
were wide price fluctuations for producer goods even in the short period 
of time as market transactions are allowed. All these data show that 
there is no evidence of strict price controls imposed on market 
operation. The existence of what appear to be genuine market prices for 
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Chinese industrial products provides strong evidence that there are 
indeed functioning markets at which these goods are traded on a voluntary 
basis. In sum, price decontrol in China could successfully digest upward 
pressure on prices through the operation of two-track price system and 
downward pressure by means of general price reduction. And available 
Table 2-11 
Market prices for major industrial producer goods 1988-89 
Items: Steel Steel Pig Cement Soda Trucks Coal Timber 
Wire Plate Iron Ash (China fir) 
Specifi- 6.5 mm over grade No.425 grade Dongfeng bitumi- 4-5 8 m 
cations: 4 mm 2 1 EQ-140 nus 14-i8 cm 
Unit : ton ton ton ton ton car ton m3 
Month Market prices (RMB Yuan) 
Jan/88 1404 1483 496 147 704 37754 102 584 
Feb 1404 1483 510 145 687 38055 101 700 
Mar 1429 1488 499 146 736 39552 99 691 
Apr 1409 1490 490 131 744 39321 91 678 
May 1437 1484 525 130 773 38323 87 662 
Jun 1450 1522 531 135 757 39569 105 697 
Jul 1461 1562 550 142 993 41645 98 809 
Aug 1564 1655 571 159 826 41560 133 846 
Sep 1629 1810 641 170 970 42637 132 778 
Oct 1796 2275 738 178 975 41148 143 716 
Nov 1709 1997 748 185 1262 47635 125 1424 
Dec 1680 1804 752 193 1192 46538 146 937 
Jan/89 2096 2483 678 218 1325 50825 202 1061 
Feb 2001 2402 639 251 1530 48173 205 1113 
Mar 1925 3300 680 224 1525 47625 147 1100 
Apr 1665 3250 650 238 1558 48875 153 1100 
May 1665 1740 650 229 1545 46000 155 1200 
Jun 1825 1740 650 219 1575 49375 153 1165 
Jul 2015 3200 650 211 1555 50750 151 1145 
Aug 2015 2400 650 210 1608 50000 160 1140 
Sep 2100 3100 650 202 1573 50125 158 1095 
Oct 1980 2030 835 205 1518 49625 160 1095 
Nov 1948 2030 835 200 1473 48358 100 1075 
Dec 1948 1970 815 191 1480 48863 167 1050 
Source: Zhongguo Wujia Nianiian (1989; pp.418-419, 1990; pp.410-411) 
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data largely confirms that there exists market prices very similar to 
genuine market equilibrium prices in their role.13 
But as described above, some peculiar features of the Chinese 
economy, largely inherited from prereform period, hinder the improved 
pricing system in China from soly bearing all the burden of adjustment to 
its market conditions. Therefore, in addition to a certain degree of 
price competition, Chinese industrial enterprises are also engaged in 
diverse activities for non-price competition to overcome the pressure 
they became to feel as the market-oriented economic reform in the country 
proceeds. The next section deals with the non-price response of the 
Chinese enterprises to expanding market forces in the economy. 
2-4 The changing behavioral pattern of the industrial enterprise 
The government's attitude towards different market conditions 
From the above discussion about general market conditions in the 
Chinese industry, it is obvious that market mechanism exerts a 
considerable pressure on the enterprise attitude as economic reform 
proceeds. However, given the important role assumed by the government and 
its power in the Chinese economy, the direction of change in enterprise 
behavior as the response to market forces and its stability largely 
depend on the government's attitude towards changing market conditions in 
addition to the general market conditions. 
12) From theoretical stands, Byrd (1989) makes use of a general equilibrium model 
with several restrictive assumptions to prove the existence of a meaningful 
short-run equilibrium solution and its Pareto optimality in a simple economy 
characterized with the two-track price system and with some stylized facts in 
the Chinese economy. As correctly pointed out by him, although the static 
results mean less in a situation of rapid structural and institutional change, they 
do demonstrate the irrelevance of planning in short-term resource allocation in 
the sense that no agents are constrained by plan targets under current 
institutional arrangement in the Chinese economy. 
48 
As mentioned earlier, in the prereform period, the Chinese 
government's usual response to the imbalance in the supply of industrial 
products was recentralization of the authority for control over materials 
supply. But, market-oriented economic reform brought about different 
response pattern of the government to changing market conditions. Instead 
of the decentralization and recentralization of administrative authority 
about economic affairs, economic means of control aimed for affecting 
decision-making process of enterprise over production and investment, 
pricing, transactions, and other aspects of market operation increasingly 
became to assume the role of adjustment. 
Notable feature of the government's response during reform period 
has been the asymmetry of its attitude towards seller's market and 
buyer's market, and it shows sharp departure from the prereform practice 
of China's economic policy. In the prereform period, restoration of 
overall balance in material supply system and resulting development of 
inventory and slack capacity made the government attempted to 
decentralize its material control system in line with its general 
economic development strategy. However, the basic adjustment mechanism 
used to be a cyclical movement of the authority for the control over 
materials between central government and local government, or between 
higher level and lower level of governments. In the process, since the 
basic institutional characteristics were intact, development of temporary 
excess supply or excess demand could not affect behavioral patterns of 
enterprises fundamentally. 
Given the feature of China's economic reform process that it has 
been accelerated by favorable result of experimental reform polices, 
decentralization of decision-making authority to enterprises crucially 
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depends on the impact of previous reform measures on the relevant market 
conditions. In the case of consumer goods, the emerging buyer's market 
made the government planning and distribution systems essentially to 
abdicate the responsibility for the procurement of enterprise output, 
forcing producers to fend for themselves and to sell their own products. 
In this context, reforms in the incentive system for commercial 
institutions which made them more profit-oriented, more concerned about 
inventories, and more independent in their decision-making reinforced 
such tendency and made producers to feel market pressure more sharply. 
For producers goods’ the impact of excess supply on market can be 
more direct and immediate, since large part of transactions take place 
directly between producers and users, without passing through commercial 
institutions. Since demand for producer goods is highly sensitive to the 
Level of investment, fluctuation in budget-financed investment brought 
about rapid transition in market conditions. Especially, it was the case 
for investment goods and intermediate goods such as ordinary types of 
machinery and equipment. In this case’ change in market conditions can be 
attributed to the abrupt eurtailment of budget-financed investment rather 
than to the existence of general buyer‘s market where adequate capacity 
slack and inventories are normal. Although the emergence of excess supply 
in producer goods market, thus, does not necessarily imply the existence 
of a stable buyer's market, it usually serves as the basis for successive 
decentralization of decision-making authority to enterprise level by the 
government as it is one of the main objectives of reform process. 
On the contrary, faced with seller's market, whether for consumer 
goods or producer goods, the Chinese government's response has been more 
passive compared with its active role in decentralization of the 
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decision-making authority in case of the emergence of buyer's market. For 
example, in the prereform period, the government usually attempted to 
avoid instituting price increases as long as possible. But since the late 
70s’ in addition to frequent upward adjustments of the prices thought to 
be fixed at inadequately low level, decontrol of minor consumer goods 
prices, decentralization of the authority for price control, expansion of 
free market prices, and especially the official allowance of two-track 
price system for producer goods have considerably alleviated the pressure 
of excess demand through price increase. The government‘s practice of 
sharp cutting back of budget-financed investment in case of severe 
pressure of excess demand for basic raw materials and investment goods 
also shows rather sharp departure from the policy in the prereform 
period, which heavily depended on the recentralization of the authority 
for control over materials and investment through administrative 
directives. 
All the facts indicate that even in case of serious shortage in the 
supply system of overall economy in China, there has been no complete 
reversal of the direction of changes in its economic policy as often 
experienced in the pre-reform period. The government slowed down the 
phase of reform or did not move forward rather than retracing its steps 
against economic reform, and relied on economic levers for fine-tuning 
but not on extreme measures of administrative recentralization. Such 
asymmetric response of the government to the development of buyer's 
market and seller's market in the economy fostered stable patterns of 
behavior of Chinese industrial enterprises under competitive pressure 
from expanding market forces set the stage for price and non-price 
competition among Chinese industrial enterprises. 
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The response of industrial enterprise to market forces 
Evidences developed in the earlier sections indicate that genuine 
market like mechanism is indeed operating in the Chinese industry. 
However, given the unique features of the Chinese economy in its 
transitional period, still strong incentives for local authorities' 
informal price control and the legacies of economic policies in prereform 
period remain in it. Therefore, its embryonic markets are still far from 
the perfection as seen by neoclassical economic theory which emphasizes 
price competition and equilibration of demand and supply through price 
adjustment. But perfect competition is not a prerequisite for realizing 
the potential advantages of the market mechanism. From the dynamic 
perspective, through competitive pressure market forces can affect 
enterprise behavior and stimulate improved performance in many different 
ways such as product differentiation and the development and diffusion of 
technological innovations even without its perfection in the neoclassical 
sense. 
In addition to the ‘passive, response of the government to the 
development of seller's market, general market condition which was 
basically free from continuous 4 suction' and shortage due to increasing 
flexibility of prices and expanding market transactions in the Chinese 
economy imposed considerable burden of adjustment to competitive pressure 
on enterprises themselves. Thus, they have fostered some behavioral 
patterns different from those of enterprises in a centrally planned 
economy. During the reform period* moreover, the Chinese consumers became 
increasingly discriminating on the basis of quality, color, styling, and 
other similar attributes rather than simply purchasing whatever is 
available, or even what is cheapest. Hence, except for a few of the best 
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national brands and for imports, domestic production of large part of 
ordinary, low-quality brands of consumer goods in China now faces a 
buyers’ market. With the exception of some basic raw materials and 
semifinished goods, the situation is similar for intermediate goods such 
as ordinary machinary and electronic products, since the Chinese 
producers increasingly became selective in the purchase of intermediate 
goods in order to produce competitive products in the market. Such 
changes in demand structure as a result of comprehensive reform policy 
together with increased enterprise autonomy over important decision-
making on production, marketing, and purchase of inputs,, prompted non-
price competition among the Chinese industrial enterprises. 
According to a survey conducted in 1985 by the CESRRI which covered 
429 enterprises in 27 cities, as early as in 1984， 51 percent of 
enterprises studied had already gained varying degrees of autonomy. And 
77 percent of them had to keep the market situation in mind when mapping 
out their production plan, and 90.4 percent of them, at least to a 
certain degree, purchased their needed raw and semifinished materials: 
from the markets. Enterprises that had the above-plan products to sell on 
the markets on their own made up 97 percent of the total. (Zhang and 
Zhang, 1987, p.48) This meant that expanding markets in the Chinese 
economy combined with the increasing decision-making power of enterprises 
and commercial organizations made the enterprises adapt themselves to the 
market conditions. 
More concrete evidence of the impact of market forces on enterprise 
managerial attitude can be found in the change of objectives of 
enterprises managers and constraints binding operation of managerial 
activities. Changes in managerial attitudes are provided by the CESRRI 
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survey in 1985 of 1386 managerial personnel in industrial enterprises, 
which asked them to rank what they perceived as the most important 
constraints affecting their decision-making. As shown in Table 2-12, the 
relative priority of plan fulfillment, which usually assumed as major 
objective of socialist firms, was rather weakened. State plan targets as 
the main constraint only fourth in the importance among eight possible 
Table 2-12 
Constraints to managerial desion-making 
Constraints Cumulative frequency(%) Series order 
Pressure from the market 71.0 1 
Prospects of enterprise 65.4 2 
Demand of the workers 48. 9 3 
Quota of the state production plan 36.5 4 
Influence of what neighboring 33.2 5 
enterprises do 
Support or not of colleagues 24.1 6 
Personal risk 12.9 7 
Inadequate funds 3.8 8 
Source: Yang, Lin, Wang, and Wu (1987, pp.82-83) 
choices after the pressure of market, the enterprise's own potentialf and 
worker's demand. This result indicates that as the role of market 
expanded, more burden of selling their products was put on enterprises 
themselves, so that the situation was sharply contrasted to that in 
traditional centrally planned economies where persistent excess demand 
for industrial products prevails. 
It is generally accepted that the main components of non-price 
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competition are： product characteristics, design； product quality； sales 
and promotional activities such as advertising and post-sale service and 
warranty； technological efforts in production； location, convenience, and 
availability. These features inevitably bring about product differentia-
tion rather than unidrectional improvement in the technological level of 
products or in quality, and they are not independent of one another! 
Given diversified economic conditions and technological gap among 
enterprises and regions in China, the potential for product differentia-
tion due to improvement in product quality and used technology for 
production, and producer's efforts to provide products with exact 
specifications as a result of increased pressure from competition would 
be even greater.15 
As a widespread practice in industrial organization studies, 
advertising-intensity is used as the proxy for product differentiation 
due to the non-price aspects of competitive behavior (for example, Caves 
and Khalizadeh-Shirasi, 1977， Porter, 1976). Following the approach, we 
13) Usually economic literature identifies three conceptually distinct forms of 
product differentiation as follows: Horizontal differentiation refers to 
differentiation by attribute or characteristics mix in the Lancaster (1966) sense 
that within a given group of products, they share certain core characteristics. 
The manner in which these core characteristics are combined determines the 
product's specification and product differentiation can be identified by the 
presence of a variety of specifications in a particular group. Vertical 
differentiation refers to differences in the absolute amounts of core 
characteristics contained in different products. As Lancaster (1979，p.28) notes 
we can regard vertical differentiation as being consistent with differences in 
quality. Thus, whereas horizontal differentiation refers to the availability of 
alternative specifications of a product in a given quality grade, vertical 
differentiation refers to the availability of alternative quality grade. 
Technological differentiation occurs when one or more of the core characteristics 
of the group is/are technically altered. Thus, technological differentiation is 
associated with the introduction of certain characteristics or attributes which 
results in new, technically improved products which are considered superior to 
existing products by all consumers, in all quality grades. Conceptually all these 
three are distinct, although in practice the clear distinction may be vertually 
impossible, where differentiation for individual products takes the mixed form of 
them. 
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can adopt the share of sales costs") of total production costs as a rough 
indicator which shows the changing economic environment in the Chinese 
industry and the character of resulting non-price competitive responses 
of industrial enterprises. Table 2-13 shows substantial increase in the 
sales cost share of total production costs in the Chinese manufacturing 
Table 2-13 
Sales costs as percentage of total production costs 
Distinction 1980 1985 
Total independent 0.31 1.04 
accounting enterprises 
State-owned enterprises 0.20 0.82 
Collective-owned enterprises 0.78 1.65 
Foreign investment enterprises 0.27 2.28 
Light industry 0.36 1.16 
Heavy industry 0.27 0.94 
Raw material industry 0.31 0.74 
Processing industry 0.19 1.05 
Source: Computed from PRC 1985 Industrial Census Data, vol.5, 
pp.596-597，pp.612-613. 
sector during the period 1980-1985, It also indicates relatively high 
share of sales costs for enterprises of other form of ownership than 
state-owned enterprises and for production units in processing industry 
than those for raw material or semifinished products. Comparison between 
the enterprises included in the state budgetary plan and those not 
subject to state budgetary plan, the share of the former is lower than 
that of the latter. They are largely consistent with our inference for 
14) Sales costs indicate the costs accrued to a production unit for sales of their 
products including expenses for packing, advertisement, and exhibition etc.. 
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enterprise response to market conditions on the basis of the extent of 
reform progress in differrent sectors and aspects of the economy. 
For the Chinese industrial enterprises, the extent and the 
character of their attempt to meet changing demand structure and their 
responses to market pressure mainly depend on their technological 
adaptability, product characteristics and factor mobility. 
Product differentiation, regardless whether it is horizontal, 
vertical, or technological, is carried out by innovation or imitation or 
by the combination of them. However, innovation does not fall uniformly 
on all enterprises, but is largely the result of consciously directed 
innovation effort as may be reflected in research and development (R&D) 
expenditure within firms and industries. Furthermore, since technological 
change is not necessarily or mostly disembodied, many other factors will 
influence the speed at which, and the extent to which, innovation is 
incorporated into production, notably the rate of investment. Thus, time 
and costs are involved in innovation and imitation of advanced industrial 
technology.1S) The ability to imitate an innovation may also depend on the 
stock of R&D the imitator is having and on the gap between the existing 
fixed capital and that needed by differentiated products. Technology 
needed for product differentiation is not a good to be produced in a 
research institute and then simply handed over to factories for use. 
Assimilation and application of a new technology need considerable effort 
for adaptation on the part of the user. As far as economic incentives due 
to the reform measures are working in the Chinese economy, given 
15) Generally the lag in imitation of a new product or process depends on the time 
necessary to start production and on how large a learning gap is.(Vernon, 1966) 
The literature on the timing of innovation suggests that market structure will 
also be important in determining the speed of imitation. (Kamien and Schwartz, 
1982) 
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individual enterprise's economic and technological conditions, the costs 
and time involved in the innovation and imitation are one of major 
determinants of the extent of product differentiation. 
As an related issue, diffusion is perhaps the weakest aspect of 
China's technology system. Because of the unreformed aspects of Chinese 
industry such as financial compartmentalism and regionalism, innovations 
are difficult to be diffused horizontally. Thus, with limitations in 
technology diffusion mechanism, with generally obsolete production 
technology and fixed capital, and with enormous technological gap between 
enterprises, the adaptability to advanced technical method in its 
production is one of important factors affecting an enterprise's 
non-price responses to market forces in China.10 
The product characteristics of a products category also has 
intimate relationship with general market conditions and, thus, with 
their planned proportions in allocation and enterprise response. 
Generally, basic raw materials or semifinished products for industrial 
products (such as cement, timber aad large part of steel) and investment 
goods often face seller's market, and tend to be produced with continuous 
process technology due to their homogeneity for end-use. For such 
products, aside from the lack of competitive pressure from market, 
difficulties in change of product mix due to the fixity of the capital 
stock and limitations in the scope for new product development hinders 
vigorous enterprise response to changing market conditions. 
Another important component which affects an enterprise's non-price 
response to market forces is the degree of ease with which product mix 
can be altered in the industry level or in the firm level. The easiness 
16) For the systematic discussion about technological aspects in the Chinese 
industry, see Tidrick (1986), 
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depends on the factor mobility between industries and the ability of a 
firm to rearrange factors for production. We note the fact that despite 
the constrained factor mobility in the Chinese industry, there also are 
substantial slacks for enterprises to adjust their product mix or expand 
product capacity to respond to the market conditions.(see chapter 6) The 
easiness is also determined by technical constraints on products mix. 
In sum, obtainable evidences show that emerging market forces in 
China also enhanced non-price competition among enterprises. In the 
process, product differentiation in the horizontal, vertical and 
technological aspects has been stimulated and various kinds of commercial 
activities of producers also have been promoted. 
2-5 Concluding remark 
Given the economic reality in China and policy objectives, 
market-oriented reform since 1979 was an imperative for the government 
rather than a choice among possible options, This feature made the reform 
process aimed at the expansion of markets relatively stable. 
Investigation of the chapter reveals sharp reduction of the share of 
central planning in the resource allocation in the Chinese industry 
during the reform period. At the same time, there has been substantial 
increase market share lo supply, production, and sales of consumer goods 
and producer goods. Although seller's market still seems to prevail in 
the supply of some raw materials and semifinished goods, general market 
conditions for consumer goods and producer goods are characterized with 
the features which can be seen in a buyer‘s market. In addition, China 
adopted some innovative pricing mechanism for the decontrol of rigid 
state fixed prices in line with the market-oriented reform. As a result, 
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even in the short period of time, substantial flexibility of prices of 
industrial products was observed. This indicates the existence of what 
appear to be genuine market prices in the Chinese industry. The 
government's stable attitude in favour of the expansion of market 
mechanism has been conducive to foster the competitive behavior of the 
Chinese industrial enterprise. As a result, the Chinese industrial 
enterprises became more sensitive to the change in relative prices and to 
engage in variety of non-price comptitions. Among others, products 
differentiation is the most common response of them to the competitive 
pressure from the expanding markets. Combined with ,foreign trade 
decentralization which will be dealt with in the next chapter, the 
changes in the Chinese industry set the stage for the new role of foreign 
trade in the economy. 
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Chapter 3 
FOREIGN TRADE DECENTRALIZATION IN CHINA 
Historically, due to the country's diversified resource endowments, 
huge size in terms of area, population, and domestic commerce, foreign 
trade in China has remained small relative to the economic activities in 
its whole economy. Furthermore, for at least two decades after the 
estabilishment of the PRC, international events happened surrounding it 
and internal economic development strategy it had adopted under 
ideological influence of its leadership hampered the expansion of 
external trade. 
As one of central elements of its overall strategy to improve 
allocative efficiency and promote the modernization and growth of the 
economy, the Chinese government introduced the ‘open-door‘ policy in 
early 1979， and it was one of the earliest and most wide-ranging 
components of the reform process. Since then, rapidly increasing exports 
of raw materials and manufactured goods, increased earnings from tourism 
and other services, and the use of foreign direct investment and capital 
inflows have permitted a dramatic increase of imports of capital goods, 
machinery, technology and materials in need. 
This was clearly a major factor in the dramatic improvement in the 
efficiency of the Chinese economy. Therefore, reform of the trade system 
can be seen as one of the aspects of ongoing enterprise reforms in the 
sense that efficient use of the foreign trade in conjunction with 
domestic production technology will lead to a better use of available 
resources than following an autarkic development. Foreign trade became to 
be regarded as an integral part of enterprise decision-making on 
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production and investment according to the market signals , not just as a 
separate sector or activity as in the past. 
In the process of the reform of foreign trade system, China has 
found its centrally managed trade system too rigid and inefficient. The 
Foreign Trade Corporations (FTCs) neither could adjust rapidly to the 
changes in the world market conditions, nor could follow closely the 
changes in technical characteristics of many products for exports 
produced in the different part of such a big country and those of imports 
requried by so many different agencies and enterprises. The system also 
hampered significantly the exploitation of opportunities for export which 
was desperately needed for import of goods and technologies dictated by 
the foreign trade plan. Since 1979, China has introduced various 
organizational reforms, and decentralized foreign trade management 
horizontly and vertically, i.e. decentralized the authority for foreign 
trade decision-making to the ministries and localities in charge of the 
relevant products. In addition to the establishment of new agencies at 
various administrative levels, part of enterprises were given the right 
to conduct external trade. On the other hand, as market-oriented reform 
proceeds in the other area of the economy, the market forces became to 
exert considerable influences in the deterfflination of trends and patterns 
of foreign trade in China. 
This chapter starts with brief review of the contents of the 
organizational reforms in China's foreign trade system. In section 2, 
focus will be placed on the change of foreign trade planning system in 
China, and in turn foreign trade pricing practices will be described in 
section 3. Section 4 will be devoted to identifying the revised role of 
foreign trade in the Chinese industry in relation with its market-
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oriented reform relying on a brief description of the trends and patterns 
of the economy's external trade. Finally’ we derive some conclusions for 
the analyis of the rest of the dissertation. 
3-1 Organizational reforms in China's foreign trade system 
Shortly after the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese government 
built up a comprehensive set of institutions to manage foreign trade. 
China moved from a strict licensing system to a state trading system 
after its agricultural sector and industrial sector had been collecti-
vized and nationalized. After 1956, foreign trade was a s^ tate monopoly, 
with no major organizational changes up to 1978. Thus, before the recent 
movement towards decentralization of foreign trade, China had a 
centralized foreign trade system similar to that of traditional Soviet 
foreign trade (see Appendix B). 
As economic reforms in China pursue tht economy's modernization and 
growth via improvement of allocative efficiency, introduction of modern 
technology and international division of labour through foreign trade 
became to be recognized by the Chinese leadership as a major means to 
achieve it. Since 1979, therefore, China has introduced fundamental 
institutional reforms to decentralize foreign trade management in line 
with the objectives of the reform. From being a residual activity carried 
out in a highly centralized manner, trade became a main focus of effort, 
with provincial authorities and institutions in the vanguard. In the 
initial atempt to reform its foreign trade system, specialization in the 
4 supra-ministerial ‘ level was tried. In July 1979, the Foreign Investment 
Control Commission and the Import-Export Commission were established 
under the State Council to supervise and coordinate the work of 
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ministries and other agencies that deal with foreign trade and investment 
matters. These agencies had a status roughly equivalent to that of the 
other state commissions. 
At the same time, various new national planning and co-ordinating 
bodies were established, such as China International Trust and Investment 
Corporation (CITIC). At ministerial level, several new export and import 
corporations were established under the production ministries to conduct 
foreign trade directly in line with their products in charge, and they 
had the authority to conduct technical as well as commercial negotiations 
with foreign firms and to sign contracts, thus could bypass the FTCs. The 
authority to directly conduct foreign trade has also been granted to 
provincial and several municipal governments. The local government was 
also allowed to organize foreign trade corporations to handle foreign 
trade. These local corporations became to direct the operations of the 
local FTC branches which still report to the national FTCs on planning 
and budgeting matters. However, the dominant role in the dual 
relationship system has thus shifted to the local foreign trade 
corporations, whose authority to conduct foreign trade directly puts them 
in a better position to coordinate the activities of the various local 
FTC branches and to promote more vigorously the interests of local 
foreign trade and economic development. 
In 1982， the 29 provinces and autonomous regions and Guang Zhou, Da 
Lian, Wu Han, Xi An, Shen Yang, Harbin, Chong Ching, Qing Daor and Hai 
Nan Island have all formally estabilished their own foreign trade 
corporations.(Guojia Jingji Tizhi Gaige Weiyuanhui, 1988, p.762) Since 
this experimental period, certain medium and large scale enterprises 
relatively well equipped with production facilities and technological 
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ability, and those have the experience in production for exports also 
have been granted the right to conduct foreign trade directly. This 
situation gave rise to much confusion over the division of 
responsibilities between the individual institutions and the national 
bodies. Particular uncertainty has been attached to the question of 
jurisdiction over particular lines of production. Initially, to overcome 
this problem, the government created the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade (MOFERT) in March 1982 by merging the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade with the Import-Export Commission. MOFERT was to supervise 
both trade and foreign trade related matters including joint ventures, 
and engaged in a number of activities to achieve greater control over the 
foreign trade and investment in relation with the embryonic markets in 
China. 
Based on the diversified and decentralized foreign trade organs as 
the result of the initial stage of reform policy since 1979, main agenda 
for foreign trade reform in China was accomplished with the approval of 
State Council for the MOFERT's Report on the Reform of the Trade System 
in Septermber 1984 (hereafter Report). The report by MOFERT provided a 
comprehensive reform programme which implicates major departure of 
foreign trade behavior of China from that in the prereform period.1) The 
1) In line with general economic reform policy which insists on decentralization 
of decision-making authority to enterprises and extension of market forces, the 
report of MOFERT stipulates:(Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations 
and Trade 1985, pp.388-398) 
(a) Separate government function from enterprise management and 
strengthen administrative management of foreign trade. 
(b) Simplify administration and transfer power to lower administrative 
levels and bring into full play the managing initiative of various 
foreign trade enterprises. 
(c) Adopt import and export agency system and improve operations and 
management of foreign trade, 
r (d) Reform the foreign trade planning system and simplify the contents. 
(e) Reform the foreign trade financial system and strengthen the economic 
means of regulation. 
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new policy was aimed at the reduction of monopoly power exercised by the 
national FTCs and separation of MOFERT as a government agency responsible 
for overall policy-making from actual participation in foreign trade 
transactions. Although the reform process has fallen short of full 
implementation of the program, according to the Report, under the agency 
system trading would be conducted mainly by a variety specialized 
companies which would compete for the ultimate buyers and sellers. Actual 
profits and losses of foreign transactions would accrue largely to the 
importers and exporters, instead of being absorbed by the FTCs. In line 
with the direction of change, in 1988, the total number of FTCs, 
corporations, and enterprises granted direct trading right was some 4000. 
With foreign trade decentralization and reduction of government's 
interference in foreign trade transactions’ as an incentive for export, 
foreign exchange retention scheme has been introduced. After experimental 
stage, since 1985, with varing retention rate from 30¾ to 70¾ according 
to commodities and regions’ enterprises producing goods for export and 
provincial authorities have been allowed to equally share the retained 
foreign exchange. Other incentives such as preferential access to credit, 
tax rebate for exports, and stable supply of inputs also have been 
provided for export promotion. Various type of incentives, consequently, 
were also conducive to counteract anti-export bias which had been existed 
in the economy as a legacy of prereform period economic policy. 
3-2 Reforms in foreign trade planning system 
In China, throughout the prereform period, its foreign trade 
planning process had double aims of isolating the domestic market from 
the destabilizing influence of world markets, and of serving as a main 
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conduit for advanced technology and capital goods desperately needed for 
rapid development of the economy. And the planning process was consistent 
with the general approach to foreign trade in centrally planned economy. 
Thus, despite several surges of imports and decentralization of the right 
to conduct foreign trade to local governments, the centrally planned 
foreign trade remained at the center of the trade regime in China before 
1979.2) 
Since the open-door policy was adopted, China's foreign trade 
system experienced fundamental changes in every aspect of it. The context 
in which the open-door policy was launched was one of general economic 
policies. The overall direction of reforms was to reduce the role of the 
central government in day to day management of the economy and, hence, of 
directive planning and to place increasing reliance on the role of the 
enterprise and individuals, both reacting to appropriate incentives. 
Growth was to come through efficiency improvements, which meant 
exploitation of comparative advantage of China and technical 
transformation and modernization. In concordance with the purpose of 
reform, since 1979, the practice in foreign trade and exchange planning 
has been first to promote exports, with due consideration of domestic 
supplies of essential goods, then to determine the level of imports based 
on expected foreign exchange earnings, thereby maintaining the current 
2) The main charateristics of foreign trade system in traditional socialist countries 
have been developed to ensure the subordination of foreign trade to the overall 
objectives of central planning. The foreign trade plan is an integral part of the 
national economic plan. In the economy, the foreign trade plan emerges as a 
by-product of the drawing up of a set of materials balances for the economy as 
a whole. Thus the system of materials balances forms a direct planning link 
between the domestic and foreign sectors, with imports and exports serving as 
potentially important balancing items. Therefore, the focus of planning process 
is believed to be on the determination of needed imports, and the annual foreign 
trade planning process would identify the required imports，and exports would be 
selected to finance the desired level of imports. 
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account in balance. Thus， export became the driving force of foreign 
trade planning. In such an overall economic context, reform of the trade 
system through replacement of mandatory or command plan by the guidance 
plan which is relying more on the use of economic levers for its 
implementation in combination with market forces is entirely natural. 
Basically, reforms in foreign trade planning in China has exerted 
toward two directions； first, decentralization of planning authority to 
local governments or relevant ministry, second, reduction of the scope of 
mandatory plan to transform it into guidance plans or into responsibility 
system of the relevant unit. 
Since 1982, exports from China roughly fall into three categories; 
the first category includes small number of important commodities which 
can affect national economy and the living standards of people to a 
greater extent, and they are subject to the unified control of the 
central FTCs and corporations pertaining to the ministries in charge. 
Commodities under fierce competition among provinces for export or 
subject to trade barriers of foreign countries constitute the second 
category for which exports are organised through cooperation between 
national export and import corporations and each provincial, municipal 
and autonomous regional governments and their foreign trade corporations. 
Other commodities not included in the first two categories fall into the 
third category, and they can be traded under the auspicies of local 
governments or their relevant institutions entitled for foreign trade, 
During prereform period, as almost all of the foreign trade was 
monopolized by small number of FTCs , all trade was basically included in 
the plan, which covered some 3000 commodities, and very few imports or 
exports that were not covered by the plan were made. But, this is no 
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longer the case’ as early as 1986, only 120 commodities were included in 
the mandatory plans of province level and even smaller number of 7 items 
were subject to the mandatory plan for imports. Furthermore, except 21 
commodities under unified control, exports of other commodities initially 
subjected to the two-tier planning system under which both of central and 
local governments share planning authority became to be under full 
control of local governments of province, autonomous region and 
municipality.(World Bank, 1988, p.22) 
Translation from mandatory plan to guidance plan allowed the 
foreign trade corporations and enterprises more freedom for adjustment to 
improve their economic efficiency.3) Even for mandatory plan, China's 
export planning system exhibits striking slackness due to the process of 
iterative negotiations. It is not the case that local organizations 
collect information and submit it to central planners who then produce a 
coordinated plan. Repeated set of interactions occur between the local 
and national levels, until the final result is obtained. The process 
usually results in the plan targets which local officials feel they are 
able to implement or they can meet and usually exceeds with ease, and 
with which central officials are content. 
In comparison with export side, the reform process in the area of 
import planning has been more rapid and far-reaching. In 1986’ mandatory 
plan for imports included only seven key raw materials, which are under 
unified management and a steady supply of them are considered as 
essential. This part of the import plan is closely related to the 
traditional role of filling shortfalls in domestic production for the 
materials allocation system. Once imports for mandatory plan have been 
3) For the difference of mandatory plan and guidance plan in their 
implementation, see Appendix C. 
69 
determined and foreign exchange allocation made, implementation of the 
import plan is assigned to particular FTCs. Mostly, these are the 
national FTCs under MOFERT, and some are assigned to FTCs established 
under production ministries. 
Import planning in China has intimate relationship with the foreign 
exchange allocation system. Thus, guidance plan in imports is essentially 
a foreign exchange allocation mechanism covering the import components of 
priority investment projects and other priority imports of raw materials, 
spare parts and equipment. For the part of imports related to the 
priority investment projects, a full feasibility study including 
estimated foreign exchange requirements is conducted and must also obtain 
the approval of State Planning Commission (SPC).4) When all these steps 
have been taken, the project automatically receives a foreign exchange 
allocation. The nature of the project and its financing determine whether 
the foreign exchange is provided in the form of a grant, an 
RMB-denominated loan, a foreign exchange-denominated loan, or simply an 
allocation of foreign exchange for the sponsoring enterprise, or ministry 
or province provides the counterpart RMB to purchase the needed foreign 
exchange. 
For the rest of imports financed either out of foreign exchange 
retention by provinces and enterprises or by foreign borrowing by 
4) For the priority imports such as raw materials, spare parts or individual pieces 
of equipment, an enterprise or a province will attempt to obtain a central 
foreign exchange allocation for these rather than use foreign exchange retention 
rights of themselves. Once the mandatory plan imports and priority investment 
projects have been provided for, SPC and State Administration for Exchange 
Control (SAEC) will determine how much foreign exchange can be allocated for 
other uses. If the required foreign exchange is above a certain limit, which 
varies from province to province, it requires SPC approval, and for below this 
level, required is the approval of the user's department in charge. It appears 
that SPC and SAEC essentially divide this part of the foreign exchange budget 
between departments according to historical shares, leaving final allocation up to 
those departments. 
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non-central authorities, import licensing system appears as the main way 
of control. MOFERT, in conjunction with SPC’ draws up a guideline for 
granting import licences to control excessive import growth and to 
protect domestic industry. Although there are isolated cases of 
applications for import licenses being refused, and they may frequently 
be subject to delay, it seems that provided a requested import has 
financing available and there is no readily available domestically 
produced substitute, it is approved eventually. 
Notable feature in the process of foreign trade planning reform is 
the uneven progress of decentralization in its export side and import 
side, and it is similar to the asymmetry of marketization in different 
industrial sectors as described in chapter 2. This is largely due to the 
legacies in the system inherited from prereform period. Firstly, 
although the exchange rates for RMB have been periodically depreciated, 
anti-export bias among producers due to still overvalued RMB limited the 
increase in exports. Moreover, as commodities produced above production 
plan could be sold on markets, producers became to weigh the relative 
benefits of higher domestic prices and of access to foreign exchange 
retention right, and the process also aggravated the anti-export bias to 
some extent, especially when excess demand dominates the markets. Under 
the circumstance, more strong measure of control was necessary in export 
side to generate required foreign exchange for imports. Secondly, local 
government's strong incentives for export expansion under the foreign 
exchange retention scheme and relatively looser system for import than 
the practice of prereform period also were important sources of the 
asymmetry in the progress of forign trade planning system reform.s) With 
5) Since with higher level of exports, higher level of imports can be approved 
directly at the provincial level, and larger number of modernization and 
71 
the incentives, at the provincial level, guidance plans for export tended 
to be converted to mandatory plans, and the command procedure was 
followed. Thirdly, at the initial stage of foreign trade 
decentralization, the products in which China was able to increase its 
exports rapidly were relativly homogeneous, hence, there was a fierce 
competition among provinces, and the situation forced the central 
authority to unify export decision-making. Thus, it has been the case 
that provinces were given rigid quotas for some specific commodities, 
such as agricultural commodities, textiles, and handicrafts. The situa-
tion was changed to a considerable extent as major progress was made in 
the market-oriented reform in the economy. At the same time, periodic 
adjustment of exchange rates for RMB (see section 3) and incentives for 
export such as foreign exchange retention right, tax rebate for exports, 
easier access to credit, and advantages in planned inputs allocation and 
reputation in domestic market as an exporter substantially alleviated the 
anti-export bias in China, 
In compliance with the progress in general economic reform and 
foreign trade decentralization, in 1987, MOFERT started to promote the 
foreign trade responsibility system for its branches. With the adoption 
of the Regulations for Some Problems in Acceleration and Deepening of 
Foreign Trade Reform in March 1988, the Chinese government decided to 
practice the foreign trade responsibility system in an overall manner. 
The practice made a breakthrough on the planning, financing, management, 
pricing in foreign trade, and on the foreign exchange allocantion and its 
control system. Under the system, local governments of provinces, 
autonomous regions, and municipalities included in the state plan can 
expansion projects can be carried out in the province concerned. 
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directly make contract with central planning authority about the bases 
(基數)• The bases include foreign exchange to be earned via export, 
foreign exchange to be turned over to the state, export subsidy for 
contracted exports, balance of the foreign exchange account, and foreign 
exchange retention ratio for over planne exports for which they are 
responsible. For the small number of sensitive goods, national FTC or 
relevant ministries' foreign trade corporations in charge sign contracts 
with central planning authority about above mentioned bases, and assume 
responsibility for the results. According to the regulations, the local 
branches of national FTC's and part of the export and import corporations 
of relevant ministries became financially independent from their mother 
institutions, and the relevant local governments take the responsibility 
instead. SPC and MOFERT are responsible for supervision and inspection of 
the accomplishment of exports, imports and other contracts by contracted 
unit. 
There also was an important breakthrough in the foreign exchange 
allocation and control system; foreign exchange retention rights of local 
governments were expanded, foreign exchange usage index was removed, and 
moreover, foerign exchange adjustment centers were established. These 
changes made a great contribution to the improvement of the efficiency in 
foreign exchange flows between production units and FTCs, which enhanced 
the incentives for porducers to export* 
These measures still fall short of the full implementation of the 
MOFERT's recommendations on trade reform as adopted by the State Council 
in October 1984. However, they are consistent with economic reforms in 
other areas being adopted in China which stress the role of economic 
levers in place of administrative management of the economy. Reforms in 
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foreign trade planning system also provided the economy with considerable 
room for adjustment in reaction to the increasing forces of market 
mechanism in China. These changes imply the major departure of the 
foreign trade planning system from that in centrally planned economy 
which characterized China's economy in the prereform period. 
3-3 Determination of prices in foreign trade 
In order to improve foreign trade efficiency in line with the 
objectives of its general economic reform, creating a linkage between 
world market prices and those in domestic markets is one of the most 
important task of foreign trade reform in China, As the result of foreign 
trade reform combined with market-oriented industrial reform measures, 
considerable progress has been made for efficient foreign trade pricing.6) 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES： Since the reform process began, China has 
devalued its currency several times. For the first step, the so called 
'internal settlement rate,(內部結算價）was applied to all foreign trade 
and trade-related transactions. This rate was first introduced on an 
experimental basis in the begining of 1980 for some selected enterprises. 
Since January 1981, the new rate pegged to US dollar has been applied to 
6) In CPEs, the planning authorities try to insulate the domestic economy from 
the fluctuations in foreign markets which would impede the fullfillment of 
national economic plans for full employment, economic growth, and structural 
change by affecting domestic prices and revenues, costs, and profits. In order to 
divorce the domentic price structure from that of international market, therefore, 
institutions for foreign trade conduct their domestic and foreign transactions in 
different currencies and at different prices. A complex set of highly 
differentiated commodity-specific taxes and subsidies covers the difference 
between (1) the fixed official domestic wholesale price of exports or imports 
and (2) the nominal domestic currency equivalent of the foreign trade price, 
obtained by translating the foreign trade price from foreign currency into 
national currency at the arbitrary official exchange rate. Official exchange rate 
in such an economy typically has accounting function only and has no economic 
role, because real trade flows are centrally determined independently of domestic 
relative prices and the price level. 
74 
all the enterprises and corporations engaged in foreign trade, as well as 
to the receipts and expenditures in foreign exchange for trade-related 
invisible transactions, such as shipping and insurance. 
The official exchange rates, which had been pegged to the value of 
a basket of currencies since 1977 remained for all other invisible 
transactions and for all settlements denominated in RMB with non-
residents until 1985, when official exchange rate was devalued to 
Y2.8=$1.00 and the internal settlement rate was abolished. In 1985, 
through four times of devaluation, RMB depreciated by 14.3%, and in July 
1986, RMB's exchange rate for US dollar once again devalued 15% and the 
exchange rate became around Y3.7=$1.00. Throughout 1987-89， there was no 
substantial devaluation of RMB, but in 1990, once again RMB was devalued 
to as low as Y5.5二$1.00 level.(Table 3-1) 
Table 3-1 
Trends of official exchange rate of RMB (Yuen/US Dollar)a 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
2.80b 2.80b 2.80b 2.80b 2.94 3.46 3.73 3.73 3.78 4.80 
Source: Statistical Yearbook (various issues) 
a Annual average of selling rate. 
b Internal settlement rate. 
Official exchange rate in the traditional CPEs typically has only 
the accounting function. Usually, with planned Imports and exports, the 
whole trading system Is making a reasonable net profit. Accounting 
profits and losses for individual commodities, or even for individual 
FTCs, have no real economic significance. Such a situation was also true 
in China before foreign trade decentralization. But since 1979, various 
trade agencies involved in direct trading increasingly became to be 
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responsible for their own trade profits and losses, since profit was an 
important criterion in judging performance and for entitlement to related 
economic benefits. 
In order to have objective measures for agencies' performance, 
application of unified exchange rate was inevitable. In this context, 
continual depreciation of foreign exchange rates throughout 1980s and 
introduction and abolishment of internal settlement rate can be 
justified. At present, China maintains floating exchange rate system 
(crawling peg), under which the exchange rate is based on the development 
in the balance of payments, movements in production costs of exports, and 
exchange rates of China's major trading partners. And variation in 
foreign exchange rates has increasing influence on decision-making for 
trade in China. Although there are different arguments about the 
effectiveness of devaluation of RMB for export promotion and its impact 
on domestic economy71, the adoption of foreign exchange rates adjustment 
as an economic lever and its increasing influence on the foreign trade 
desion-making are a large step towards effective operation of foreign 
trade in China. 
EXPORT PRICING： Under the prereform trade system, all trade 
agencies had to implement export plan based on the state fixed prices. 
Thus, trade agencies procured export commodities at the ex-factory price 
same with domestic procurement price. The selling prices abroad were, 
however, determined by the export market conditions. This pricing policy, 
together with the foreign trade plan and official exchange rate resulted 
in a rather complicated picture of profits and losses in foreign trade. 
7) For example, based on the concept of effective exchange rate, Sung (1989) 
categorically disputed the argument for ineffectiveness of depreciation of RMB 
for trade balance improvement in China. On the contrary, Wang (1986) doubts 
that depreciation can be an effective export promotion in China. 
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At the official exchange rate, for most manufactured goods, domestic 
prices in RMB on average exceeded both import prices and export prices. 
As a result, most imports made accounting profit, while most exports 
suffered accounting losses.� But, the differences tended to be evened 
out within the whole state trading system. 
Since the reform process began, the authority for foreign trade was 
decentralized to locacl governments and enterprises. For mandatory plan 
exports, the process is straightforward and FTCs arrange the delivery 
and marketing of the commodities, for which producers are paid at the 
fixed state prices. But, increasing share of guidance plan exports in 
China in combination with expanding self-marketing by production units 
and introduction of the foreign trade responsibility system made the 
scene rather different from that in the past. Domestic purchasers and 
FTCs now compete for commodities in short supply both in domstic and 
export markets, arid FTCs cite competition from domestic purchasers as the 
single most important constraint to increasing exports. Therefore, with 
the strong motivation towards achieving high levels of exports and 
possibility of high profit, supply contracts for commodities for which 
they compete with domestic purchasers are usually negotiated at prices 
higher than the fixed state prices.9) Prevalence of such practice provided 
8) The opposite situation prevails for the trade of agricultural products and raw 
materials. 
9) There are five different modes of plan implementation for the guidance plan 
export: (World Bank, 1988 p. 107) 
(a) At the provincial level, the guidance plans are converted into the 
command plan, and the command plan procedure is followed. 
(b) Supply contracts are negotiated with producers at the fixed state 
prices. 
(c) Supply contracts are negotiated at higher than the fixed state prices, 
where the producer has the alternative of supplying to the free 
domestic market. 
(d) FTCs negotiate contracts with producers on an agency basis, deducting 
their fees and passing on the international price to the producer. 
(e) Supplies are procured from the captive producers, which have been 
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the economy with an indirect conduit through which domestic producers' 
behavior could be influenced by the changes in foreign market conditions. 
Although the MOFERT policy of instituting export procurement on an 
agency basis was one of explicit objectives of the reforms announced in 
October 1984, it has been implemented to only a limited extent, and large 
part of goods are still procured by FTCs on their own account, in 
contrast to the situation with respect to imports, This situation is 
probably due to the fact that FTCs are strongly motivated towards 
achieving high level of exports, and to the government‘s fear that full 
implementation of the agency system for exports would result in a decline 
in the level of exports. However, as foreign trade reform deepens, the 
role of enterprises engaged in foreign trade as the intermediaries 
providing information, skill and personnels for foreign trade for 
production units tends to be more emphasized than their traditional role 
of foreign trade plan implementation. With the progress of reform in the 
area, the influences of economic incentives based on the market-oriented 
behavior of relevant econofflic units on their decision-making process have 
been increased steadily, 
IMPORT PRICING： Throughout the prereform period, uniform prices for 
industrial goods produced by state enterprises Were fixed by the State 
Price Bureau according to ex-factory prices, which included the costs of 
production, profits and the consolidated industrial and commercial tax. 
Income tax was added for goods produced by collective enterprises. These 
data were transmitted to the foreign trade agencies as the base for 
fixing the price at which imported goods were sold to the purchasing 
agencies. If uniform ex-factory prices did not exist, but there were 
financed by the FTC. 
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announced wholesale prices (These prices are fixed by the Ministry of 
Commerce and the State Price Bureau) for the similar domestically 
produced goods in the major trading ports, the prices of imported goods 
were fixed accordingly. The prices of imported goods might be adjusted to 
reflect differentials in quality and specifications after negotiation 
between the MOFT and the agencies that ordered the goods. The State Price 
Bureau would mediate in case of failure to reach agreement. If the 
imported goods were not produced domestically and there was no similar 
products, prices were fixed according to the c. i. f, value at the port of 
arrival (converted at the prevailing official exchange rate), plus the 
import duty, consolidated industrial and commercial tax, and a fee 
charged by the foreign trade agency. (Xiang Gen, 1985, pp.17-18) 
As a major component of foreign trade decentralization policy in 
China, the pricing system for imports has been diversified. It was in 
accordance with the economic reform strategy aimed at the exposure of the 
economy to the competitive pressure from domestic and international 
markets. Consequently, there exist mainly three methods of pricing for 
imports, each of which is practiced according to the characteristics of 
the imported commodities from the perspective of the national economy. 
Firstly, mandatory plan imports are sold on the domestic market for the 
regular domestic price. This may result in losses for the FTCs because of 
lower domestic prices, and they are directly compensated for these 
losses. Secondly, imports of some iterns made by FTCs, by the state, or 
other import agents for which there is price control cannot be sold at 
less than the domestic price. Commodities in this group tend to be 
consumer goods, which are on the restricted import list. Frequently, the 
State Price Bureau determines a price for the imported equivalent to 
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account for quality differentials. Thirdly, other imports are made on an 
agency basis； i.e. the FTC requires payment of the full import costs plus 
all taxes and its own costs. The FTC's costs are generally around 5%, as 
they do not aim to make profits on such imports. 
Just as the reforms of import planning have progressed further than 
export planning, so have reforms of the pricing system for imports. 
Whereas it seems that most procurement for exports continues to be made 
by FTCs on their own account at domestic price (whether at the state 
fixed price or market price), the agency system is well estabilished in 
the import sector. In fact, the first and the second pricing method for 
imports are being applied to limited number of commodities subjected to 
the strict import control. In 1988, the share of imports made on an 
agency basis was as much as 90% of all imports in value terms(Zhongguo 
Wujia Nianjian 1989. p.162), and it shows that the role of foreign trade 
enterprises as intermediaries for provision of necessary information, 
skill, and personnel has been developed rapidly in import side. With the 
expanding markets in the allocation of industrial products in China, such 
changes in import pricing method opened the possibility of competitions 
between domestic producers and foreign suppliers for the Chinese 
purchasers. 
3-4 Changing role of foreign trade in China 
Market-oriented reform and the role of foreign trade 
Regardless a country's economic system is based on market mechanism 
or central planning, foreign trade has been regarded as the means for 
improving welfare status of a country. But, the extent to which foreign 
trade is employed and the role assigned to it is radically different 
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according to the economic system a country adopted. Thus, established 
institutional framework by which foreign trade is implemented also 
differs remarkably between countries with different economic systems. 
In a market economy, the size, composition and direction of foreign 
trade are mainly determined by the operation of market forces. As a rule, 
the spontaneous operation of the market mechanism and profit motivation 
are considered as stimulating healthy competition arid efficiency, and 
thus, promoting an international pattern of production and trade which 
yield maximum returns from the resources employed. Even where state 
agencies directly engage in foreign trade, they are, in general, subject 
to the same market forces and commercial considerations as private 
traders. In most market economies, goverments intervene in the market to 
modify the prices paid or obtained through tariffs, subsidies and in some 
cases manipulation of exchange rates. But goverments essentially 
endeavour to achieve their objectives through the ordinary market forces, 
i.e. influencing supply of demand but without interfering with the market 
mechanism as a system. Government intervention may also assure the form 
of quantitative restrictions of imports or exports, or in some cases, 
complete prohibitions. But, such direct controls are normally regulated 
by the rules of international organizations such as GATT and IMF, of 
which most western countries are members. 
On the other hand, in the CPEs greater importance is attached to 
stability and orderly development. It is believed that free working of 
the market forces causes too many disruptions and it should be 
fundamentally superseded by planning. The level, structure, and direction 
of their foreign trade are, thus, subject to foreign trade plan. The plan 
is integrated by the central planning authority into the general economic 
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plan within the ramifications of government policy. Whereas in the 
industrially developed market economies the emphasis appears to be on 
exports, in the centrally planned economies, given planned targets of 
economic activities, it is imports that occupy the focus of attention. 
Imports are the starting side in the planning process, since they are 
considered as indispensable to meet developmental targets. Exports are 
essentially looked upon as a sacrifice to secure the required imports. 
During the 1949-78 period, China's foreign trade was conducted in a 
highly centralized manner. The system that was in place to conduct 
foreign trade during the period was designed with the concept of 
self-reliance in mind. Trading rights were reserved for a relatively 
small number of central, highly controlled institutions, A large number 
of administrative procedures were erected to ensure the confirmation of 
foreign trade practices with the general objectives of economic planning. 
Although the level, commodity structure, and direction of trade were 
changed according to the transformation of the economy and the 
development strategy adopted, China's trading activity during the period 
can be characterized by common features possessed by the traditional 
socialist planned economy. 
But, contrast to the fact that most of CPEs of socialist type 
concentrated their effort on figuring out needed imports for the economy, 
in China, with the pressure from huge population the export possibility 
of the economy played major role in the import planning In terms of 
quantity and origin of imports during the prereform period. (Perkins, 
1968) In fact, there was recognition among the Chinese leadership that 
the task of modernization would be better served by obtaining 
technologically advanced foreign capital goods through foreign trade. 
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But, throughout the prereform period, the limited availability of 
resources for exports combined with the government's strict application 
of the principle of independence, equality, and mutual benefit in the 
relationship with foreign countries in fear of economic instability and 
trade deficit substantially limited the role of foreign trade in China. 
The experience of failure in the 1978 modernization drive relying 
on import of technologically advanced capital goods without reforming the 
economic system led the Chinese leadership to adopt fundamentally 
different approach to foreign trade from 1979 on. However, because of the 
deep-rooted fear for erosion of socialist ideology and macroeconomic 
instability, the foreign trade reforms in China since 1979 had to take 
the course of gradual decentralization of decision-making power and 
cautious connection of trade activities with expanding market forces. 
With the State Council's approval of the report of MOFERT on reform of 
the foreign trade system in September 1984� foreign trade in China 
assigned a vital role in conjunction with full-fledged economy-wide 
reforms. It is no longer only supplementary to the materials production 
and supply plans. Foreign trade in China is expected to play quite an 
independent role in generating income and employment opportunities as 
well as improving productivity via faciliatating inflow of technical 
information and international division of labour. It is quite simiar to 
the role assigned to foreign trade in market economy. 
As argued in previous chapter, in the country, there had been 
several attempts to decentralize economic power to local authorities in 
the prereform period as an economic strategy to improve overall 
performance of the economy. But the emphasis put on the role of market 
mechanism as a main tool of improving economic efficiency is a major 
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departure of recent reform from the preceding three decades of economic 
development experiences relying on central planning and the Stalinist 
type of economic development in China. In this context, foreign trade 
decentalization is a vital part of the reform process. Granting the right 
for export and import to local authorities and enterprises is consistent 
with the central thrust of the industrial reform which aimed at 
decentralization of decision-making authority about production and 
investment to the production units. Even though the sensitivity of the 
Chinese policy-makers to the balance of payments problem has called for 
ad hoc readjustment policy at times, foreign trade decentralization in 
combination with market-oriented reform in the economy paved the way for 
China to be able to realize the potential gains from international trade 
as the experiences of outward-oriented economies suggest.101 
Some evidences for the changing role of foreign trade 
Table 3-2 shows radical change in the role of foreign trade in the 
Chinese economy as its reform proceeds in early eighties. The feature of 
foreign trade planning which matches available resources for exports with 
the needed imports is well reflected in the same directional movement of 
exports and imports before 1983. Facing the four ‘waves' of imports, i.e. 
for 1958-59, 1964-65， 1972-75， and 1978-1980 periods, there were 
amounting increases in exports too, and thus, the Chinese economy could 
keep total trade almost in balance. Similarly, there was amounting 
decrease in the level of imports when resource constraint in the economy 
made it inevitable to cut exports as disproportionality among economic 
10) It is generally believed that successful microeconomic reform and 
decentralization which enable flexible resource allocation In domestic economy is 
the key to efficiency-improving decentralization of a trade regime to be 
successful. (Sung, 1986, Srinavasan, 1987) 
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Table 3-2 
Value and growth rates of China's commodity 
exports and imports 1958-1990 
Year Exports^  Growth rateb Importsa Growth rateb Balancea 
1958 19.8 24.0 18.9 25.5 0.9 
1959 22.6 14,1 21.2 12.2 1.4 
1960 18.6 -17.9 19.5 -7.9 -0.9 
• 14.9 -19,7 14.5 -26.0 0.4 
1962 14.9 -0.1 11.7 -18.8 3.2 
1963 16.5 10.7 12.7 7.9 3.8 
1964 19.2 16.2 15.5 22.2 3.7 
1965 22.3 16.3 20.2 30.4 2.1 
1966 23.7 6.2 22.5 11.5 1.2 
1967 21.4 -9.8 20.2 -10.1 1.2 
1968 21.0 -1,5 19.5 -3.7 1.5 
1969 22.0 4.8 18.3 -6.2 ‘ 3.7 
1970 22.6 2.5 23,3 27.5 -0.7 
1971 26.4 16.6 22.0 -5.2 4.4 
1972 34.4 30,6 28.6 29.6 5.8 
1973 58.2 69.0 51,6 80.4 6.6 
1974 69.5 19,4 76.2 47,7 -6.7 
1975 72.6 4,5 74.9 -1.7 -2,3 
1976 68.5 -5.6 65,8 -12.1 2.7 
1977 75,9 10,7 72.1 9.7 3,8 
1978 97,5 28.5 108.9 51.0 -11.4 
1979 136.6 40.1 156.7 43.9 -20.1 
1980 181.2 32.7 200.2 27.8 -19.0 
1981 220.1 21.5 220.2 10.0 -0.1 
1982 223.2 1.4 192.9 -12.4 30.4 
1983 222.3 -0.4 213.9 10.9 8.4 
1984 261.4 17,6 274.1 28.1 -12.7 
1985 273,5 4.6 422.5 54.1 -149.0 
1986 309.4 13.1 429,0 1.5 -119.6 
1987 394.4 27.5 432.2 0.7 -37.8 
1988 475.2 20.5 552.8 27.9 -77.6 
1989 525.4 10.6 591.4 7.0 -66.0 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1990, p.633. 
Figures before 1980 are from Ministry of Foreign Trade, and figures 
since 1980 are from Customs Statistics, 
a 100 million US dollar. 
b Percentage increase over previous year. 
sectors developed. Relatively large trade deficits during 1978-80 despite 
the concurrent effort to increase exports to meet the planned imports 
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manifested the limitation of China's economic system at that time to 
afford massive import of capital goods. But, there was fundamental change 
in the relationship around 1983 due to the breakdown of the insulation 
between domestic economy and external economy with decentralized 
decision-making authority and expanding market forces in the economy even 
in advance of the official announcement of comprehensive industrial 
reform package. Since then, given relatively stable international market 
conditions, levels and composition of exports and imports have been under 
strong influence of the development of economic situation in China rather 
than determined by the planning authority in consideration of available 
resources for exports and planned imports. 
Since the announcement of comprehensive reform measures in the 
fourth quarter of 1984, flexible out-of-plan prices in domestic market 
and diversified pricing practices in export procurement by foreign trade 
enterprises with individual economic agents' incentives for profit 
tracking made exports to be responsive to foreign demand and domestic 
market conditions. On the other hand, expansion of the agency system in 
import side combined with foreign exchange retention scheme and 
substantially decentralized investment decision-making made production 
units increasingly to be sensitive to the price differentials of 
intermediate products between domestic market and international market. 
Trade data in Table 3-2 roughly indicate such systematic change in 
the Chinese economy since 1983. For example, in response to the demand 
pressure from overheated economy with investment fever which was mainly 
due to unlimited credit expansion of China's financial institutions in 
the fourth quarter of 1984, China's foreign trade experienced with record 
high trade deficit in 1985. In contrast, during 1986-87, due to variety 
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of adjustment measures combined with export promotion policy, exports 
increased substantially but imports remained almost unchanged. These 
experiences imply that instead of the concurrent movement of imports and 
exports under central planning foreign trade system, economic forces 
began to affect imports and exports differently in China as is usual in a 
market economy. 
Based on empirical evidence, as a result of the pursuance of the 
open-door policy since 1979, the Chinese economy has become much more 
trade-oriented. As shown in Table 3-3, on average, China's trade 
dependency ratio defined as the value of total trade as a percentage of 
Gross National Product (GNP) was on an upward trend and reached 31.4 
percent in 1990. At the same time, values of exports and imports as 
percentages of GNP were 16.9 and 14.6 in turn. Considering huge scale of 
the Chinese economy, foreign trade in the country no more can be 
characterised by its supplementary role in traditional CPEs, and it is no 
Table 3-3 
China's commodity exports and imports 
as percentage of GNP: 1978-1990 
Year Exports Imports Total Trade 
1978 4.7 5.2 9.9 
1979 5.3 6,1 11.4 
1980 6.1 6.7 12.8 
1981 7.7 7.7 15.4 
1982 8.0 6.9 14.9 
1983 7.5 7.3 14.8 
1984 8.3 8.9 17.2 
1985 9.5 14.7 24.2 
1986 11.2 15.5 26.6 
1987 13.0 14.3 27.3 
1988 12.6 14.7 27.3 
1989 12.3 13.8 26.1 
1990 16.9 14.6 31.4 
Source: Statistical Yearbook (various issues) 
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longer the isolated economy that it once was. As the share of foreign 
trade increased in the Chinese economy, not only the development in 
domestic economic situation could affect foreign trade sector, but 
changes in government's foreign trade policy also became to influence 
economic conditions through various channels. For the unprecedented 
increase in the price level in 1988, for example, the Chinese 
government's simultaneous application of trade policies for export 
promotion and import restiction should at least take a partial 
responsibility.IU 
Furthermore, the emphasis put on the role of trade,for efficiency 
11) Too see the point, we can compare the economic situation in China in 1987-88 
with that in 1984-85 relying on the changes of some important indicaters of the 
economy. 
Table F-l: Growth rates of some indicators (% increase over preceding year) 
Total output Investment purchasing Money Bank General 
value of in fixed power for supply loans index of 
society asset consumer goods (M2") retail prices 
1984 14.7 28.2 29.5 29.7 28.8 2.8 
1985 17.1 38.8 26.7 21.9 33.6 8.8 
1987 14.1 20.6 19.5 22.8 19.0 7.3 
1988 15.8 23.5 26^ 19.4 16-8 18.5 
Source: Statistical Yearbook (various issues) 
The data indicate that the aggregate demand pressure was weaker in 1987-88 
than in 1984-85. But, the economy experienced sharp increase in price level in 
1988. In 1987-88，the Chinese government took various measures for export 
promotion including tax rebate for exports and relaxation of the export licence 
system. At the same time, import control was tightened through the import 
licence system, quality inspection scheme for imports, and intensifying 
supervisory authority of customs etc. In addition, the official foreign exchange 
rate also was kept constant since the successive depreciation in 1985-86. As a 
result, in 1988，despite of apparent symptoms of inflation China's exports 
increased by 20.5 %. On the contrary, imports increased only by 27.9%. The 
situation is radically different from that in 1985，when exports increased by 
4.6% and imports by 54.1% due to the overheated economy (Table 3-2), Thus, 
in 1985, increase in imports under relatively liberalized foreign trade system 
relieved the economy from the aggregate demand pressure considerably. But, in 
1988，it was no more the case. In view of the increasing dependence of the 
Chinese economy on foreign trade, the government's foreign trade policy in 
1987-88 should be blamed for the sharp increase in the price level in 1988 in 
the sense that it was adopted with disregard to the domestice economic 
situation. 
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improvement and decentralization of decision-making authority together 
with responsiveness of the enterprises engaged in foreign trade to market 
signals for their profit have induced significant changes in the 
commodity composition and direction of China's foreign trade. 
In export side, Table 3-4 indicates that except for the period of 
1984-85 when the Chinese economy was under strong demand pressure due to 
macroeconomic imbalance, the share of manufactured goods had been 
steadily increased on average and amounted to 71.3 percent of total 
exports in 1989. In part, it was due to the Chinese goverment's 
relatively tight control of primary products' exports in view of their 
low price elasticity in foreign market and fierce competition among 
regional exporters as well as sharp decrease in oil price in the world 
market in 1986, which made the share of crude oil and related products 
reduced sharply in 1986. On the other hand, and more importantly, it was 
the result of deliberate policy of the government to upgrade the 
open-door policy as a fundamental constituent of China's new economic 
development strategy. 
Commodity composition of imports is presented in Table 3-5. As in 
the case of exports, there was also considerable shift in the share of 
primary products and manufactured goods following the structural change 
in the economy around 1983. The dramatic change in the imports 
composition clearly mirrors the effects of the economic reform process in 
China. As a result of the rural reforms in which communal production was 
replaced by a household contractual system, agricultural output rose 
sharply in the early eighties, and sharp reduction in imports of 
agriculture-based raw materials, particularly grain, was followed. Thus, 
more resources could be directed towards import of manufactured products 
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Table 3-4 
Commodity compostion of China's exports21 
Primary Productb Manufactured Goods0 
Foodd丨Textile丨 Crude| Chemical丨 Textile jMachineryiIcioth- | 
Year [Fibree j Qilf | Products j Fabric^  | [jngi | 
1983 13.3 3.0 19.5 43.3 5.6 13.1 5.5 9.3 56.7 
1984 12.8 3.5 21,8 45. 7 5.2 14.1 5.8 10.2 54.3 
1985 14.4 4.2 24.6 50.6 5.0 11.9 2.8 7.5 49.4 
1986 14.8 3.7 10.8 36.4 5.6 13.7 3.6 9.5 63.6 
1987 12.6 3.8 10.1 33.5 5.7 14.7 4,4 9.5 66.5 
1988 12.9 3.5 7.1 30.3 6.1 13.6 5.8 10.2 69.7 
1989 12.3 2.9 6.9 28.7 6.1 13.3 7.4 11.7 71.3 
Source: China’s Customs Statistics (various issues) 
a As percentage of total value of exports. 
b SITC 0,1,2,3,4 
c SITC 5,6,7,8,9 
d SITC 0,1 ® SITC 26 f SITC 33 s SITC 5 
h SITC 65 i SITC 7 i SITC 84 
which considered as indispensible for efficient growth of the Chinese 
economy and for its export promotion. Decentralization of decision-
making authority regarding investment, production, and marketing in 
combination with foreign trade reform, provided the Chinese industrial 
Table 3-5 
Commodity composition of China's importsa 
Primary Productsb Manufactured Goods0 
Cerealsd I Fertilizer叫 Textile| Iron & iMachineryhi 
Year I Fabricf1 Steels i ] 
1983 11.5 27.2 6.5 2.6 16.5 18.7 72.8 
1984 6.4 19.0 6.0 3.5 15.7 27.1 81.0 
1985 2.3 12.5 3.5 3.8 16.7 38.9 87.5 
1986 2.3 13.2 1.7 3.8 15.7 39.2 86.8 
1987 3.9 16.0 3.2 4.3 11.1 33.9 84.0 
1988 3.3 18.2 4.2 4.3 8.4 30,2 81.8 
1989 5.0 19.9 4.0 4.8 9.8 30.8 80.1 
Source: China's Customs Statistics (various issues) 
a As percentage of total value of imports, 
b SITC 0,1,2,3,4 
c SITC 5,6,7,8,9 
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Table 3-6 
Direction of China's commodity trade by different 
categories of countries and regionsa 
Developing Industrialized CPEs Hong Kong 
Year Countries Countries 
" 1 T o t a l j 16?5 5579 14?1 13?3 — 
1978 [ Exports I 19.6 37.4 15.3 25.9 
Imports I 13.8 72.5 13.0 0.7 
I Total 14.4 57.9 8.3 18.1 
1985 j Exports 1 22.5 43.9 9.0 22.1 
Imports J 8.3 68.5 7.7 15.0 
Total 13.2 54.3 11.2 19.2 
1986 I Exports ! 18.5 38.6 10.8 ' 28.0 
Imports I 8.9 67.1 11,5 12.0 
Total 13,6 50.1 9.2 24.4 
1987 I Exports | 17.6 40.9 9.0 28.9 
j Imports I 9.4 60.7 9,5 19.7 
Total 13.2 47.6 9.2 27.4 
1988 I Exports | 15.6 39.8 8.8 31.6 
Imports j 10.8 55.5 9.6 23.1 
Total 12,6 47.9 9,5 26.9 
1989 I Exports I 13.6 40.5 9.0 32.8 
Imports I 11.4 56.2 10.2 20.4 
Source: Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 
(various issues) 
a as percentage of total volume. 
enterprises with the opportunity to satisfy their desire to modernize and 
to overcome competitive pressure they are now facing through effective 
use of foreign trade. The increase in machinary and textile fabric share 
of imports as shown in Table 3-5 reveals the tendency.m 
Although the machinery share of imports in China increased 
substantially, as shown in Table 3-6’ it does not mean automatic increase 
12) The extraordinarily high share of machinary imports in 1984-85 might be due 
to macroeconomic imbalance in China during the period. 
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in industrialized countries' share of imports as was the case in the 
prereform period. In the past, china's trade was heavily geared towards 
industrialized market economies, particularly in import side. But, Table 
3-6 indicates that there was considerable decrease in the industrialized 
countries' share of total trade and it was mainly due to decreased share 
of imports from them. Considering decreasing share of CPEs and developing 
countries in China's foreign trade, which possibly owing to the reduced 
influence of political consideration on foreign trade decision-making and 
changed role of trade, it is evident that rapidly increasing share of 
Hong Kong in China's imports superseded the share of ^ industrialized 
countries. We also note that China correctly records the majority of Hong 
Kong's re-exports to China according to the initial country of origin 
except those originated from Korea (R. 0. K) and Taiwan (R.0.C) for 
political reasons®. In this context, the rapid increase in Hong Kong's 
share of imports indicates that evolving economic conditions in China 
since the reform process started have provided economic motives for the 
economy to increase imports from Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan. 
Relying on the empirical evidences we described, we can conclude 
that the level and pattern of trade in China since 1983 thus have not 
been determined by the traditional principle of foreign trade in CPEs: 
i.e. to import only those， particularly advanced technology and capital 
goods and intermediate inputs, which the country cannot produce or cannot 
produce in sufficient quantities efficiently, and to export whatever the 
13) From 1990 on, China's customs statistics includes data for trade with Korea 
and Taiwan. Nevertheless, the data exclude transactions between them through 
Hong Kong's re-exports. As early as in 1988，the sum of re-exports of Hong 
Kong to China originated from Korea and Taiwan was around 3 billion US 
dollars and it amounted to a quarter of Hong Kong's total exports to China as 
appeared in Chinese customs statistics. Before 1985，Korea and Taiwan's exports 
to China through Hong Kong or other way was negligible. (Hsueh and Oh, 1989) 
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country can produce in surplus in order to finance imports. Instead, they 
have been the products of complicated interaction between individual 
economic agents' profit-oriented reactions to changing economic 
environment and the ad hoc responses of different levels of governments 
to evolving economic conditions as the economy is situated in a 
transitional period towards more market-oriented system. During the 
process, as shown in previous chapter, the signals from the expanding 
markets in the form of changes in price level or competitive pressure 
were allowed to assume a critical role. 
3-5 Concluding remark 
As the result of the foreign trade reform in line with China's new 
economic development strategy, there has been a fundamental transforma-
tion of the Chinese economy from one end of the spectrum of CPEs' 
diversified institutional arrangements for external economic relationship 
to the other extreme of the spectrum. That is, the economy was 
transformed from a system with； a fixed accounting exchange rate； an 
automatic system of variable taxes and subsidies divorcing domestic and 
foreign prices； and complete central control over all foreign trade and 
foreign capital market decisions, to a radically different system with； a 
heavily managed flexible exchange rate system； relatively constant taxes, 
subsidies, and tariffs linking domestic and foreign prices； decentrali-
zation of foreign trade decision-making within a set of import and 
foreign exchange controls that are tightened or loosened in response to 
the balance of payments situation； and restricted freedom for foreign 
borrowing decisions. The new system is quite like those of developing 
market economies. Expanding maket forces in domestic economy in 
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combination with such radical change in institutional arrangements for 
external economic relationship made China's domestic economy to be 
organically connected to foreign trade sector. Therefore, changes in 
economic situation in China became to be reflected in the levels, 
composiition, and direction of its imports and exports. In the process, 
as economic reform deepens, the influence of individual economic agents' 
decision-making has increased. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FACTOR PROPORTIONS THEORY AND INTER-INDUSTRY TRADE IN CHINA 
As shown in previous chapters of the dissertation, market-oriented 
reform and foreign trade decentralization brought about profound change 
in the role of foreign trade and its performance in China. The aim of 
this chapter is to provide a legitimate evidence for the conceptual 
appropriateness of factor proportions theory to understand international 
inter-industry trade in China as a result of its efforts to decentralize 
and marketize the economy during past decade. It should be emphasized 
that my intention is not to submit the factor proportions theory to a 
further test against China's foreign trade performance. On the basis of 
empirical studies accumulated for decades, I adopt the view that 
inter-industry trade pattern in market economies is largely consistent 
with the prediction of traditional Heckscher-Ohlin (hereafter H-0) theory 
of international trade. 
Publication of the People's Republic of China 1985 Industrial 
Census Data and detailed China's foreign trade statistics according to 
the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC Rev.2) under the 
title of the Summary Surveys of China's Customs Statistics made the 
important data bearing on the relationship between foreign trade and the 
domestic economy available for the study. 
4-1 Realization of Comparative Advantage in China 
The proposition that the pattern of international trade is 
determined by comparative advantage is the oldest one in the pure theory 
of international trade for market economies and is common both to the 
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Ricardian comparative costs theory and the H-0 factor proportions theory, 
so long as comparative advantage is measured by relative autarkic prices 
While the classical Ricardian theory relates differences in comparative 
costs to differences in the comparative productivity of labour but does 
not explain the reasons for such divergence. This fundamental task has 
been left to contemporaty trade theorists, whose central contributions 
have been the H-0 theorem, originated by E. Heckscher, elaborated by B. 
Ohlin and which in its contemporary form owes much to the analytical 
techniques and propositions contributed by P. Samuelson. The H-0 theorem 
focuses on differences between countries in their relative factor 
endowments and on differences between commodities in the intensities with 
which they use these factors as the reason for their divergence in 
comparative costs. 
In a simple general equilibrium framework for analytical purpose, 
free trade can have no effect upon the domestic economy unless the 
international terms-of-trade differ from the price ratio obtained in the 
home market in the closed economy equilibrium. Given such a divergence, 
the effect of free trade is to raise the price of exportables, which 
promotes a reallocation of domestic production towards exportable goods 
and away from importables. In the process, the relative price of the 
factor used relatively intensively in producing the country's 
exportables is raised and that of the factor used relatively intensively 
in producing the country's importables is lowered. In setting out to 
explain the pattern of international trade by inter-industry differences 
in factor intensities and inter country differences in factor endowments, 
the theorem posits the existence of a well-defined relationship among 
trade flows, factor intensities, and factor endowments： A country wi 11 
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export that commodity which intensively uses its abundant factor.^ 
Basically, the comparative advantage in the framework of H-0 model with 
the ‘2x2x2, general equilibrium model provides an explanation of trading 
pattern as result of the interaction of factor markets and commodity 
markets under pure competition. With the support of the other three 'core 
proposition'2' of H-0 model the theorem succinctly states that relative 
factor endowments ratio, abstracting from differences in tastes and a 
number of other potential determinants, can determine the trade patterns. 
Therefore, all the conceptual appropriateness of the use of comparative 
advantage as a base of the analysis of China's foreign trade pattern 
depends upon the extent to which ths marketization of the economy has 
proceeded as a major direction of economic reform in China. 
Wilczynski (1965) pointed out the irrelevancy of the theory of 
comparative costs in the centrally planned economies of the traditional 
socialist countries, as their Institutional arrangement and standards for 
the guidance of their foreign trade are radically different from those of 
market economies. His argument based on the five major characteristics in 
the practices of the CPEs is as follows: First, the theory of comparative 
costs rests on the assumption of proportionality of prices to real 
economic costs. But, pricing policies and practices in the centrally 
planned economies do not allow the free-market mechanism to operate, 
whether in the factor or product markets. The pricing practices of 
planning authority do not necessarily reflect scarcity in prices. In 
addition, domestic prices are effectively insulated from external 
influences to protect the economy from international disturbances. Thus, 
1) It is a simplest statement of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem for 2x2x2 case. 
2) The three ‘core proposition' indicate the factor-price equalization theorem, the 
Stolper-Samuelson relationship, and the Rybczynski theorem. 
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the CPEs have no simple indication of the extent to which foreign trade 
is gainful. Second, imports and exports are not based on individual 
participant's decisions guided by current price differentials. Import 
needs are generally determined first, and then the exports, which are 
essentially considered as a sacrifice to obtain the imports, are planned 
accordingly. Fulfillment of the plan once approved by the government 
authority becomes all-important, usually irrespective of subsequent 
changes in relative cost. Third, even when cost disadvantages are 
substantial and beyond doubt, CPEs often disregard them in pursuing their 
autarkic policies, especially in the area of manufacturing industries. In 
striving towards the ideal of 4 planned proportional development of the 
national economy', it is argued that the initial cost disadvantage of a 
particular industry will be largely overcome in the future within a 
balanced economic structure. Fourth, because of the non-commercial 
considerations in foreign trade decision-making, gains from the 
differences in comparative casts are often not fully attained. The actual 
trade transactions are carried out by foreign trade corporations with a 
monopoly of clearly defined categories of exports and imports, and such a 
corporation does not have to treat each transaction as a commercial 
proposition. Fifth, exchange rates operated by the CPEs‘ do not 
necessarily relate domestic to foreign prices. These economies pursue the 
strict form of exchange control, and by official exchange rates their 
currencies are usually over valued. All in all, these features of foreign 
trade practices in CPEs are due to their denial of the theory of 
comparative costs on the basis of ideological consideration. The theory 
of comparative costs has been described as； " a pseudo-scientific, 
reactionary foreign trade theory dissemimated by bourgeois 
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economists to serve as a theoretical basis for the Western 
discriminatory foreign trade policies towards Socialist countries". 
(Lange, 1960, p. 11) In addition, the strict insulation of domestic price 
structure from that of world market to protect the economy from 
'capitalist fluctuations and crises' further intensified such 
characteristies. 
As the analysis in the previous chapters indicates, changes in the 
Chinese economy since economic reform began have been directed just the 
opposite side from traditional CPEs' practices. With positive attitude 
towards the concept of comparative advantage in international trade among 
scholars and government officials, reform measures taken during the 
period reduced the extent of rigidity and insulation of the eocnomy from 
world market considerably. Introduction of market mechanism in large 
scale for resources allocation and decentralization of decision-making 
authority to local governments and enterprises in various sector of the 
economy have been effective to rationalize its price structure and to 
make individual economic agents more sensitive to economic gains or 
losses. In contrast, the share of planned allocation of resources reduced 
rapidly and the planned imports and exports became limited to small share 
of total trade. Non-commercial considerations now assume less important 
role in foreign trade decision-making process. Furthermore, since 1985 
the unified exchange rate has been adjusted (actually depriciated) to a 
considerable extent several times in direction of Its real value and, 
thus, gradually enhanced its role as a economic lever. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the basic obstacles for China as a socialist country to 
gain from foreign trade based on comparative advantage have been largely 
removed as a result of its economic reform. 
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The logical consequence of above disussion leads us to the position 
to adopt the possibility of using the methodology developed for testing 
of H-0 theorem as the means of investigating the extent to which market 
forces in China contributes to the determination of its inter-industry 
trade patterns. 
4-2 Extension of H-0 theorem and implications for empirical testing 
In order to apply H-0 theorem to the empirical analysis of the 
patterns of trade in China's manufacturing industries, we must first 
understand the complexities arising from the dimensional problem and 
empirical application procedure itself. 
For many-good two"factor case, the proposition states: "Ordering 
the commodities with respect to the capital-labour ratios employed in 
production is to rank them in order of comparative advantage. Demand 
conditions merely determine the dividing line between exports and 
imports, it is not possible to break the chain of comparative advantage 
by exporting, say, the third and fifth commodities and importing the 
fourth when they are ranked by factor intensity." (Jones, 1956) However, 
Bhagwati (1972) showed that this chain proposition would not hold where 
factor-price equalization occured. Jones and Bhagwati apparently 
concurred, however, that the proposition would be valid whenever factor 
prices are not equalized, though neither provided proof. Deardorff (1979) 
has provided a formal proof for the proposition that trade accords with 
the ranking of goods by factor intensity if there are unequal factor 
prices in a two-country, two-factor model. He also showed, in an 
extension to the many-country case, that each of a country's exports will 
be at least as capital-intensive as each of the exports of all less 
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capital-abundant countries and at least as labour-intensive as each of 
the exports of all less labour-abundant countries regardless whether 
using the physical or the price definition of factor abundance. 
The second line of extension was initiated by Vanek (1968) and 
Melvin (1968), and they proposed a weaker version of the H-0 theorem, 
involving the factor content of trade rather than its commodity 
composition. In the many goods, two-factor model, Vanek (1968) with 
factor-price equalization, shows that the capital-abundant country will 
have more capital embodied in its exports than its imports and less 
labour embodied in its imports than in its exports, so t^ hat the factor 
content theorem is valid not just in ratio form but also in absolute 
form. Brecher and Choudhri (1982), within the basic two-factor 
multi-commodity model of a two-country world, show that international 
factor-price equalization is unnecessary for deriving the H-0 theorem in 
its factor-content version. Thus, although weaker version of the H-0 
theorem in terms of factor content of trade has been considerably 
generalized to include the case of many goods, many factors and many 
countries, it is the case only with the assumption of factor price 
equalization. 
In relation with the generality of H-0 theorem, with many goods, 
many factors and factor-price-equalization assumption, Learner (1980) 
analyzes its implications for the Leontief test of the H-0 theorem for 
the case of unbalanced trade. Learner shows that a valid test of the 
pattern of unbalanced trade must be stated in terms of the factor ratios 
embodied in production vs. consumption, rather than exports versus 
imports. Melvin (1968) shows that if there are more goods than primary 
factors of production then the indeterminacy of the structure of 
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production implies that any good may be exported by any country. Thus, as 
Deardorff (1982) puts it, this kind of generality has been bought only at 
the cost of other and perhaps equally restrictive assumption. 
Deardorff (1980’ 1982) takes rather different approach for the 
generalization of the law of comparative advantage. For the 
generalization, he argues that what is needed is to relax somewhat the 
rigidity of the proposition itself and require only that it holds in the 
sense of appropriate average rather than for each commodity individually. 
Following generalization of the theory of comparative advantage in terms 
of correlations between autarky prices and trade, Deardorff (1982) 
provided the generalized factor-content version of the H-0 theorem which 
provides a formal statement of the general idea that countries tend to 
export the services of those factors which they have in relative 
abundance. He also provided in the same paper a generalization of the 
commodity version of the theorem. The concept of a covariance is 
generalized to relate three variables rather than two. It is then shown 
that this generalized covariance among certain measures of factor 
abundance, factor int ens it y, and trade must be positive. What this 
implies for the pattern of trade is that goods that are exported, must on 
average use relatively intensively those factors in relative abundance 
and unintensively those factors that are relatively scarce. Analogously, 
imported goods must on average use scarce factors intensively and 
abundant factor unintensively. (Deardorff, 1982) Therefore, the generali-
zation of the H-0 theorem as a predictor of trade patterns based on the 
law of comparative advantage by relaxing several extreme assumptions 
including that of low and even dimensionality made the theorem survive as 
correlation, or in an average sense. It states that countries will tend 
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to export those goods which use relatively intensively their relatively 
abundant factors of production. 
Although survival of the H-0 theorem in terms of the generality of 
the assumptions was possible through relaxation of the rigidity of the 
proposition to some extent, there still remain some issues to be 
clarified in relation with the application of the theorem to empirical 
study of patterns of trade. These issues are closely related to the 
general method for empirical test of trade theories. First of all, in a 
proper empirical test, a careful formulation of a maintained hypothesis 
and an alternative hypothesis, and to identify observable phenomena about 
which the maintained hypothesis and the alternative offer different 
prediction is the first step of the procedures for the purpose. Many 
empirical studies were conducted in the context of general equilibrium 
model with two countries, two commodities, arid two factors which permit 
us to state the H-0 theorem in an unambiguous manner. However, in the 
process， since abstracting from differences in tastes and a number of 
other potential determinants renders relative factor endowment ratios 
determine the trade pattern, no one expects the theory to be exactly 
correct in its prediction for commodity composition of trade, As the neo 
factor proportions account and neo technology explanation of composition 
of trade apparently supported by enormous evidence, it must be conceded 
that many different characteristics express themselves in export 
patterns. Hence, as Hufbauer (1970) argues, no one theory can monopolize 
the explanation of manufactures trade. In fact, competing trade theories 
are rather complementary in their role for the explanation of commodity 
composition of trade. Furthermore, since generalized H-0 theorem is 
stated in terms of correlation or average performance of trade, there 
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exists insurmountable limitations of data in its included category and 
time span. All these factors contribute to the difficulty for the 
establishment of unambiguous maintained hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis in testing trade theories against real world data. Therefore, 
trade theories have usually been examined empirically without a clear 
statement of any alternative. In that event, whether the maintained 
hypothesis is accepted or rejected is a matter of aesthetics and 
judgement. As a consequence, when we conduct an empirical test about H-0 
theorem as one of trade theories, we do not test it to determine whether 
to accept or reject the theory, but only to measure the accuracy of the 
H-0 model. 
As mentioned earlier, since the H-0 theorem is a relationship among 
three variables: factor abundance, factor intensity, and trade, a proper 
test of accuracy must include direct and independent measures of all 
three concepts. However, most studies of trade have used measures of two 
of these sets of variables and have inferred the third. In addition to 
measuring only two of the three theoretical concepts, as explained in 
Learner (1984» p.50), many studies use inappropriate inferences about the 
third, unmeasured concept. The classic example is Leontief's (1953) 
‘paradox‘ when he used input-output table for the US economy to compare 
the capital per man embodied in one million dollar worth of 
representative US exports with the capital per man embodied in one 
million dollar worth of import substitutes. Surprisingly, he found that 
the ratio of capital to labour embodied in US exports was smaller than 
that embodied in import substitutes. However, his was not a test of the 
H-0 theorem, since he did not measure factor endowments. Leontief himself 
tended to accept the theorem and therefore interpreted his results as 
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demonstrating that the US is in some sense well endowed with labour. But 
subsequent literature has so often referred to his result as a •paradox,, 
that this interpretation has apparently not been accepted. But a number 
of other studies have applied the Leontief approach to other data sets3� 
and the results have typically reaffirmed the paradox for the early years 
but found that it may have disappeared by 1970 (Deardorff, 1984). In 
response to this paradox, a number of studies pointed to skilled labour, 
or human capital as a factor distinct from physical capital and unskilled 
labour, and have indicated that this may be the primary source of US 
comparative advantage. Learner (1980) argued that the US in Leontief's 
data was a net exporter of both capital and labour services, and this 
could have happened either because US trade was unbalanced, or because 
factors other than capital and labour were involved. 
A second measurement of the accuracy of the H-0 theorem involves 
regressions of a given country's net exports across commodities on factor 
input intensities as in Branson (1971), Branson and Monoyios(1977), 
Harkness and Kyle (1975) and Maskus (1983), and others, If the estimated 
coefficient of a certain factor is positive, the country is inferred to 
be abundantly supplied in that resource. But as Learner and Bowen (1981) 
showed by means of a three-dimensional example, the inference made about 
factor endowments from a cross-section regression of trade on factor 
intensities may be incorrect. Subsequently, Aw (1983) proved in the 
framework of a multi-country and multi-industry model that inferences 
about relative factor abundance from cross-section results in regard to 
the trade of a particular country cannot be made, unless very stringent 
3) For example, Tatemoto and Ichimura (1959) for Japan, Roskamp (1963) for 
West German. For the US, Vanek (1963), Keesing (1965,1966)，Baldwin (1971)， 
etc.. 
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conditions are met. 
A third variety of study regresses net exports across countries on 
measures of factor endowments as in Learner (1974), Chenery and Syrquin 
(1975), Bowen (1983), and Learner (1984). In the most comprehensive 
analysis of this kind of relationship, Learner (1984) regressed the net 
exports of each of 10 aggregate commodities for 60 market type countries 
on measures of the relative supplies of 11 factors of production for 
these countries. He concludes that the main currents of international 
trade are well understood in terms of the abundance of a ‘ remarkbly 
limited list of resources' and that, in this sense,'the H-0 theory comes 
out looking rather well,. (Learner, 1984, p.xvi) But this type of study, 
though conceptually appropriate, cannot be said to be a complete 
measurement of the accuracy of H-0 theorem either. As Bowen (1983) as 
well as Learner (1984) admits, there is no necessary relationship between 
the coefficients estimated in regard to factor endowments and the factor 
intensity of trade. As pointed out by Deardorff (1984, p,492), therefore, 
all of these works are very useful in describing the determinants of 
trade, and perhaps even in predicting trade flows, but as a body of 
evidence actually testing the H-0 theorem it is at best only suggestive. 
He also suggested that one can view these studies as tests of the joint 
hypothesis that the H-0 theorem is valid and that some relationship among 
endowments hold. 
On the other hand, Balassa (1979，1984), Balassa and Bauwens (1985), 
and Bowen, Learner, and Sveikauskas (1982) simultaneously introduced trade 
flows, factor intensities, and factor endowments in their analyses. 
Though apparently not intended as a test of the theorem, Balassa's (1979) 
work corrected this deficiency by regressing estimated factor intensity 
106 
coefficients of trade flow for 36 countries on separate measures of their 
factor endowments. The results provided encouraging support for the 
factor proportions theory. Furthermore, Balassa and Bauwens (1985) 
examined the determinants of trade among 38 principal exporters of 
manufactured goods using similar procedure in the framework of 
multilateral trade model. The estimates provide support to the H-0 theory 
of international specialization by showing that countries which are 
relatively abundant in physical and in human capital tend to export 
relatively physical capital intensive and human capital intensive 
products in bilateral trade, and the result remains robust as various 
methods of specification, estimation and measurement are applied. 
All extensions and evidences described in this section indicate 
that operation of the market mechanism in commodity markets and factor 
markets is generally consistent with the inter-industry trade pattern as 
predicted by the factor proportions theory. As mentioned earlier, the aim 
of the chapter is not to test the accuracy of H-0 theorem with the 
available Chinese data, it is rather to examine the extent to which 
market force in China due to economic reform affects the pattern of its 
inter-industry trade. Therefore, in this dissertation, I mainly adopt the 
approach which includes the measures of al I the three relevant variables 
of H-0 theorem as shown in Balassa and Bauwens (1985) to see the impact 
of market-oriented reform in the Chinese industry on the pattern of 
inter-industry trade. 
4-3 Determinants of inter-industry trade in the Chinese industry 
This section will give econometric contents for my argument. For 
the purpose, I will first elaborate on the method and statistical data 
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for econometric investigation of inter-industry trade pattern in the 
Chinese industry. Then, it is attempted to provide a test to the 
appropriateness of factor proportions theory of international trade as an 
explanation of inter-industry trade patterns in the Chinese industry. 
Method of the analysis 
As an appropriate method to measure the accuracy of factor 
proportions explanation of international trade pattern in the context of 
multi-country, multi-commodity and multi-factor, Balassa (1979,1984), 
Balassa and Bauwens (1985) make use of all three relevant concepts； trade 
flows, factor internsity arid factor endowments. In transposing results 
obtained from the ‘commodity space' into the ‘country space，， the method 
applied provides a test of the H-0 theory. The results can be seen as 
positive evidences in support of the factor proportions theoretical 
explanation of inter-industry trade pattern as a consequence of the 
operation of market forces in the market economies. 
Compared to other approaches such as Leontief's test for factor 
contents of imports and exports and cross industry or cross country 
regression analyses, the methodology adopted in the above studies is 
relatively robust either theoretically or conceptually. Therefore, I 
follow the line of inference proposed by them for the purpose of the 
analysis in this chapter. The analysis simultaneously introduce trade 
flows, factor intensities, and factor endowments irl analyzing the pattern 
of inter-industry trade in manufactured goods in China, The mehtodology 
applied involves ' two-stage' estimation procedure as well as ‘one-pass' 
estimation procedure for the purpose of comparison. In the first stage of 
the two-stage estimation procedure, normalized net exports of all 142 
industries to each of 32 major importers of Chinese manufactures are 
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regressed on the measures of physical capital and human capital 
intensities of the Chinese industries. In the second stage， the 
regression coefficients thus obtained, indicating the relative capital 
intensities of the export structure of China vis-a-vis their imports, are 
regressed on the ratios of physical and human capital endowments of each 
country to those of China. Ordinary least squares (OLS) have been used 
for the first stage of estimation, then in order to adjust for the 
possible heteroskedasticity, generalized least squares (GLS) have been 
used in the second stage of estimation. In the latter case two 
regressions have been estimated sImuX taneous1ys I also conducted 
‘one-pass' estimation by OLS as suggested by Balassa and Bauwens (1985)， 
which combines the two stages of estimation mentioned above. 
The concept of an industry and trade variable 
Empirical tests of the H-0 model have tended to identify sets of 
commodities as grouped in the accepted classification of trade statistics 
with the concept of industries used in the model, which are assumed to 
produce perfectly homogeneous commodities. But, undoubtedly, goods and 
services possess large numbers of characteristics, as seen by Lancaster 
(1966), and no two are ever perfect substitutes for each other with 
respect to all characteristics. The criteria of aggregation used in the 
compilation of international trade statistics are the extent of 
commodities' substitutability in consumption and the similarity of input 
requirements in production. Therefore, they have the tendency to 
disregard the problems arising from the obvious discrepancy between the 
concept of an industry as defined in the model underlying the hypothesis 
tested and that as defined in the aggregated data. In this context, the 
problem of defining industries is the problem of partitioning all 
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production and consumption activities in an economy into proper subsets 
which are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Many definitions of industry 
have been used on the basis of their own theoretical grounds.4) 
In practice, however, most of the empirical analyses concentrate on 
the 3-digit and, if that is not possible, on the 2-digit level of 
aggregates of the Standard Industrial Trade Classification (SITC) or 
equivalent aggregates of the different kinds of classifications. It is 
widely aknowleged that the resultant aggregates of internationally traded 
goods correspond roughly to ‘industries', as the concept is used 
conventionally in economic analysis, that is, a group of producers 
producing essentially the same set of commodities. In our investigation, 
China's 1986-1989 trade data edited by the General Administration of 
Customs of the PRC according to the Commodities Classification for 
China's Customs Statistics which 3,s equivalent to the 4-digit level of 
SITC are utilized. The data are aggregated by the author to cover total 
142 commodity groups of 3-digit SITC in the manufacturing sector (SITC 
5，8) with the exclusion of natural resource products whose production is 
importantly affected by the availability of natural resources.5) 
With such a definition of an industry, the fact that the 
simultaneous exports and imports in an industry are inconsistent with the 
premise of the H-0 theory brings about the problem of selection of 
appropriate trade variable for empirical study. Because of the 
uncertainty regarding the form of the linkage between comparative 
advantage and trade, variety of specifications of the dependent variable 
in regression for test of the theory have appeared in the literature. The 
4) In his study of intra-industry trade in the Heckscher-Ohlin framework, Falvey 
(1981)，for example, favoured a grouping in terms of the set of commodities 
which can be produced using mobile labour and industry-specific capital. 
5) Commodities belonging to the SITC division 68 were excluded for the reason. 
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most common is net exports, but separate regressions for gross exports 
and imports have also been attempted, In this vein, Balassa (1965) made 
use of the ratio of country's share in the world exports of a particular 
commodity to its share in the world exports of all manufactured good as 
an indication of its ‘revealed' comparative advantage6'. Harkness and Kyle 
(1975) used only the sign of net exports in the relevant industry as the 
dependent variable. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Deardorff (1982) 
correctly, if gross exports behave much differently from net exports, 
they reflect the phenomenon of intra-industry trade about which the 
standard factor proportions model has little to say. In, this case, the 
signs of net exports of the ratios of a country's exports to the world's 
exports in industries are inadequate to be used as dependent variables in 
an econometric study of 8-0 theorem. Thus, in addition to the theoretical 
appropriateness, as we utilize the net exports as the trade variable, the 
errors involved in measuring comparative advantage In terms of only 
exports or imports can also be reduced. In the analysis, net exports in 
the Chinese manufacturing sector (SITC 5-8) to the 32 major importers7) of 
China's products on the 3-digit level of SITC are utilized. 
Related issue is the problem of normalization of the trade 
variable. Since the volume of trade of a particular good in a country 
obviously depends on the importance of that good in world market and the 
size of the relevant country's economy, in order to avoid those effects, 
net exports have to be normal ized8). As done by Branson and Monoyios 
(1977) in their investigation of the determinants of the US trade 
6) In his subsequent investigation, Balassa (1984) defined revealed comparative 
advantage analogously with regard to imports. 
7) The trade flows between China and them comprise over ninety percent of the 
total trade of China in SITC 5-8. 
8) On the importance of the normalization, see Sturn and Maskus (1981), p.211. 
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pattern, the scaling method often been used is the value of shipment of 
an industry in individual countries.9) Because of the lack of data, I 
follow the method utilized in Balassa and Bauwens (1985)， and the 
normalization has been done by expressing the net exports of China to 
country j in industry i, (Xij - Mi j), as a ratio of the sum of these 
exports and imports (Xij + Mij). 
Factor intensity coefficients and factor endowments 
In the study, three factors of production are introduced： physical 
capital, human capital, and labour. With labour as the numeraire, factor 
intensities are expressed in terms of physical and human capital per 
worker while factor endowments are defined by relating the endowment of 
physical and human capital to the size of labour. 
Since the aim of the chapter is to investigate whether the 
structure of inter—industry trade in China is consistent with the 
prediction of the H-0 model as the result of operation of market forces 
in the Chinese industry, given the uniqueness of the economy, it is 
important to choose the factor intensity coefficients of Chinese 
industries from its own data unless factor substitution elasticities are 
zero.101 As mentioned earlier, the product classification scheme used in 
this study is based on the 3-digit SITC categories. But, since there is 
no exactly matching Chinese industrial statistics in their classifi-
cation, we can only make use of approximately matching data. In this 
9) The method also criticized by Deardorff (1984，p.487). He argued that the use 
of industry shipment artificially reduces the apparent trade flow in precisely 
those industries where comparative advantage is strongest and a great deal is 
produced, 
10) Because of lack of data, for empirical study of trade patterns, US data for 
factor intensity coefficients have been reluctantly used in many studies without 
theoretical or empirical validity. Although Lary (1968) has shown variations in 
capital-intensity coefficients to be small in US-UK, US-Japan, and US-India 
comparisons as regards his value added measure, Noland's (1988) estimates show 
larger divergence. 
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context, the People's Republic of China 1985 Industrial Census Data 
(hereafter Census data) published in 1988 is a very useful point of 
departure for the purpose.11} In using the Census data, for the purpose of 
comparison with other studies and because of the lack of more detailed 
trade statistics than SITC 4-digit level of classification, I try to 
match the Census Data to the products classification of trade data rather 
than to match the trade data to the classification of the Census data. In 
case the Census data do not have comparable level of classification with 
SITC 3-digit level, I utilized data from the upper level of 
classification which includes it. 
In the analysis, physical capital intensity and human capital 
intensity are dealt with separately. Branson (1973) observed that under 
the assumption of perfect complements or perfect substitutes’ various 
forms of capital can be aggregated to form one capital intensity 
coefficient. Elsewhere, Balassa and Bauwens (1985) tested H-0 theorem 
with both of aggregated and disaggregated capital to confirm the theory. 
They made use of the stock measure and flow measure of aggregated capital 
intensity, where the former was expressed in terms of physical capital 
stock per worker plus discounted differential between average wage rate 
and that of unskilled labour, and the latter in terms of the sum of the 
non-wage value added per worker and average wage rate. For China, 
however, the approach depending on the wage differential is difficult to 
apply due to little variation in wage rate among industries according to 
the variation of factor intensity. Thus, I relate trade flows to the 
disaggregated physical capital intensity and human capital intensity. 
11) in the PRC 1985 Industrial Census Data. Chinese manufacturing sector was 
classified into individual categories ranging from 200 up to about 500 according 
to the purposes and objects of the census of relevant items. 
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Physical capital intensity is defined in terms of the fixed capital 
for production (生産用固定資産） per employee of the relevant industry at 
the end of 1985, which includes capital for productive purpose such as 
houses, buildings, machinery, tools and apparatuses, facilities, 
measurement equipment and office machines. Although it was recorded in 
purchasing price, I do not consider the problem of depreciation, since 
the study is concerned only with the relative physical capitial 
intensities among the the Chinese industries. For human capital, I adopt 
the view that differentials in the intensity are reflected in 
inter-industry differences in the employment of different kinds of labour 
following Keesing's (1965) lead. Human capital intensity is, thus, 
described with the percentage of the number of techinical personnel to 
that of total employees of the relevant industry in the end of 1985, 
Both of physical capital intensity and human capital intensity are 
expressed in logarithmic terms, ) 
In the absence of comparable data on the physical capital stock in 
the individual countries, as a proxy for physical capital endowment, I 
have taken the sum of gross fixed capital formation over the period 
1972-86’ estimated in current prices and converted into US dollars at 
average exchange rate of each year, reflecting the assumption that 
physical capital has a life of 15 years.12 The data have been obtained 
from various issues of National Accounts Statistics published by United 
Nations.13) Investment values have been assumed to depreciate at an annual 
12) A similar procedure was employed by Hufbauer (1970), Balassa (1979)，Learner 
(1984). The periods considered were ranged from 12 years in Hufbauer (1970) to 
17 years in Balassa (1979)，and we used the period of 15 years as was in 
Learner (1984). . 
13) Data for gross fixed formation given in the source for socialist countries 
cannot be directly compared with those for market economies, but without 
consistent data series in other sources, we adopt them as the best availabe data. 
Since the data have been converted into US dollors at average official exchange 
114 
rate of 4 percent a year, and the estimates have been devided by the 
number of economically active population pertaining to 1983 as obtained 
from Demographic Yearbook published by United Nations. 
For human capital endowment, modified Harbison-Myer index of 
education has been used as a proxy for human capital. The index is 
derived by dividing the sum of the number of secondary school students 
and three times of the number of tertiary institutes students by the 
number of total population whose age ranged from 10 to 25. The data have 
been obtained from various issues of Statistical Yearbook published by 
United Nations. In the analysis, relative factor endowments between China 
and another country is defined in terms of the ratio of factor 
endowments between them and expressed in logarithmic terms. All the 
national attributes for our study as mentioned above are summarized in 
the Appendix F of the dissertation. 
Specification and the result of estimation 
Balassa (1979) introduced a two-stage procedure to analyze the 
pattern of comparative advantage in manufactured goods. In the first 
stage of estimation, Indices of comparative advantage for manufacturing 
product categories were regressed on variables representing relative 
capital intensity in the case of each country. In the second stage, the 
regression coefficients obtained for the individual countries were 
regressed on variables representing relative factor endowments in a 
cross-section framework. As transposing results obtained from the 
commodity space into the country space, the method utilized data for all 
three variables to test H-0 theorem instead of inferring one from the 
rate in the relevant year, considering generally overvalued exchange rate in 
socialist countries, relatively understated gross fixed capital formation in the 
countries might be offset to a considerable extent, 
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other two. In the investigation, I make use of the approach to argue that 
considerable portion of inter-industry trade in the Chinese industry can 
be explained by the factor proportions theory of international economics 
as market forces became to take more important role in the past decade. 
The first stage of estimation is represented by equation (4.1), 
where indices of comparative advantage are regressed on the physical 
capital-labour ratio and human capital-labour ratio. In the second stage, 
by equation (4.2), the resulting regression coefficients for bilateral 
trade are regressed on relative factor endowment variables. 
NXji = a j + 召Pjln pi + y3hjln hi + uj i (4.1) 
Gj 
(a) /Spj 二 aP + bPln——+ vPj (4.2) 
Gc 
(b) /3hj = ah + bHn-^ - + v^ -
He 
In the equations, NX stands for normalized net exports； superscripts p 
and h denote physical and human capital intensities, respectively; and G 
and H are the physical and human capital endowment variables. The 
subscript j(1...32) indicates China's trade partner and i (1...142) is 
the industry subscripts. The subscript c denotes China. In turn, uji is 
the error term in (4.1)， vPj and vhj are the error terms in (4.2). 
I estimate above equations for Chinese trade and industrial data 
for each year of the period 1986-1989. There are 32 equations for each 
year pertaining to bilateral trade between China and other countries 
chosen for the study in the first stage; in each equation there are 
potentially 142 observations. In fact, there are fewer numbers of 
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non-zero observations, because of the lack of trade flows between China 
and certain countries in some categories of goods. 
In (4.1), regression coefficients (y3’s) show the estimated rela-
tionship between the pattern of net exports between China and other 
countries and the capital intensities of the individual industries. 
Negative (positive) /3 coefficients thus shows that China has the 
comparative advantage in labour (capital) intensive products while 
numerical magnitude of the /3 coefficients indicates the extent of the 
China's comparative advantage in labour (capital) intensive commodities. 
In (4.2), the ratios of physical and human capital endowments in 
China's trading partners to those in China are introduced to explain the 
pattern of the (3 coefficients estimated in (4.1), That is, the physical 
capital intensity of bilateral trade is linked to relative physical 
capital endowments and human capital intensity of bilateral trade to 
relative human capital endowments. Hence, in (4.2), we test the 
hypothesis that inter-country differences in the 日 coefficients in the 
equation (4.1) can be explained by the differences in the ratios of the 
physical and human capital endowments between China and its trade 
partners. If the sign of /3's estimated in (4.1) are negative, the 
negative (positive) b coefficients in (4,2) thus show that China exports 
labour intensive products to the countries endowed with abundant capital* 
The numerical magnitude of b's show the sensitivity of the commodity 
characteristics of China's exports in terms of factor intensities with 
regard to the difference of capital endowments between China and its 
trade partner. 
In order to escape from the influence of multicollinearity of the 
factor endowment variables, in (4.2), I relate the estimated coefficients 
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of physical capital intensity to relative physical capital endowments in 
(a) and that of human capital intensity to relative human capital 
endowment in (b) separately. Therefore, the hypothesis tested is that 
China as a country with relatively abundant unskilled labour tends to 
import capital intensive products and, thus, tends to export relatively 
labour-intensive products in bilateral trade as predicted by factor 
proportions theory. Ordinary least squares (OLS) has been used in 
estimating (4.1), and in order to escape from heteroskedasticity problem 
likely to be present in econometric work on cross-section data which may 
lead to inconsistent estimates of the standard errors of the coefficients 
and thus to incorrect significance tests, generalized least squares have 
been used first in estimating (a) and (b) of (4.2) simultaneously. 
An estimation technique combining the two stages of estimation 
procedure in a ‘ one pass' procedure as suggested by Balassa and Bauwens 
(1985) were also utilized for our analysis. The one-pass procedure 
combines the two stages of estimation, involving the use of interaction 
terms that relate capital intensities to capital endowments. Combining 
(4.1) and (4.2) yields： 
Gj Hj 
NXji = ao + aPln pi + ahln hi + bPln In pi + bhln In hi + eji 
Gc He 
(4.3) 
where eji is disturbance term. Comparisons of (4.2) and (4.3) show that 
one can interpret the coefficients of lnpi and lnhi in one-pass 
estimation as the constants of the second stage equation, and the 
coefficients InGj/Gclnpi and lnHj/Hclnhi as the coefficients of lnGj/Gc 
and lnHj/Hc in the second stage equation. Under certain assumptions, even 
though the statistical significance will differ owing to differences in 
the number of observations, the two sets of estimated coefficients will 
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have equal values (Amemiya, 1978). 
The results obtained from alternative estimation procedures for our 
analysis is given in Table 4-1 with t-values in parenthesis. The 
regression coefficients of relative human capital endowments have 
expected sign and consistently statistically significant at one percent 
level whether they are estimated by the two-stage or the one-pass 
procedure. Nevertheless, the results for physical capital intensity are 
not so definitive. The regression coefficients estimated by the two-stage 
procedure and by the one-pass procedure have different signs and levels 
of statistical significance. But, considering asymptotic validity of the 
significance test in the former and reletively low levels of t-values for 
it, it would be reasonable to accept the results obtained by the one-pass 
estimation procedure, which show expected sign and consistent statistical 
significance at one percent level throught 1986-1989. 
On the other hand, the magnitudes of the coefficients of physical 
endowments are not so different from nil regardless the estimation 
procedures. Comparing with those of human capital endowments, this 
implies weaker responsiveness of net exports in the Chinese industry to 
the variation in physical intensity across industrial sectors and across 
its trade partners. This also might partly explain the opposite signs of 
the coefficients of physical capital endowments obtained by two different 
procedures of estimation. Weak response of China's net exports to the 
variation in physical capital intensity and endowments might be due to 
the relatively comprehensive industrial basis in China as a result of 
industrial development strategy as a socialist country in the past. In 
addition, in view of the long life of capital goods in the Chinese 
industry where the scraping decision tends to be made in the perspective 
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Table 4-1 
Regression coefficients for the determinants of 
inter-industry trade 
Explanatory variables： aP ah bP bh R2 jsja 
Two-stage 
estimation 1986 -0.190** 0.098 0.049* -0.450** 0 448 64 
by GLSW (-3.23) (1.12) (2.45) (-5.54) 
1987 -0.181^ 0.169* 0.040* -0.501** 0.519 64 
(-3.19) (2,11) (2.07) (-6.76) 
1988 -0.255" 0.147* 0.043* -0.439^ 0.420 64 
(-3.83) (1.75) (1.87) (-5.59) 
1989 -0.224^ 0.136* 0.028 -0.400^ 0.336 64 
(-2.68) (1.65) (0.98) (-5.23) 
One-pass 
estimation 1986 -0.041 0.013 -0.012^ -0.366** 0.283 3650 
by 0LS： (-1.40) (0.36) (-7.69) (-13.20) 
1987 -0.048* -0.012 -0.014� -0.331" 0.289 3768 
(-1.72) (-0.35) (-9.17) (-12.64) 
1988 -0.132" -0.009 -0.013^ -0.277$# 0.262 3874 
(-4,78) (-0.26) (-9.04) (-10.63) 
1989 -0.116^ -0.031 -0.016" -0.232^ 0.245 3949 
(-4.23) (-0.94) (-10.57) (-9.13) 
a The number of observation. 
** Statistically significant at 1% level, 
* Statistically significant at 5% level. 
# Statistically significant at 10% level. 
of physical life of capital goods rather than in that of economic life of 
them, the gross fixed capital formation during 15 years used as a proxy 
for capital endowments might underestimate the stock of economically 
active physical capital in China.13 China's huge rural population also 
14) Since we have utilized the feasible GLS estimation procedure in the analysis, 
the usual significance tests now have an asymptotic justification rather than 
small sample validity. (Johnston, 1984，pp.337-338) 
15) In 1985，it was reported that 38.9 percent of the Chinese industrial enterprises' 
equipment and installations for production was of 1980s vintage while another 43 
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might be conducive to the underestimation of the country's capital 
endowments in our analysis as the gross capital formation during 15 years 
were divided by economically active population for the calulation of 
relative physical endowments of countries. Finally, we note that some 
industries in China with high physical capital intensity produce basic 
intermediate inputs which are standardized so that they have high 
substitutability and produced with mass production technology. Such 
products are often exported to the industrialized countries, and they 
might be conducive to the weak regression coefficients of physical 
capital endowments, too. All the constants of the equations pertaining to 
physical capital are statistically significant at one percent level 
except those for 1986 and 1987 estimated by the one-pass procedure. 
But, constants of the equations pertaining to human capital are not so 
definitive in their signs and statistical significance, and the 
magnitudes of them are not so different from zero. 
Average levels of the explanatory power of the regressions range 
between 0.34 and 0.52 in case of the two-stage estimation procedure, 
which are higher than those of the one-pass estimation prodedure recorded 
between 0.25 and 0.29. Considering the cross-sectional nature of the 
analysis and in comparison with other studies1® the extent of explanatory 
power of our regression results for China are rather respectable. 
percent of them of 1970s vintage. Remaining 18.1 percent was of 1960s or of 
the older vintage. ( PRC 1985 Industrial Census Data, summary edition, 
pp. 134-137) However, since the purchasing prices were used for the data, the 
quantitative share of the older vintage of equipment and installations was 
underestimated. Thus, it is believed that, during the period of 1986-89, 
substantial amount of economically active physical capital for production in the 
Chinese industry was of the older vintage than 1972. 
16) For comprehensive survey of econometric testing of trade theories, see 
Deardorff (1984) in Jones and Kenen (1984). For comparison with the result of 
similar method of estimation, see Balassa and Bauwens (1985) which conducted 
econometric testing for H-0 theorem against bilateral trade data among 38 
principle exporters of manufactured goods. 
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4-4 Concluding remark 
In sum, the result of the econometric analysis shows that the 
factor intensity of bilateral trade in manufactred goods in China can be 
explained in terms of relative factor endowments as predicted by factor 
proportions theory of international trade. In general, China tends to 
import capital intensive goods, especially human capital intensive goods, 
and thus, tends to export labour intensive goods as the country is 
situated in relatively weak position in capital endowments. The result 
leads us to conclude that inter-industry trade in China's bilateral trade 
with other countries largely follows the patterns predicted by the factor 
proportions theory^  Therefore, as far as we accept the fact that the 
tenet is a product of inference based on the well functioning market 
mechanism and that China's economy in a transitional period utilizes 
market forces as its cooperative mechanism at least at the critical 
margin, its market forces is indeed operating in determination of its 
inter-industry trade patterns, 
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CHAPTER 5 
INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE IN THE CHINESE INDUSTRY 
This chapter consists of six parts. The first section contains 
historical background of intra-industry trade in international economics 
and describes the evolution of trade theories to explain it. The second 
section presents a review of theories of intra-industry trade and 
hypotheses about trade patterns which can be derived from them. In the 
third section I measure the' level of intra-industry trade in the Chinese 
industry, and attempt to identify the 'stylized facts' in regard to its 
patterns, Then, the analysis of the sources of Intra-industry trade in 
the Chinese industry is provided. Theoretical and econometric investiga-
tion about the determinants of China's intra—industry trade in 
manufactures is conducted in the fifth section. The chapter is ended with 
a short concluding remark. 
5-1 Background 
As the numerous references in the literature on intra-industry 
trade indicate1), most authors agree that systematic research on the 
subject began with the contributions of Grubel and Lloyd (1975). Grubel 
and Lloyd (1975) themselves observed, however, that the notion of 
intra-industry trade was not new and that their study was regarded as the 
continuation of a past concern with the pattern of commodity trade, and 
they referred to earlier publications which can be regarded, as 
forerunners of the study of intra-industry trade. Frankel (1943) for ‘ 
instance found that countries, with a relatively high proportion of 
1) See Greenway and Milner (1986) for comprehensive overview of the literature 
on intra-industry. 
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international trade per capita, export and import what are apparently 
same commodities. He explained such trade in terms of differences in 
quality between the imported and exported goods, unit values being used 
as proxies for quality. The exchange of products differentiated in 
quality was explained by differences in human skill endowments between 
countries. 
Hirschman (1945) studied a broader issue, namely the extent to 
which the structure of world trade was dominated by the exchange of 
foodstuff and raw materials against manufactures, which was considered 
the traditional type of international trade. Hirschman found that the 
exchange of manufactures against manufactures increased in the year 
1913-29, and considered it as evidence of international division of 
labour between industries. The approach in Hirschman (1945) involved the 
measurement of the matching of individual countries' exports and imports 
by broad classes of commodities. This is equivalent to the measurement of 
intra-industry trade when only two broad industries are considered, 
namely those producing foodstuffs and raw materials, and manufactures. 
On the other hand, the phenomenon of intra-industry trade was 
empirically observed and presented with some emphasis in studies carried 
out in the 1960s which dealt mainly with the effects of economic 
integration on specialization in trade. The studies relate in particular 
to the effects of the Benelux Economic Union (BLEU) founded in 1954 and 
the European Economic Community (EEC) founded in 1958. In his study of . 
the changes in the pattern of intra-bloc trade of the BLEU, Verdoorn 
(I960) calculated the bilateral trade ratios of a sample of 121 products 
at comparable levels of international trade classification for two 
different points in time. He noticed that the number of the extreme 
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values of the ratios had been reduced while their median increased since 
the formation of the BLEU. From this he inferred that specialization, if 
it did accompany the intra-bloc trade, was to be found within rather than 
between the different categories of trade. He also argued that the rather 
large variance of the price differentials found for the Dutch and BLEU 
bilateral export prices indicated, in the absence of trade obstacles, a 
high degree of product differentiation, and corroborated the trend 
towards intra-industry specialization. Michaely (1962), analysing the 
relationship between commodity concentration and price fluctuations in 
international trade, computed an index of dissimilarity of exports and 
imports in five classes of commodities for 36 countries, and noted that 
in general the commodity composition of exports and imports of the high 
income countries showed considerable similarity while the opposite held 
true for most of the developing countries, Balassa (1963) noticed that 
much of the increased trade in manufactures in the EEC occurred within 
rather than between commodity groups, Kojima (1964), on the basis of the 
results of his study of the pattern of international trade among advanced 
countries observed: "A significant finding which present opportunities 
for further inquiry is the rapid growth of horizontal trade2) of 
manufactured goods among highly developed, homogeneous and industrial 
countries. We need to uncover the forces underlying this conspicuous 
trend and define any new philosophy that may have evolved which is 
contrary to the traditional comparative costs theory." (Kojima, 1964’ 
P.36) 
The cases briefly discussed indicate that the study of intra-
industry trade and its forerunners originated from an apparent 1 � 
2) Kojima (1964，1971) used the terms ‘horizontal trade，and 'vertical trade' 
instead of the terms 'intra-industry' and 'inter-industry' trade. 
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contradiction between the empirical observation of such trade and the 
expectations based on the traditional trade theory.3) This contradiction 
has inspired two broad views on reconciliation. The first one recognised 
that the aggregation level of trade data chosen to represent the 
theoretical concept of the industry comprised with heterogeneous 
products. According to this view, the observed intra-industry trade was 
due to the inclusion of the items with differences in factor contents 
that were large enough to restore the validity of the H-0 theory within 
the same statistical category of products. Therefore, sceptics have 
regarded these observations as a spurious phenomenon. On the basis of 
calculations using 1963 US census of manufactures, Finger (1975) argued 
that nearly 40 percent of the variation in factor intensity among the 
product categories considered was within these categories. In order to 
distinguish between theoretical predictions and empirical observation, he 
insisted upon calling the former ‘intra-industry' and the latter ‘trade 
overlap'. In the review of the book by Grubel and Lloyd (1975), Lipsey 
(1976) concluded that 4much, although not all, of intra-industry trade is 
a statistical phenomenon'. Similar view was expressed in Rayment 
(1976,1983). According to these scholars, it is difficult to agree with 
the argument that the observation of exports and imports in the same data 
category is reason to reject the factor proportions approach to trade 
theory. 
More recently, using the method of extrapolation relying on the 
result of regression, Chipman (1985) generated empirical estimates of the 
3) In the early 1960s a number of applied economists were interested in the 
evolution of trade patterns pursuant to the formation of the European Economic 
Community. Verdoorn (1960) found evidence of increasing intra-industry 
specialization in the decade following customs union's foundation. Conventional 
wisdom on the effects of customs union, following Viner (1950), suggested that 
inter-industry specialization would follow trade liberalization. 
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level of disaggregation needed for observed intra-industry trade 
disappear. He made the argument that all intra-industry trade is a 
statistical artifact attributable to the ‘categorical aggregation' of 
data, and a sufficient degree of disaggregation would eliminate the need 
for a theory of intra-industry trade. Although Chipman (1985) has some 
reservation about the legitimacy of the extrapolation in his estimation, 
the argument is made that it is possible to accomodate observed 
intra-industry trade within standard H-0 model. 
In this context, definition of an industry is important. As a more 
advanced discussion, reviewing various attempts in the literature, Lloyd 
(1989) concluded that the problem of defining industries is the problem 
of partitioning all production and consumption activities in an economy 
into proper subsets which are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. However, 
the criteria used to group commodities into industries differ between 
models; there may be no single partitioning that can be used to test a 
multiplicity of hypotheses concerning intra-industry trade. In all cases, 
a product group is defined by a proper subset of commodities. Within the 
subset commodities are related to each other in someway that is not 
shared by commodities not in the subset. Although the conceivable 
patterns of inter- and intra-industry vary sharply between models, it is 
this relatedness which gives rise to genuine intra-industry trade. In 
some sense, all the models can be considered as the extensions of H-0 
model. For instance, by disaggregation of one or two of the industries 
into a commodity continum, some intra-industry models and the theoretical 
extensions of H-0 model have been linked in the intra-industry trade 
models based on a commodity continuum4). 
4) See Lancaster (1980,1984), Helpman (1981)，Falvey (1981), and Dixit and 
Grossman (1982). 
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Nevertheless, all empirical studies on intra-industry trade have 
recognized the danger that its quantitative importance will be exagger-
ated by the inclusion in a single trade category of goods which either 
have different production functions or have different end uses. 
Especially Grubel and Lloyd (1975) and Gray (1979) were able to 
disaggregate as far as their data bases allowed without any serious 
indication that intra-industry trade would disappear. Thus, the second 
approach to reconcile the phenomenon of intra-industry trade with 
theoretical considerations was to relax the assumptions underlying the 
H-0 theory and to see whether this could lead to , a theoretical 
underpinning of the empirical observations on intra-industry trade. 
Allowances were made to postulate alternative view of industries, namely 
that they could be characterized by production process with increasing 
rather than constant returns to scale, producing differentiated rather 
than homogeneous goods, in imperfect rather than perfect competitive 
markets. Relaxing the assumptions of the H-0 theory one by one or 
simulaneoustly gave rise to a variety of models capable of explaining the 
existence of intra-industry trade. This approach was followed systemati-
cally in Grubel and Lloyd (1975, part 2). It led to the descriptions of 
intra-industry trade in functionally homogeneous products, in differen-
tiated products, and of intra-industry trade due to technology gap, 
product cycle and foreign processing etc. Later contributions in search 
for a theoretical explanations of intra-industry trade was focussed 
particularly on the elements of alternative market structures and various 
types of competitive behaviours. 
On the other hand, since there may be no single partitioning that 
can be used in modelling a multiplicity of hypotheses concerning 
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intra-industry trade, usual practice for tidy general equilibrium model 
is to select only a few of the relevant variables and assume away the 
rest. As Gray (1990) puts it, "When all aspects apply to all commodities, 
the resulting phenomenon can merit no other description but ‘untidy', and 
to force it into a single, formal model with all of the circumscribing 
assumptions that formality requires, will cover up as much, if not more 
than it reveals". In the next section, theories of intra-industry trade 
and their resulting hypotheses for its determination are dealt with. 
5-2 Theoretical explanations for intra-industry trade , 
The presence of many separate and distinct models of intra-industry 
trade indicates that the wide range of factors can affect the volume and 
pattern of intra-industry trade. These variables influence intra-industry 
trade from a number of different directions and can be supplemented in 
many cases by idiosyncrasies at the country and industry level. Various 
models of intra-industry trade permit the formulation of testable 
hypotheses, although not of ones which are necessarily model-specific. 
Therefore, it is difficult to test specific models of intra-industry 
trade, at least at the present. This forms a striking contrast to the H-0 
model of inter-industry trade for which we may be able to establish 
model- specific, testable hypotheses. Documentary evidences and 
development of theoretical models of intra-industry trade suggest that 
among others the variety of product, production characteristics and 
market structure may be systematically related to intra-industry trade, 
and hypotheses explaining it can be derived. 
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION： Development of the models of intra-
industry trade tends to place more importance on trade in differentiated, 
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rather than homogeneous, products. According to Greenway (1984)， although 
it may not always be possible to clearly distinguish in practice, three 
distinct forms of product differentiation can be conceived. Horizontal 
differentiation refers to differentiation by attributes, or characteris-
tics, in the Lancaster's (1979) sense； all the products within a given 
group share certain common, core characteristics. The manner in which 
these characteristics is combined determines the product's specification, 
and product or attribute differentiation can be identified by the 
presence of a variety of specifications in a particular group or 
industry. Vertical differentiation refers to the presence, of differences 
in absolute amount of all the core characteristics present in a group of 
products. This type of differentiation can be regarded as being broadly 
consistent with differences in quality (Lancaster, 1979, p,28); i.e. the 
availability of alternative quality grade of the products in an industry 
grouping. Technological differentiation occurs when one or more of the 
core features of products in a group have technically different 
attributes and/or are combined in the process of production by 
technologically different process. The technological differentiation is 
the outcome of innovations which result in new, technologically improved 
products at all price and quality ranges of the product. Technologically 
differentiated products coexist on markets, either because the diffusion 
and adjustment process are not instantaneous or because such innovations 
are continually occuring. However, the distinction between these various 
forms of product differentiation is Important because their underlying 
determinants and the manner in which they affect international exchange 
may differ. In fact, since products are invariably indivisible into their 
individual attributes, differentiation may often take the form of some 
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mixture of horizontal and vertical differentiation or vertical 
technological differentiation. 
Similarity of demand conditions or taste overlaps between 
countries, associated with diversity of preferences between individual 
consumers in each country, would appear to play an important role in 
generating markets for differentiated products and, as a result, 
intra-industry trade. In an attempt to explain the observed higher volume 
of trade between countries with more similar demand patterns, Linder 
(1961) hypothesized that the range of goods consumed in a particular 
country depends on the average level of income and its distribution. 
According to the study, products differ in quality and consumers choose 
different types of a differentiated products, not so much because their 
tastes are different, but rather because their incomes are different. 
Hence, the propensity for countries to import from each other will be 
greater, the closer the composition of their internal demand and more 
similar their income level. 
But, in general, ‘pure' intra-industry trade as appeared in 
economic literature unambiguously refers to the exchange of horizontally 
differentiated goods. In the neo-Chamberlinian approach for monopolistic 
competiton in international trade which can be found in Krugman 
(1979,1980,1982), Dixit and Norman (1980), and Venables (1984), each 
individual is represented as consuming all available variety of a product 
in identical quantities and as gaining utility in a symmetrical fashion 
from increased variety. Alternatively, in the neo-Hotelling approach 
which was built upon Lancasterian analysis of consumer behavior and is 
fully articulated as a model of intra-industry trade in Lancaster (1980), 
preference diversity is represented as diverse individual demands for 
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specific or ideal varieties, differentiated by attributes in a horizontal 
fashion. Not only does taste overlap increase markets for domestically 
produced goods, the scope for scale economies, it also increases the 
possibilities for profitably meeting demands for variety. Preference 
diversity is a pre-condition, therefore, for intra-industry trade in this 
type of models. The basic models of product differentiation demonstrated 
the existence of intra-industry trade in the extreme case where two 
economies were identical in every aspect. But, neither approach can 
predict the direction of trade unless differences in initial factor 
endowments are permitted. 
On the contrary, Falvey (1981) showed the possibility of 
intra-industry trade basically in the H-0 framework with the assumptions 
of industry-specific capital and vertically differentiated good by 
quality. Especially in his model, the direction of trade is determinate, 
and furthermore it is consistent with the prediction of H-0 theory. 
As has been seen by Hufbauer (1970) and Grub el and Lloyd (1975), 
although some hypotheses proposed by several scholars in the early 
sixties were developed without any reference to intra-industry trade, 
they have clear implication that technological differenciation might be 
one of important sources of intra-industry trade. Among others, Posner 
(1961) advanced the ‘technological gap' hypothesis which stressed those 
elements that provide early manufacture of new products with the export 
advantage. But later, producers must rely on lower wages or other static 
features to promote export as importers at initial stage begin to 
imitate. A somewhat similar and yet conceptually distinct explanation 
was offered by Vernon (1966) in his 'product cycle theory', in which 
location of production depends on the stage of its lifetime, or of 
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standardization, that product has reached. A more recent model combines 
transfer of production between countries with continuing innovations 
(Krugman, 1979), in which after a lag, new products from innovating 
country are able to be produced in the initial importer and this lag 
gives rise to trade. In the model, exporting country has to innovate 
continually to gain its quasi-rents from its monopoly of new products. 
ECONOMIES OF SCALE OF PRODUCTION： Economies of scale provide an 
incentive for specialization and trade over and above such reasons as 
international differences in factor endowments. Thus, in a world where 
scale economies are important, it is natural to expect to, find countries 
exchanging goods produced with quite similar factor proportions. And if 
we were to aggregate groups of products into sectors defined by 
similarity of factor proportions^  we would expect to find substantial 
amounts of two-way intra-sector trade. (Helpman and Krugman, 1985, p.131) 
In this way, increasing returns seem to allow a straightforward explana-
tion of the trade patterns in contradiction to the implications of 
traditional H-0 theory. 
Most of traditional trade theory rests on the simplifying 
assumption of constant returns to scale. It has been known for a long 
time, however, that relaxing the assumption of a constant returns 
technology can have a significant impact on our view of trade. Even while 
helping to create the factor proportions theory, Ohlin (1933) pointed out 
that economies of scale in production provide an incentive for 
international specialization and trade that can supplement the incentives 
created by cross-country differences in factor endowments and give rise 
to trade even in the absence of such differences. 
About the quantitative importance of economies of scale, there has 
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been a trend for scholars in industrial economics to revise their 
assessment.(Scherer, 1980) This reflects several factors. First, 
'industries' often produce many products, so that even when optimal plant 
size is only a few percent of total industry output, there may be many 
products produced at less than optimal scale. In this context, economies 
of scale due to the length of runs comprise important source of 
decreasing cost. Second, there appear to be important economies of 
multi-plant operation not captured by plant-based estimates of scale 
economies.(economies of scope) Third, there are probably important 
dynamic scale economies internal to firms. (learning by doing) 
In view of the emerging evidence of economies of scale, increasing 
returns seem to be useful for explaining the important features of the 
international economy. But, except under very special circumstances 
increasing returns are inconsistent with perfect competition. The 
presence of economies of scale at the level of firm implies that 
price-taking behavior is inconsistent with non-negative profits and thus 
markets cannot be perfectly competitive. Such consideration prompted 
development of international trade models which integrated decreasing 
cost and imperfect competition. But the fact that there is no general 
theory of the behavior of imperfectly competitive firms makes it 
difficult to deal with the problem in a single framework. Helpman and 
Krugman (1985) showed the possibility of intra-industry trade under three 
kinds of imperfectly competitive market structures (contestable markets； 
Cournot oligopoly： and monopolistic competition) regardless whether the 
products are differentiated or not. 
On the other hand, as Helpman and Krugman (1985) pointed out, the 
assumption of external economies of scale make it possible to analyze 
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international trade under economies of scale in the perfect competition 
framework, since returns of scale are constant at the level of the firm 
in the case and social increasing returns take the form of external 
economies. In this context, Ethier (1979,1982) referred to economies of 
scale at the firm level as 'national' returns to scale, and referred to 
those arising from an increased number of components due to a greater 
division of labour as 'international/ returns to scale. He also showed 
that with identical factor endowments between trade partners trade 
pattern due to the international returns scale would be intra-industry 
trade rather than inter-industry trade. , 
Without explicit reference to intra-industry trade, Rosenburg 
(1976,1982) develops the notion that increasing returns in the dynamic 
sense are secured through a progressive division of labour between firms. 
And it is argued that obvious advantage of such arrangement is that there 
is an important learning process involved in machinery production, and a 
high degree of specialization is conducive not only to an effective 
learning process but to an effective application of what is learned. 
Thus, he highlights the importance of dynamic economies of scale in the 
capital goods sector arising from focussing the technological efforts in 
the firms on a narrow range of products. In addition, Kol and Ray men t 
(1989) suggest the possibility of increasing returns due to the 
specialization in the process of production among firms in a more static 
sense relying on the concept developed by Young (1928).s) From the 
theoretical point of view, as the specialization among firms may go 
across national boundaries in search of a better utilization of 
differences in comparative advantage and due to the limitation on the 
5) For details, see the next section. 
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extent of markets, the appearance of intra-industry trade is rather 
natural in this context. 
MARKET STRUCTURE： Since under general circumstances a world where 
returns to scale is not constant will not be a world of perfectly 
competitive markets, the theory of international trade under conditions 
of imperfect competition received substantial attention from trade 
theorists in relation with intra-industry trade. In fact, the theoretical 
development about differentiated products, increasing returns to scale 
and imperfect competition in the context of intra-industry trade have not 
been independent. Explanations for intra-industry trade on the basis of 
the existence of differentiated products were mainly based on the 
assumptions of imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale. 
The development of this approach has been spurred by recent advancement 
in industrial organization theories of market behavior and their new 
models. Krugman (1979,1980,1982), Helpman(1981), and Brander and Krugman 
(1983) among others, have applied these models to problems in 
international trade. Although there is no general theory of the behavior 
of imperfectly competitive firms, some basic issues are commonly dealt 
with by various approaches. The basic issues are usually related to how 
price-setting firms behave, and they include； whether firms with market 
power act in a co-operative or a non-cooperative fashion, the strategic 
variable in terms of which the non-cooperative game is played, and the 
conditions of entry and exit from the industry. Because the theory of 
cooperative behavior in oligopolistic industries is not well developed, 
general consideration in the context of international trade is directed 
toward the latter two issues. 
The theoretical exploration about intra-industry trade under 
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imperfect competition largely divided into two groups of models； models 
for ‘large, numbers of relatively ‘small’ producers cases, and those for 
‘small' numbers of relatively ‘large' producers cases.(Greenway and 
Milner, 1986, p.112) The first gorup of models consists of models of 
international oligopoly which generates intra-industry trade. Alternative 
assumptions regarding conjectural variation, entry conditions, and 
product specifications, these models result in differing patterns and 
directions of trade. Brander (1981), for example, shows that market 
segmentation can lead to two-way trade in the identical good. Similarly, 
the works of Brander and Krugman (1983), and Krugman (1984) result in 
intra-industry trade in the identical good with Cournot assumption. In a 
different mode, papers of Shaked and Sutton (1983,1984) demonstrate the 
existence of intra-industry trade with vertically differentiated goods. 
Eaton and Kierzkovski (1984) examined trade in horizontally differen-
tiated goods and had similar result. All these models demonstrates how 
intra-industry trade can occur in oligopolistic markets with increasing 
returns to scale under a variety of circumstances. 
The second group consists of monopolistic competition models, based 
on the concepts of Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)， and 
Lancaster (1979). These models offer insights into alternative way of 
handling preference diversity and scale economies in general equilibrium 
framework and were applied to an open economy setting by Krugman 
(1979,1980,1982) and Lancaster (1980) respectively. Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977) have modeled the situation where individual values variety itself 
and the production side of the economy is characterized by monopolistic 
rather than perfect competition. Krugman (1979) applied the analysis to 
the open economy setting and demonstrated how, with decreasing costs in 
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production and product differentiation (horizontal), intra-industry trade 
could appear even between identical economies. An alternative approach to 
product variety has been presented by Lancaster (1979). In his version, 
products represent bundles of characteristics and every consumer has his 
most preferred • package, of characteristics, this, in turn, gives rise to 
demand for variety at the aggregate level. Due to the existence of 
internal economies of scale, only some consumers are able to obtain their 
ideal products, others buy differentiated goods which only approximate 
their most preferred varieties. Lancaster (1980) applied this approach to 
international trade to show that intra-industry trade opens as a 
consequence of preference diversity and decreasing cost. 
In both Krugman (1979) and Lancaster (1980)， the general pattern 
and level of trade can be predicted, but not the direction of trade. 
Gains from trade result from the ability of both countries to benefit 
from the exploitation of scale economies, which results in lower product 
prices for manufactures, as well as gains from greater product diversity. 
In the same vein, Helpman (1981) and Helpmari and Krugman (1985) 
generalized the H-0 model by introducing product differentiation and 
monopolistic competition in combination with initial differences in 
factor endowments between the trading economies. In the model, 
intra-industry trade can still emerge, and one can say something about 
the direction of trade. 
Apart from the approaches mentioned above which emphasize the role 
of decreasing costs and product differentiation in the framework of 
imperfect competition, in developing alternative analyses, Falvey (1981) 
proposed a intra-industry trade model based on the H-0 factor proportion 
theory in a two-country, two-factor setting without resorting to 
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imperfect competion approach. In his model, industry specific capital and 
vertically differentiated goods in quality which in turn have direct 
relationship with capital intensity was assumed. As the result, trade 
pattern within an industry consistent with the predictions of the H-0 
model was emerged, where each country exporting the qualities which use 
their relatively abundant factors intensively. 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY： An implicit assumption of the 
models which have been considered is that the firms engaged in production 
are single product firms whose production facilities are located in one 
country. There are, however, theoretical grounds for expecting that in 
markets where intra-industry trade is significant many of the firms 
produce more than one variety of a given product, and in some cases have 
production and/or distribution facilities which are located in more than 
one country. 
Enormous amount of research about conduct and performance of 
multinational corporations and foreign direct investment stimulated the 
examination of their impact on intra-industry trade recently. For 
example, Helpman and Krugman (1985) built a general equilibrium model of 
trade which includes decreasing costs, demand for horizontally 
differentiated products, and multinational firms. They hypothesized that 
when multinational firms are present, differences in relative factor 
endowments do not necessarily have the expected negative influences on 
the share of trade which is intra-industry. For foreign direct 
investment, Norman and Dunning (1984) discussed one-way and two-way 
foreign direct investment, and their relationship to intra-industry trade 
in various types of goods. Using an eclectic paradigm, they observed that 
for some type of commodities being traded, significant economies of scale 
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associated with producing specific variant in the specific foreign market 
might contribute to intra-industry trade regardless whether they are 
horizontally or vertically differentiated. 
Related issue is whether factor movements across national border 
and intra-industry trade are substitutes or complements. In a well-known 
paper, Mundell (1957) demonstrated that in the H-0 framework, trade in 
factors and trade in goods were substitutes for each other. Contrarily, 
models with intra-industry trade have the property as a central feature 
that similarity of factor endowments between nations tends to promote 
such trade as it limits the inter-industrial exchange. Agmon (1979) 
argues that foreign direct investment and intra-industry trade will be 
complement rather than substitues, since the factors which are likely to 
result in the emergence of multinational corporations are also the 
factors which are likely to result in intra-industry trade. Markusen 
(1983) demonstrates how differences in production technology between 
countries, and variety of product and factor market distortions, all lead 
to situations where factor movements and commodity trade are complements 
rather than substitutues. This leads him to conclude that a situation 
where trade in goods and factor movements are substitutes is probably a 
special case peculiar to the H-0 model. Since in most cases of 
intra-industry trade models, intra-industry trade occurs in conjunction 
with product market imperfection, the proposition that factor mobility 
and intra-industry trade can be complements rather than substitutes is 
consistent with Markusen's conclusion. With a model of intra-industry 
trade in intermediate goods, Ethier (1979,1982) showed the complementry 
character of factor mobility to intra-industry trade. 
BARRIERS TO TRADE： The price raising effect of commercial policy 
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interventions and of transportation costs associated with distance would 
undoubtedly reduce trade volumes. But the influence of trade barriers on 
the shares of intra-industry trade of total trade is rather ambiguous. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, one would expect the volume of intra-industry 
trade, but not necessarily the degree of its share, to be inversely 
related to the extent of trade barriers. 
Positive role of physical proximity on intra-industry trade is 
relatively clear, since physical proximity is likely to be collinear with 
cultural proximity and taste similarity or because geographically close 
trading partners are more likely to be members of some sort of free trade 
area. 
The possible effects of commercial policy are more problematic. Low 
or zero intra-customs union tariffs, for instance, may foster 
intra-industry trade,: but the presence of a high common external tariff 
may also induce inward foreign direct investment and within-union 
intra-industry trade. Alternatively, as Tumlir (1979) argues, the 
observed growth of intra-industry trade in Western Europe may in part be 
due to governmental efforts to restrict inter-industry specialization 
with the increased use of non-tariff interventions for maintenance of 
employment in sensitive sectors. Generally, it is argued that commercial 
policy of government to promote exports or to substitute imports also can 
influence the share of intra-industry trade depending on the relative 
intensity and effectiveness of the measures and on the imports and 
exports levels that would prevail without such measures (see section 3 of 
chapter 6 of the dissertation). 
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5-3 Quantitative significance and patterns of intra-industry trade in 
China 
In the section, I try to provide some empirical evidences of the 
importance of intra-industry trade in the Chinese industry. Then, it is 
also attempted to observe its features from the perspectives of； its 
trend through time, inter-country groups comparison, and inter-industry 
pattern. 
Measure of intra-industry trade and data 
Intra-industry trade is defined as the value of exports of an 
'industry' which is exactly matched by the imports of the same industry. 
In the analysis, several measures have been employed for the measurement 
of the actual intra-industry trade. For the measurement of actual 
intra-industry trade in China's manufacturing industries at the SITC 
3-digit level of aggregation which consist of all 142 groups of 
commodities (excluding those pertaining to the division 68), I employed 
both of measures proposed by Grubel and Lloyd (1975) (GL index) and 
Aquino (1978) (Aquino index). On a multilateral basis the GL index Bj 
measures the extent of the absolute amount of commodity exports in a 
particular industry or commodity grouping j which is offset by imports in 
the same grouping, and expresses this intra-industry trade as a 
proportion of the total trade in this commodity： 
Bj = /v .. � j = 1...142 (5.1) 
(Xj+Mj) 
In its contracted form： 
, |Xj-MjI A r u A lXj-Mjl 1 Bj = 1 - -H———=1 - Aj [where Aj = . “ � ] (5.2) 
(Xj+Mj) (Xj+Mj) 
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Bj indicates the level of intra-industry trade, whereas Aj is directly 
related to the level of inter-industry trade. When Xj or Mj=0 and there 
is no overlap of imports and exports in industry j then Bj is zero. 
Alternatively if Xj=Mj and exports and imports are completely matching, 
then Bj is unity. The bulk of the empirical studies of intra-industry 
trade used GL index as the basis of their analyses. Nevertheless, Aquino 
(1978, pp. 278-82) argues that the overall trade imbalance has an 
imbalancing effect6) on the single commodities trade flow, and proposes 
Aquino index Qj by adjusting the GL index on the assumption that the 
balancing effect is equiproportional to all industries as follows： 
Qj = 1 - _ i - L j = 1.,.142 (5.3) 
(Xje+Mje) 
n n 
^ 2(Xj+Mj) ^ 2(Xj+Mj) 
j = 1 j S 1 
where Xje = Xj ’ Mje = Mj 
2 Xj 2 Xj 
I j:i j=i 
Exactly same measures can be utilized for the bilateral intra-
industry trade between China and different country groups. For the 
purpose, I employed the trade data of China with 34 countries which 
comprise over ninety percent of China's total trade in SITC 5-8. Then, I 
divided the countries into four groups of countries according to their 
economic characteristics; industrialized countries, developing countries, 
socialist countries, and Hong Kong and Singapore as a group of countries. 
I computed Aquino indices for trade flows between China and each country 
groups as a whole on SITC 3-digit level. Aquino index of industry j in 
6) The argument for adjustment based on the same grounds as those of Grubel and 
Lloyd's proposal on summary measures (see below), but is critical of their 
failure to extend the principle to the more disaggregated level of industries. 
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China's trade with country group k can be expressed as:7) 
n , lXjk8-MjkB| • t ‘ Qjk = 1 jr: r- (5 4) 
n n . 
%.2(Xjk+Mjk) ^ 2(Xjk+Mjk) 
where Xjke = Xjk J = 1n , Mjke = Mjk~~^ 
2 Xj 2 Xj 
j=l j=l 
j = 1.,.142 k = 1..,4 
Next, in order to see the extent of the average l^ evel of intra-
industry trade in China and its change during 1986-1989, I utilize simple 
arithmetic average of the GL index (5.5), its weighted average weighted 
by the share of trade of relevant industry in total trade (5.6), and the 
summary measure adjusted for overall trade imbalance according to Grubel 
and Lloyd's proposal (5.7). In addition, simple arithmetic average of 
Aquino index also is reported. 
l n 
«Bj 二 一 2 Bj (5.5) 
n j = 1 
n Xj+Mj 
«Bjw = .2 wjBj [where wj 二 ] 
j = l 
2 IXj-Mjl 
二 卜 ^ (5.6) 
2(Xj+Mj) 
j = i 
7) In China, given sensitivity of the authority and current institutional arrange-
ment, considerations for overall trade imbalance may be more influential than 
other countries for determination of trade pattern in individual industries. Thus, 
I utilized Aquino index in the analysis, and the adjustment was made for overall 




2 (Xj+Mj) - 2 |Xj-Mj I 
*Bja = — 7) 
n n n ') 
• S^ Xj+Mj) - 1.2 Xj -.2 Mj| 
J -1 J = L J = L 
1.2 Xj-iMj| , , j = l j = l = ’ where k =— ’ n = 1...142 
一 .2(Xj+Mj) j = i 
According to Grubel and Lloyd (1975， p.22), the mean is a biased downward 
measure of intra-industry trade if the country's total commodity trade is 
imbalanced or if the mean is average of some subset of all' industries for 
which exports are not equal to imports regardless whether it is weighted 
or not. Thus, they proposed a measure (5.7), which is adjusted for the 
aggregate trade imbalance fay expressing intra-industry trade as a 
proportion of total commodity export plus import trade less the trade 
imbalance. 
As in case of preceding chapter, trade data covering SITC 5-8 on 
3-digit level available from the Summary Surveys of China's Customs 
Statistics (1986,1987,1988,1989) are employed for the analysis. 
The general level and trends 
Before discussing differences in the measured intra-industry trade 
among industries, it is useful to examine overall level and trends of 
intra-industry trade in the Chinese industry. For the purpose, the 
statistical summary measures of intra-industry trade , *Bjwf «Bja,and 
j 8)) developed above are utilized. Table 5-1 shows the result of 
calculation of the measures for Chinese manufacturing industries covered 
by SITC 5-8 during 1986-1989, and it gives some indication of the change 
8) *Qj indicates simple arithmetic average of Aquino Index. 
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in the relative amount of intra-industry which occurred between 1986 and 
1989. Although the time-span is too short to lead us to a definitive 
conclusion, all four indices provides a hard evidence of increasing share 
of intra-industry trade in China's foreign trade of manufactured goods. 
Table 5-1 
Level and trends of intra-industry trade： 1986-1989 
measure 1986 1987 1988 1989 
*Bj 0.324 0.381 0.410 0.431 
沌广 0.209 0.270 0.298 0.320 
0.361 0.363 0.388 0.380 
0.328 0.384 0.414 0.430 
Source: Calculated from Summary Survey of China's Customs 
Statistics 1986.1987.1988.1989. 
As shown in Table 5-2 ’ compared to the level of intra-industry trade of 
other developing countries, the extent of such type of trade is rather 
significant in the Chinese industry. In 1978, average values of the 
summary measure of GL index weighted by the share of relevant industry in 
total trade of a country were: 0.589 for industrial countries^ ， which is 
far higher than for developing countries as a whole, 0.226, and among the 
latter the more advanced NICs a higher value of 0.42， and lowest value of 
0.145 among non-NIC developing countries. Even though the point of time 
under investigation is different, China's average intra-industry trade 
during 1986-1989 in terms of *Bjw was considerably higher than those of 
9) In the Havrylyshyn and Civan's (1985) study, industrial countries consist of 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
U.K., U.S.A.; Newly industrialized countries: Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Hong 
Kong, India, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Taiwan, 
Yugoslavia; Non-NIC developing countries: Algeria, Cameroon, Central African 
Rep., Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Rep., Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan. 
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i.' S imi lar inCOme level countries and even higher than all developing 
countries as a group including NIC's in 1978. Considering China's four 
decades of historical background as a socialist country, this is rather 
remarkable result. 
Table 5-2 
China's intra-industry trade compared to other countries 
«Bjw 
China 0.274¾ 
Industrial countries 0.589b 
Developing countries 0.226b 
Non-NIC developing countries 0.145b 
Newly industrialized countries 0.420b 
Source: a as in table 5-1，arithmetic average of 1986-1989. 
b Havrylyshyn and Civan (1985, Table 1); for year 1978. 
a b cover SITC 5-8 on the level of 3-digit classification 
except division 68. 
For more concrete view of the characteristics of intra-industry 
trade in China's manufacturing sector, I also calculated the bilateral 
intra-industry trade between China and different country groups for each 
year of the period 1986-1989 (Table 5-3). Contrary to usual understanding 
of intra-industry between countries, which expects higher level of such 
trade between similar countries in terms of income and factor intensity 
(Helpman and Krugman,1985, Greeriway and Milner,1986), Table 5-3 indicates 
intra-industry trade in the Chinese industry was highest in trade with 
Hong kong and Singapore as a group of countries for which recorded 
arithmetic average of Aquino index during 1986-89 was as high as 0.418, 
followed by 0.276 for trade with industrialized countries. For socialist 
countries and developing countries, the level of intra-industry trade was 
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I l0W, and °'189 for the fomer and 0.206 for the latter. Considering that 
I intra-industry trade tends to be higher the larger the partner group, 
because it is more likely that trade in any given SITC category will be 
less balanced with a single partner than with a large number of partners, 
such high level of intra-industry trade between China and Hong kong and 
Singapore is striking. Since Hong kong and Singapore are included in the 
Table 5-3 
China's intra-industry trade with different country groups 1986-8910' 
1986 1987 1988 1989 average 
Trade with： 
Industrial countriesa 0.254 0.257 0.292 0.304 0.276 
Developing countries^  0.176 0.203 0.224 0.222 0.206 
Socialist countries0 0.163 0.174 0.201 0.219 0.189 
Hong Kong and Singapore 0.405 0.420 0.428 0.420 0.418 
Source: as in Table 5-1. 
a including Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany FR., Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, U.K., and U.S.A.. 
b including Brazil, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and U.A.E.. 
c including Czechoslovakia, Cuba, German DR, Hungary, 
Korea(DPR), Romania, Poland, and USSR. 
Asian Newly Industrialized Economies, and large part of trade between 
China and Taiwan and between China and Rep. of Korea is recorded as 
re-export of Hong Konglu, with, some theoretical bases12, we can conclude 
10) Reported in terms of arithmetic average of Aquino's index for each country 
group. 
11) Before 1990, Chinese official trade statistics did not include the data of its 
trade with Taiwan and Korea(Rep.)^  Nevertheless, as early as 1988，the amount 
of trade between China and Taiwan and between China and Korea through Hong 
Kong which recorded as re-export of Hong kong was enough to make them fifth 
and eighth trade partner of China in their magnitudes. (Hsueh and Oh 1991) 
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that the level of intra-industry trade of China with Asian Newly 
Industrialized Economies is substantially higher than that with other 
country groups. Low level of intra-industry trade recorded in China's 
trade with socialist countries^  is consistent with the general 
conclusions of relevant literature (Pelzman, 1978， Drabek and Greenway, 
1984)’ and it also indicates that integration of China's economy into 
world market significantly incereased the importance of intra-industy 
trade in its manufacturing sector. 
Finally, Tabel 5-4 shows the sensitivity of the level of intra-
industry trade in the Chinese industry to the level of statistical 
aggregation. As compared with 3 digit classification used as a proxy of 
industries which comprises 142 product groups, a lower level of 
disaggregation into 34 product groups and a higher level of 
12) Viewing geographic advantage for entrepot trade of Hong Kong and Singapore, 
it might be supposed that higher level of intra-industry trade between China and 
them should be attributed to their geographic feature rather than their 
comparative advantages as Newly Industrialized Economies, but it is not true. 
According to Sung (1985), for entrepot trade, re-export trade and transhipment 
should be distinguished. Transhipment can be explained by the consideration of 
transportation cost, but re-export should be explained by that of transaction cost. 
Moreover, transhipment is not recorded in trade statistics. Therefore, we can 
regard re-export of the two economies as the realization of their comparative 
advantage in intermediation of such trade owing to their factor endowments. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the commodity composition of their 
re-exports to industrialized countries and developing countries originated from 
China is very similar to those of China's direct exports to the country groups. 
And most of China's imports through Hong kong and Singapore are recorded by 
origin in Chinese trade statistics except those from Taiwan and Korea. Thus, 
there is the possibility that the recorded intra-industry trade of Hong Kong and 
Singapore as Newly Industrialized Economies is biased downward. In addition, 
large part of Hong kong's direct foreign processing conducted in China which 
reflects its special feature in relation with China is recorded in SITC 9 in 
Chinese trade statistics, and does not have serious influence in the computation 
of intra-industry level in SITC 5-8 (see the next section), 
13) Actual economic systems in the countries classified as socialist countries are 
substantially different from one country to another in many aspects, but in the 
sense that those countries have a lot in common in the way of operation of 
national economy due to the legacies of centrally planned economic system of 
socialist type, at least by the end of eighties, we regard them as a group of 
countries, 
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disaggregation into 528 product groups^  yields rather limited changes of 
aVSrage 4 '25 Percentage points increase and average 6.4 percentage points 
decrease of intra-industry trade. Although the level of intra-industry 
trade in the Chinese industry declines undoubtedly as we deal with more 
disaggregated trade data, as expected, even on narrower level of 
classification than usual definition of industry, there still remains 
substantial intra-industry trade to be explained. 
Table 5-4 
China's intra-industry trade on different level of aggregationa 
SITC： 2-digit 3-digit 4-dig'it 
n=34 n=142 n=528b 
1986 0.388 0.328 0.284 
1987 0.406 0.384 0.314 
1988 0.442 0.414 0.339 
1989 0.450 0.430 0.363 
Source: as in Table 5-1 
a arithmetic average of Aquino index on the relevant 
level of SITC. 
b n indicates the number of product groups on each level 
of classification for SITC 5-8 except the division 68. 
The inter-industry pattern of intra-industry trade 
With our recognition of the increasing importance of intra-industry 
trade in the Chinese manufacturing sector, using average of Aquino index1® 
we can comment on the pattern of intra-industry trade among different 
industries in the economy. Table 5-5 presents level and trends of 
14) In fact, this level of disaggregation was the deepest breakdown of China's 
trade statistics for the period 1986-1989 available to the author. 
15) Since we are interested in levels of intra-industry trade at the industry 
level(which we equating with the 3 digit SITC), unweighted rather than trade 
weighted average are reported as was in country groups comparison. 
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j intra-industry trade among sections of SITC during 1986-1989. As is 
seen, in SITC section 5 and 6 recorded average Aquino indices are higher 
than in SITC section 7 and 8. Considering that chemicals and manufactured 
goods classified by materials are more likely to comprise intermediate 
goods, and that machinery, transportation equipment, and miscellaneous 
manufactured articles are largely consisted of capital goods and consumer 
goods which are close to final goods, we can suggest that intra-industry 
trade in China is more intensive in industrial intermediate products 
Table 5-5 , 
Average level of intra-industry trade by SITC sectiona 
SITC division 1986 1987 1988 1989 average 
5 Chemicals and related 0.532 0.558 0.545 0.508 0.536 
products 
6 Manufactured goods classi- 0.347 0.420 0.458 0.476 0.425 
fied chiefly by materials 
7 Machinery and transport 0.259 0.305 0.343 0.367 0.319 
equipment 
8 Miscellaneous manufactured 0.228 0.297 0.341 0.388 0.314 
articles 
Source: as in Table 5-1. 
a arithmetic averages of Aquino index on 3-digit SITC groups. 
groups than finished goods. However, since SITC is ambiguous with respect 
to the end-use characteristics of products, it is difficult for us to 
derive definite conclusion. 
Table 5-6 which contrasts each of ten industries (which we are 
equating with the 3 digit of SITC) of high level and of low level of 
intra-industry trade is more indicative for China's inter-industry 
pattern of intra-industry trade in terms of inter-industry differences in 
capital intensity. As shown in Table 5-6, contrary to the expectation 
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Table 5-6 
SITCa Groups with high level and low level of Qj 
Ten groups with high Qj Ten groups with low Qj 
1986 514’ 751,523’ 893,786’ 752’ 672,781,676, 674 
516，598’ 718，677,778 783,846,897,896，844 
1987 667’ 516,591,592,761, 711,896,843,781,842, 
523,885,656,662,793 851，572,846,712, 844 
1988 532,722,533’ 893’ 775, 666,783,843,851,842, 
598, 661’ 656, 523,667 781,846,572,712, 844 
1989 871,676,621,656,533’ 666,562，845，843, 572， 
898,667,778,554,523 851,842’ 896，844，846 
Average physical 7175.5b 4355.4b 
capital intensity (0.127)d (0”927)d 
Average human 3.32° 2.20° 
capital intensity (0.308)d (1.754)d 
Average number of 16.78 13,15 
4 digit listings 
Source: computed from Summary Surveys of China's Customs Statistics 1986’ 
1987.1988.1989. and PRC 1985 Industrial Census Data. 
a For description see Appendix G. 
b Defined in terms of productive fixed capital per empoyee. 
c Defined in terms of percentage of technical personnel of total 
employment. 
d Coefficient of variation in terms of the standard deviation of 
relevant statistics divided by their averages. 
which depends on Linder (1961) type hypotheses, ten industries with 
higher Qj are those using physical and human capital more intensively on 
average than those with lower Qj, In relation with capital intensity, it 
also should be noted that both of the coefficients of variation as 
defined in the table are substantially higher in ten industries with low 
intra-industry trade than in those with high level of intra-industry 
trade. This indicates the former is influenced to a greater extent than 
the latter by extreme values. Another notable result is that the small 
difference between high Qj industries and low Qj industries in the number 
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°f 4 d i g U Pr°duct grouPs bel°ng to each of them on average. As shown in 
Table 5-6， the average number of 4 digit listings for industries with 
high Qj are only about 3.5 higher than that of industries with low Qj. 
The result once again confirms that staistical disaggregation itself does 
not have significant influence on the differences in the level of 
intra-industry trade among industries. 
Summary： The stylized facts and their implications 
We can summarize our empirical findings about general level and 
trends, inter-country-group pattern, and inter-industry pattern of 
intra-industry trade in the Chinese industry as follows： 
1. Measured intra-industry trade in the Chinsese manufacturing 
sector for the period of 1986-1989 shows its increasing share of total 
trade. In view of the expanding market forces in China as a result of 
economic reform process, this observation is consistent with the 
generally accepted view in economic literature on intra-industry trade 
that intra-industry trade tends to be greater where the market structure 
become more competitive as far as differentiated goods are concerned. 
2. Compared with the result of other studies, the average level of 
intra-industry trade in the Chinese manufacturing sector is still higher 
than that of other developing countries, whether or not Newly Industrial-
ized Countries are included in the category. In case that intra-industry 
trade in the Chinese industry could be explaind by economic variables 
related to market forces, the observation in turn would imply that maket 
forces are operating indeed in determining of China's foreign trade 
patterns. 
3. Intra-industry trade in the Chinsese manufacturing sector is 
highest in trade with Hong Kong and Singapore which are regarded as 
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representing Asian newly industrialized economies, the second in trade 
with industrialized market economies, the third in trade with other 
developing countries, and it is lowest in trade with socialist countries. 
This contrasts to the hypothesis that on average the more similar 
countries are in per capita income, the larger the share of 
intra-industry trade in their bilateral trade volume, which is implied by 
large number of models based on taste overlap for horizontally 
differentiated products and economies of scale, and supported by 
Loertscher and Wolter (1980) and Helpman and Krugman (1985). 
4. The low level of intra-industry in China's trade, with socialist 
country group is consistent with the widely accepted view in economic 
literature on intra-industry trade, 
5. The sensitivity of the levels of intra-industry trade in the 
Chinese industry to the change in the level of aggregation is rather 
limited. At the level of aggregation of 4 digit SITC, there remains 
substantial extent of intra-industry trade. Therefore, theoretical 
explanation for its patterns and level is needed. 
6. Although SITC is somewhat ambiguous in the respect, intra-
industry trade in the Chinese industry tends to be higher in intermediate 
goods or semi-finished goods than finished goods. Such tendency is partly 
due to deliberate foreign trade policy of the Chinese government, but it 
is also caused by the economic incentives given by market-oriented reform 
measures taken in China. 
7. The shares of intra-industry trade tend to be higher in the 
Chinese industries with intermediate range of physical and human capital 
intensity, and lower in the industries with extreme intensity of them. 
With our observation of different intra-industry trade levels in the 
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Chinese industry in trade with different country groups, such tendency 
suggests that factor proportions variables as indicators of comparative 
costs should be considered as an explanatory variables in the analysis of 
inter-industry patterns or inter-country-group patterns of intra-industry 
trade in China. 
8. The number of subgroups on a lower level of SITC, that of 4 
digit SITC in our study, has limited influence on the level of 
intra-industry trade in China caculated for 3 digit SITC groups which are 
defined as industries in this study. The limited sensitivity of average 
levels of intra-industry trade to dissagregation of tr,ade statistics 
reinforces the need for theoretical explanation for intra-industry trade 
in the Chinese industry different from the explanation relying on the 
concept of categorical aggregation. 
5-4 Sources of intra-industry trade in the Chinese industry 
The influences of market-oriented reform 
It is generally believed that recorded intra-industry trade may be 
more prevalent in the market economies than in the CPEs. This is to be 
expected in part as a result of higher per capita incomes in developed 
market economies. However, fundamentally, this is because the planning 
process itself in the CPEs may deter competition on the supply side and 
repress the expression of taste diversity on the demand side. (Greenway 
and Mi lner, 1986, p. 92) In other words, to the extent that we see 
intra-industry trade as the outcome of the operation of market force, we 
would expect that, ceteris paribus, intra-industry will be higher for 
market type economies than for the CPEs, In his study of intra-industry 
trade specialization in Soviet-COMECON trade, Pelzman (1978) concluded 
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that even though within some sectors there was shift towards 
intra-industry trade in Soviet-Comecon trade, in general it could not be 
characterized by intra-industry specialization. Drabek and Greenway 
(1984) investigated the impact of regional economic integration on 
intra-industry trade by comparing EEC and CMEA. They found that since 
economic integration in the market economies provided more favorable 
environment for intra-industry trade than that in the CPEs, its impact on 
the level of intra-industry trade was more positive in EEC than CMEA. 
Obstacles for the CPEs of socialist type to develop intra-industry trade 
specialization are mainly due to the incapability of the economic system 
to provide necessary pre-conditions for it. This point can be easily seen 
by consideration of basic features of centrally planned socialist type 
economy. 
As far as we share the view that intra-industry trade is a 
phenomenon results from the operation of unlimited market forces, 
Wilczynski's (1965) case for the irrelevancy of comparative costs as 
major determinant of international trade patterns in the traditional CPEs 
10 can also be applied to argue the inadequacy of theoretical concepts of 
intra-industry trade for understanding trade patterns in such economies. 
In addition, some systematic factors characterizing CPEs are conducive to 
inter-industry trade171 and can be used to explain their low level of 
intra-industry trade. 
As it has been widely ackowledged, rapid economic growth is the 
overriding goal of CPEs, and the objective used to be pursued by means of 
16) The case by Wilczynski is cited in chapter 4. See pp.99-100 of the dissert-
ation. 
17) Of course, there is no priori reason and theoretical basis to assume that the 
prevalence of inter-industry trade in the CPEs has something to do with factor 
proportions theory of international trade. 
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°VerfuU employment Planning and quantitative targeting. Supply of 
intermediate goods and final goods is tightly controlled by directives 
from Planning authorities. Therefore, given distorted price structure and 
over valued currency, disequlibrium in goods market and foreign exchange 
market is a rule rather than exception. Under such circumstances, foreign 
trade usually assume the residual role of balancing supply ability and 
demand conditions of domestic economy, and such role of foreign trade is 
accomplished in a higly aggregated manner of plan implementation. Such 
practices in CPEs intrinsically involve inter-industry type of trade 
rather than that of intra-industry type. 
On the other hand, as disequlibrium in goods market and foreign 
exchange market prevails in CPEs, resulting currency and commodity 
inconvertibility inevitably introduces high level of bilateralism181 in 
international trade as an important means of alleviating pressure from 
the balance of payments problems in such economies. Institutionally, 
bilateralism is accomplished by means of annual and long-term trade and 
payment agreements that attempt, within limits and after taking account 
of credits, to keep trade between the two participating countries in 
balance over the period in question. As far as such bilateral 
transactions are conducted as an extention of planning process, above 
argument for bias towards inter-industry trade in CPEs still holds. 
Therefore, considering the role and practices of foreign trade in 
such economies, we can conclude that the level of intra-industry in CPEs 
is generally lower than that of market economies with similar income 
levels. We can even argue that the recorded intra-industry trade in CPEs 
is meaningless as far as their economic system fails to meet the 
18) For currency and commodity inconvertibily, and bilateralism in the CPEs, see 
Holzman (1974). 
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preconditions of intra-industry trade as a market-force-induced 
phenomenon. With more conservative stand, there is no theoretical 
argument or empirical evidence to suggest that the foreign trade criteria 
and the incentive structures in CPEs encourage intra-industry trade. In 
this context, conclusion of Pelzman (1978) in his study on Soviet-CMEA 
and that of Drabek and Greenway's (1984) comparison of the impact of 
economic integration between EEC and CMEA are consitent with our view. 
In China, as shown in chapter 3’ before the end of 1970s, despite 
the cyclical changes of the government's attitude towards foreign trade, 
main framework of foreign trade system was basically consistent with that 
of CPEs. Nevertheless, market-oriented reform in the Chinese industry 
brought about fundamental changes in the economic environment of the 
country. China's reform process related to foreign trade is rather 
radical in its approach to the extent that it largely relies on the 
decentralization of foreign trade authority to the enterprise level and 
expansion of the role of market mechanism and economic incentives rather 
than on devising indexes of foreign trade efficiency only within clearly 
defined limits.1® And its expanding share of exports under guidance plan 
and rapid progress made in the import agency system allowed substantial 
room for adjustment for foreign trade participants in conducting foreign 
trade. 
Foreign trade managerial responsibility system combined with 
successive devaluation of RMB and partly liberalized price system in the 
economy made individual enterprise which engaged in foreign trade 
activity more keen to making profit and, more sensitive to relative price 
19) In the early stages of economic reform in Eastern European countries including 
USSR, major effort has been directed towards devising efficiency indexes for 
exports, imports, and investment in relation with foreign trade. 
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and cost structure. Therefore, viewing the existence of operating market 
mechanism which makes production units to be sensitive to the relative 
prices and production costs and makes them compete internally and 
externally to satisfy the market demands as the basic condition for the 
emergence of intra-industry trade and specialization in an economy, it is 
no doubt that the Chinese industrial sector became to fullfil such 
condition to a considerable extent. In this context, we can identify some 
major sources of intra-industry in the Chinese industry on the basis of 
theoretical considerations outlined in the preceeding section. 
It is clear from the analysis of chapter 2 that despite markets for 
consumer goods and producer goods in China have experienced shortages of 
individual commodities from time to time, market mechanism became to 
exert a substantial pressure on enterprise behavior in the Chinese 
industry. Especially the Chinese government's consistent policy and 
institutional arrangements such as two-track price system and allowance 
of self-marketing in combination with foreign trade reform laid a 
foundation for the competitive environment in the economy. Market 
pressure from competitive atmosphere made Chinese industrial enterprises 
to adjust their products to changing demand structure which now reveals 
consumers' preferences and potential buyers requirements more freely than 
pre-reform period. 
The role of demand factors has no doubt been influential in China. 
The Chinese consumer's freer expression of tastes and preferences 
resulted in greater demand for and supply of differentiated goods in both 
of horizontal and vertical spectrum. Higher level of disposable income 
due to the introduction of econmic incentive system and increase in 
profit-tracking activities of individual economic agents in combination 
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with rapid monetization and expanding markets in the economy accelerated 
the tendency. Hence, the changing economic environment in China opened 
the possibility of intra-industry trade in differentiated commodities as 
illustrated by intra-industry trade models based on differentiated 
products. The evolving situation in China sharply contrasts with that of 
traditional CPEs' where the social preferences is expected to be revealed 
through plan targets desired or, is at least under the control of 
planners. The presumption can be supported by the product diversification 
activities in quality and specifications of the Chinese industrial firms 
facing buyers' market as reflected in the increasing sales expenses of 
them as market-oriented reform proceeds. And the situation has been 
described in chapter 2 of the study. 
Nevertheless, in view of the Chinese government's intensive 
interference in foreign trade to limit the import of ‘unnecessary' 
consumer goods and consumer durables there is some difficulties to relate 
Chinese consumers' diversified demand structure to the recorded intra-
industry trade directly. Therefore, the theoretical explanation of 
intra-industry based on horizontally differentiated commodities and 
static economies of scale (whether as seen by neo-Chamberlinian approach 
or neo-Hotelling approach) due to the expansion of the plant size as 
assumed by majority of existing models for intra-industry trade has only 
limited power of applicability to the present circumstances the Chinese 
industry is situated in. 
In conjunction with such difficulties, models for intra-industry 
trade in differentiated intermediate goods are attractive. Although the 
majority of contributions to build a theoretical base for the observed 
phenomenon of intra-industry trade focussed on final consumer goods and 
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consumers preferences^ , some studies suggest intimate relationship 
between demand for variety of finished manufactured goods and 
differentiation of intermediate products. As Helpman (1985) shows, with 
the assumption of existence of appropriate variety of intermediate goods 
in the sense that each variety of finished goods can be produced with the 
smallest quantities of inputs when its most adequate variety of 
intermediate products is employed in its production, we can derive 
intimate relationship between product differentiation of final goods and 
intermediate products to open up the possibility of intra-industry trade 
in intermediate products. As mentioned earlier, Ethier (1979,1982) even 
argues that it is in intermediate rather than final goods production that 
product differentiation is most important. In other words, the preference 
for variety implicit in the demand for ever more specialized machine 
tools, motors, equipment, and so forth is more powerful source of trade 
and specialization than the desire for variety by ultimate consumers. 
This senario fits consideraly well in the Chinese industry increasingly 
under pressure of competition from domestic and foreign competitors. As 
shown in Chapter 2t with great efforts in the Chinese industry for 
resolving problems caused by the prevalence of ‘small but comprehensive' 
production units, it is no doubt that such motives as seen by Ethier 
increasingly important in the foreign trade decision-making in China. 
From theoretical point of view, whether it is for final goods or 
for intermediate goods, demand for differentiated and specialized 
products by itself cannot provide a strong basis for the emergence of 
intra-industry trade. This is because with constant returns to scale 
20) See, for instance, Dixit and Stiglits (1977)，Krugman (1979), Lancaster (1980) 
and for a survey, see part I in Greenway and Milner (1986)，and the 
introduction in Tharakan and Kol(1989). 
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production technology, and without the influences from difference in 
factor endowments on products differentiation, any intensity of demand 
for diversity could be catered for by domestic producers. Thus, in 
theoretical models for intra-industry trade, in addition to the 
differentiated products, usually the economic force conducive to 
decreasing costs in the production function is assumed. Generally, in 
relation with economies of scale at the level of the firm, as seen in 
previous section, it is possible to distinguish three sources of 
economies of scale in a given industry： size of plants, length of 
production runs, and the size of firms. And all of them are more or less 
limited by the extent of the market. 
Among them, an important one to be noticed in relation with the 
source of intra-industry trade in China is the concept of economies of 
scale from the extention of production runs due to the division of the 
production process into several stages of production by specialized 
firms. The concept appears to be in close correspondence with Adam 
Smith's devision of labour, but Allyn Young is regarded as the pioneering 
author (Rayment 1983, Kol and Rayment, 1989). Young (1928， p.537, cited 
in Kol and Rayment, 1989) argues: "Notable as has been the increase in 
the complexity of the apparatus of living, as shown by the increase in 
the variety of goods offered in the consumers' markets, the increase in 
the diversification of intermediate products or groups of products has 
gone even further.” Allyn Young‘s concept of deversification of 
intermediate goods can be interpreted as a process of division and 
specialization of the production process expected to occur with an 
expanding market.2D As a resulting benefit from the process, Rayment 
21) Grubel and Lloyd (1975) called such type of specialization as vertical 
specialization and distinguished it from differentiation in quality. Elsewhere, 
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(1983’ p.18) observes： "As the market expands so the relatively more 
disadvantageous activities can be peeled away and the original producer 
will compromise less with his greatest comparative advantage.” Thus, with 
expanding market, exchange as a result of the process would depend on 
differences in comparative advantages and the extent of economies of 
scale. This opens the possibility of intra-industry trade in intermediate 
products. 
In China, following the government's experiments on state 
enterprises as an attempt for industrial reorganization, there has been a 
proliferation of industrial corporations consisting of a variety of forms 
and arrangements.22 They are mainly aimed at efficiency gains from 
horizontal specialization and vertical integration. As early as in the 
end of 1988, there were 1630 industrial corporations across all of 36 
provinces, autonomous regions, districts and municipalities on planning 
sheet. And they mainly include the industries related to machinary, 
electronic products, light manufactures, textile^ etc.. Given 'small but 
comprehensive', and ‘large and comprehensive' "industrial enterprises as a 
legacy of pre-reform industrialization policy, vertical integration of 
narrowly specialized producers is one of major approaches for intensive 
growth of the Chinese economy, and the concept of economies of scale, 
especially which comes from expanding length of production runs, has been 
emphasized. 
Data from some case studies explici tely show that there exist 
substantial economic benefits from emerging industrial corporations. For 
instance, a case study for 20 Chinese industrial enterprises based on 
interview (Xu Lu ,1987, p, 287) shows Mingdong Electrical Machinery 
Greenway and Milner (1986) called the latter as vertical specialization, too. 
22) Largely they take the form of mergers, joint ventures and various associations. 
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Corporation after being incorporated into China Electrical Appliance 
Joint Exports Corporation in 1981’ specialized production has been 
strengthened, and the phase of creating new products quickened. In 1982 
alone the corporation produced and trial-produced 391 product series in 
sixty-five specifications, and with extensive sales promotion activities 
total value of sales was increased by 59 percent over the previous year. 
In case of Tianjin Color Textile Corporation, as an objective of 
establishment the corporation follows the principle of having ' the 
factory turn out specialized products and the whole corporation produce a 
complete variety of products', so that each unit manufactrues only one or 
two kinds of major products. All these evidences clearly indicate the 
fact that the importance of economies of scale due to appropriate 
specialization is recognized and increasingly applied to the process of 
economic reforms in the Chinese industry. 
In China, all such changes in industrial environment as a result of 
economic reform undoubtedly provide strong impetus for intra-industry 
trade. Because of the importance of sunk cost (for research and 
development) and accumulation of experience for product differentiation 
and quality improvement, especially, in the vertical spectrum of an 
industry make the self-reliant adjustment of the economy almost 
impossible, if not extremely inefficient. In addition, still limited 
factor mobility23 between industries in China evokes additional time lag 
for the adjustment. Therefore, it is natural to suppose that 
intra-industry trade emerges as an important conduit for adjustment of 
the economy to changing industrial environment. 
The Chinese policy-makers' eagerness to improve technological 
23) Related issues in the context of inter- and intra-industry trade in China are 
discussed in chapter 6. 
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ability of the country's comprehensive, but technologically lagged behind 
industrial sector also helps the economy to exploit sources for 
intra-industry trade. In the dimension of economic policy, the character 
of economies of scale to be expected in this case is dynamic rather than 
static. As seen by Rosenburg (1976,1982), increasing returns secured 
through a progressive division of labour between specialized firms is 
conducive not only to effective learning process but to an effective 
application of what is learned.^  Combined with the Chinese industrial 
enterprises' efforts to be more competitive in markets as described in 
chapter 2, consideration for effective learning and applications of 
production technology by policy-makers and managers in China cannot be 
ignored as a source of intra-industry trade. 
The role of foreign capital 
In order to identify sources of intra-industry trade in the Chinese 
industry in relation with the influences of foreign capital, it is 
convenient to distinguish the role of foreign capital as the origin of 
offshore assembling/processing in China from its role as the source of 
various types of direct foreign investment in China's manufacturing 
sector for other objectives. As a result of China's open door policy and 
establishemt of the Special Economic Zones, exports and imports for 
offshore assembling/processing in China take a substantially large share 
of China's trade flow in industrial products. For instance, in 1987, the 
related exports and imports took 18.0% and 13.3¾ of China's total exports 
and imports in manufactures.23 In view of the importance of such type of 
trade, we need to clarify some related issues in conjunction with 
24) Gains from intra-industry trade from such perspectives are discussed in chapter 
6. 
25) Calculated from Statistical Yearbook 1988 and Customs General Administration 
of PRC (1989). 
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intra-industry trade in the Chinese industry. 
Usually, offshore assembling/processing in China is conducted 
through some kind of contract with the Chinese firms and foreign 
customers or through direct foreign investment. In relation with offshore 
assembling/processing in China Hong Kong assumes dominant role in direct 
foreign investment^  as well as in assembling/processing contracts with 
the Chinese firms. For instance, in 1987, Hong Kong's share of China's 
exports of assembled/processed industrial products was 93.0¾^ . and Hong 
Kong's share of China's imports of materials for assembling/processing 
reached 92.6%. ( Customs General Administration of PRC, 1989) 
It is easy to see the economic rationale behind the phenomenon. In 
most of traditional trade models, services such as assembly processes are 
non-tradable because they cannot be shipped abroad, In fact’ in the case 
of most services the ratio of transport cost to price is assumed to 
approaches infinity. But, the dramatic lowering of transport and 
communication costs and improvement of management skill in the past 
decades made it possible to trade services through embodiment into 
commodities. In this context, Hong Kong has comparative advantages in 
information and personnel in relation with ‘China market' as well as in 
geographical locatioru Thus, its economic benefit from labour intensive 
assembly or finishing process in China in pursuance of the utilization of 
the cheap labour is supposed to be overriding the costs involved in the 
process. The growth of such activities has been accelerated by the 
favourable conditions provided by the Chinese government to promote them. 
26) According to Hsueh and Woo (1989)，Hong Kong's share of China's total direct 
foreign investment during the period of 1983-86 was 56.9%, compared to US, 
16.3%, and Japan 7%. 
27) Of course, large part of such exports to Hong Kong (about 90%) is reexported 
to the rest of the world. 
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Thus, offshore assembly/processing in China is consistent with the H-0 
theory since it represents the exploitation of comparative advantage in 
the labour service for production.28 
Nonetheless, in many countries, and at most available aggregation 
level of trade data, the parts and assembled/processed products are 
classified in the same statistical category, which give rise to the 
‘seeming’ intra-industry trade. In addition, since governments usually 
regulate the destination of the products and usage of imported materials 
involved in the activities, recorded level of intra-industry trade is 
extremely high in the case. As a result, especially for developing 
countries, intra-industry trade can be overestimated. But, fortunately, 
China's customs statistics distinguishes trade flow related to the 
offshore assembly/process in China, which is recorded in the SITC section 
9.m Hence we can escape from the danger of including the trade flow due 
to assembling and processing in China in the analysis of Intra-industry 
trade in China, We also excluded it from the analysis of inter-industry 
trade pattern in the Chinese industry in view of its special features. 
In fact, however, the assembly/processing in China can affect 
China's intra-industry trade through indirect way, and sometimes even 
through illegal way. Firstly, since the firms engaged in such activities 
are highly efficient under the influence of international competition, 
the behavioral pattern of them provides the local industrial enterprises 
under the competitive pressure from markets with a model they can 
28) According to an estimation, as early as in 1987, industrial firms in Hong Kong 
could have saved labour cost by 50-70% if the processing was done in Shen 
Zhen. (Hang Seng Economic Monthly, April, 1987，cited in Hsueh and Woo, 
1989) ~ 
29) According to the author's calculation, in 1987，the level of China's 
intra-industry in the SITC section 9 at the 3-digit level was 0.88 in both of the 
Aquino index and GL index. For Hong kong only, it was 0.86. 
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imitate. As a result, such imitation leads the Chinese enterprise to show 
more active response to the market signals. Such sentitiveness might be 
conducive to intra-industry trade as appropriate incentives are given. 
Secondly, profit-tracking behavior of the firms engaged in the assembly/ 
processing also gives rise to genuine intra-industry trade. Because of 
higher prices for imported materials in the China's markets and the 
availability of low-priced substitutes for them, although it is legally 
prohibited, imported materials for assembly/processing are often sold in 
the domestic markets and locally produced parts and components are used 
in place of them. Such practice, although illegal, bring into genuine 
intra-industry in intermediate goods trade. In fact, in 1987, the value 
of exports due to assembly/processing was US$ 47.1 billion compared to 
US$ 48.3 billion of imports of materials for them.305 Considering the 
value-added in the process, this confirms that the illegal profit-
tracking activities are prevalent indeed. In that case, the level of 
intra-industry trade in China calculated from the trade data covering 
SITC 5-8 actually underestimates the extent of such type of trade in the 
economy. 
In view of the Hong Kong's dominant role of foreign direct 
investment in China and the concentration of its investment on the 
projects for assembly and processing, foreign capital invested in the 
other area of industrial sector in China has relatively minor role in 
determination of trade pattern.3U With the exception of the 
assembly/processing related investment, main part of the foreign direct 
30) Calculated by the author from Customs General Administration of PRC (1989). 
31) The foreign-invested firms' share of China's gross output value of industry 
was 0.92%, 1.62%, 2.77%, and 4.0% in each year of the period 
1987-90.(calculated from Statistical Yearbook, and Shen Zhen Statistical Bureau, 
1989，1991) 
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investment in the Chinese industry consists of that from industrially 
advanced countries such as United States and Japan. For China, given the 
prevailing limitations on foreign exchange spending, foreign investment 
by industrialized countries is seen as the most cost-effective vehicle to 
obtain greater access to desired technology. 
On the other hand, main objectives of investors from industrialized 
countries are to gain a strong foothold in China to capture potential 
Chinese market and/or to keep the competitive edge against their 
competitors. Therefore, they are keen on keeping the quality of their 
products, which in turn crucially depends on the availability of 
appropriate parts and components. Usually, they rely primarily on imports 
of kits or components as the result of the inability to find reliable, 
high-quality sources of components and parts in China.32 On the contrary, 
despite the measures designed to stimulate export of their products, 
their export has been stagnated.® In the process of production in such 
firms, China provides labour or components produced with intensive use of 
labour. Thus, the operation of such type of foreign-invested firms is 
conducive to inter-industry trade rather than intra-industry trade. 
Nevertheless, as in the case of offshore assembly/processing in China, 
their demonstration effect through the efficient management of firms 
stimulates the responsiveness of the local industrial firms to the 
competitive pressure, and contributes to intra-industry trade indirectly. 
32) For example, for the products of Beijing Jeep, an equity joint venture of China 
and US established in 1984, local contents was still less than 10% at the end of 
1987. Even in most successful case such as Shanghai Foxboro, another joint 
equity venture of China and US started in 1982，most products did not get 
beyond the 30-40% level of local contents till 1988. (Business China, January 
25， June 27, 1988) 
33) For instance, the Fujian-Hitachi TV plant, started in 1981 as a China-Japan 
equity joint venture, had to import over 60% of its components needed, but was 
able to export only 6.0% of its products in 1986.(South China Morning Post. 
August 26，1986) 
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5-5 Determinants of intra-industry trade in China 
In this section, in relation with our observations on the stylized 
facts in the pattern of intra-industry trade and the sources of such type 
of trade in the Chinese industry, a simple international trade model is 
built. In the process, the stylized facts and the sources of intra-
industry trade in China can be connected with the economic rationale 
based on the operation of the market mechanism. To support the viewpoint, 
an econometric analysis is conducted and the result is reported. 
Major determinants of intra-industry trade in China 
In the section 3 and 4 of the chapter, we observed the patterns of 
intra-industry trade in the Chinese industry and investigated possible 
sources of it from the perspective of the economic incentives for such 
type of trade affected by the market-oriented reform. Given the direction 
of change of the economic environment and policy objectives in China, all 
the observations and investigations suggest two economic variables as the 
vital signals which affect individuals decision-making process and 
ultimately lead to intra-industry trade: the difference in comparat ive 
cost s of product ion between count r ies (as the indication of the 
difference in factor endowments) and the elast icity of subst itut ion of 
d i f f e r e n t iated products (as the indication of the extent of product 
differentiation). 
With the diversified preference structure and the incentives for 
intra-industry trade from international returns to scale in the Ethier's 
sense34', individual economic agents in China are faced with the problem of 
34) In fact, Ethier (1979,1982) did not elaborate on the economic rationale for the 
concept of international returns to scale. In our analysis, the application of the 
concept to intra-industry trade in the Chinese industry is based on the economic 
rationale developed by Young (1928) and Rosenburg (1976,1982). Young saw the 
static efficiency of the division of production process by specialized firms. On 
the other hand, Rosenburg saw the dynamic efficiency of specialization within an 
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choice. With the improved price system, difference in the comparative 
costs between the Chinese producers and foreign producers, and the 
substitutability between domestic and foreign products are considered in 
the process of the choice. In fact, the elasticity of substitution 
(whether in end-use or as intermediate inputs) between differentiated 
products determines the variety of products. Hence, intra-industry trade 
can be seen as the result of the choice. As mentioned in previous 
section, foreign-invested firms in China are more keen to reducing 
production costs and to keeping the quality of their products than the 
local firms. But, intrinsically they are faced with the same problem of 
choice with the local firms. Their sensitivity to changing conditions and 
managerial efficiency often provide a behavirol norm for the local firms. 
Basically, these inferences are supported by the stylized facts 
observed. 
A simple international trade model 
The purpose of the introduction of an international trade model is 
to identify the economic rationale of intra-industry trade in the Chinese 
manufacturing industry from the perspective of market^ oriented reform. 
The model is based on the factor proportion variables, as indicators of 
comparative costs, and the degree of product differentiation, which 
depends on the elasticity of substitution between varieties. In the 
process, it is not attempted to build a complete model which describes 
the details of China's foreign trade and their interrelationship with the 
rest of the economy. But, I try to show how the two important signals 
(the comparative costs and the elasticity of substitution) from two 
industry in relation with technological upgrade and diffusion. In China, both 
kinds of efficiency seem to provide the incentive for intra-industry trade as 
economic reform proceeds.(See section 3 of the chapter.) 
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hypothetical economies based on market mechanism and sharing the 
incentives for intra-industry trade with China, determine the pattern of 
intra-industry trade between them. The simple model provides the basis 
f°r construction of hypothesis which can be tested against the Chinese 
data. 
The model is based on the work by Hansson and Lundberg (1989). 
They utilized neoclassical two-factor, multi-sector framework of the type 
presented by Deardorff (1979) in combination with the Armington (1969) 
assumption that products are differentiated by place of production.» 
However, the model used in Hansson and Lundberg (1989) only considers the 
case of final goods, and provides no rationale of the intra-industry 
trade in differentiated intermediate inputs. In view of the importance of 
intermediate inputs in China's foreign trade, we explicitly deal with the 
case in which any or all of products also can be used as intermediate 
inputs. In addition, in the Hansson and Lundberg's model, goods produced 
in a country are homogeneous and, goods are diffentiated only by the 
location of production, In our model, products are not only 
differentiated by the location of production, but also have varieties in 
a country. Furthermore, for the interpretation of the model we also 
explicitly consider the possible relationship between the factor 
proportions variables and the various aspects of production differenti-
35) Of course, there was substantial gap between the operating mechanism in the 
Chinese economy during the period discussed in the study and that in a 
hypothetical economy as seen by neoclassical trade model. The aim of the 
utilization of neoclassical trade model with rather restrictive assumptions in the 
analysis is twofold. Firstly, I would like to show how the two major sources of 
intra-industry trade in the Chinese industry identified in the analysis bring about 
intra-industry trade in an economy based on the market adjustment mechanism. 
Secondly, relying on the result of the econometric analysis of the hypotheses 
derived from the model against China's industrial and trade data, I hope we can 
infer the extent of the operation of market mechanism in China's industry in 
determination of its intra-industry trade. 
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ation in the context of the Chinese industry. 
THE H0DEL: Let A and B be two countries with fixed supply of two 
factors of production, labour L and capital K’ which are perfectly mobile 
between sectors but internationally immobile. Country A is relatively 
well endowed with capital and country B is with labour. The countries are 
symmetric, i.e. they are of equal size and consumer preferences are 
identical. Suppose there are n industries, which can be ranked with 
respect to capital intensity® ki. Each industry produces differentiated 
products, which also can be used as intermediate inputs. The extent of 
the differentiation in each industry is predetermined and initially 
assumed as same in both countries. The differentiated goods of an 
industry produced in a country are close but not perfect substitutes. So 
do those from the same industry of A and B. Therefore, in the model, all 
sectors may well be operating simultaneously in both countries. It is due 
to reciprocal demand for products produced in other countries with the 
assumptions of similar preferences and of the existence of ‘international 
returns to scale' in Ethier's (1979) term in the case of intermediate 
inputs. The production function displays constant returns to scale given 
the variety of intermediate inputs. But an expansion of the 
finished-goods production arising from an increased number of differenti-
ated intermediate inputs as a result of international trade displays 
increasing returns, since the variety of intermediate goods is valued per 
se. Therefore, we can specify the production function as follows； 
Xi = Fi[Li,KifXii,Xi2,...,Xin], i = 1...n, (5.8) 
36) Throughout our analysis, no factor reversals are assumed. 
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L Where Xi i n d i c a t e s the representative variety of industry i for which 
the production functions in both country are assumed identical, and Fi[-] 
exhibits constant returns to scale. Fixed coefficients between 
: intermediate inputs and final output are assumed, and for the demand for 
Xik as a kind of intermediate input for production of X：, we suppose CES 
type function： 
Xik = 0(xti,xf2,..., xfm:X?itX? X?m) 
. 2m /?» 1/ R： 
=0(Xii,...Xi2m) = [.? Xi?1] 131, j = 1...2m (5.9) 
J - 1 
In the equation (5.9), m indicates the number of differentiated products 
in industry i in a country, the superscripts A and B for country A and B, 
0�i5i <1, and Oi 二 l/(l-/?i) is the elasticity of substitution between any 
pair of products in industry i, which is supposed to be identical between 
any pair of differentiated products regardless whether they are produced 
in a country or in different countries. With the CES subproduction 
function which is analogous to the subutility funciton used in Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977), the larger is the number of varieties, the lower the 
effective price of intermediate inputs (components). The economies 
implied by such functional form do not reflect the increased plant size 
but a greater division of labor, i.e. the disintegration of a production 
process to extend the length of production run. Thus, using intermediate 
goods make it possible to economize primary factors due to such economies 
of scale. Production functions are assumed internationally identical, and 
have the usual properties of concavity and homogeneity. All markets are 
assumed to be perfectly competitive. 
We now assume that A and B are trading but, relative factor prices 
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丨 i n equilibrium are not equalized. Then for each country, we can define a 
function：37' 
Vi(Li,Ki,Pi,...pn) = max[ PiXi -J^kXik ] k=l...n (5.10) 
s.t. Xi = Fi[LifKitXU Xin] 
For given prices, the functions Vi(Li,Kif-) describes, in nominal terms, 
the maximum net revenue that can be earned from the production of the 
representative variety of industry i and allocated to payment of the 
primary factors, capital and labour. The resulting unit-value-added 
isoquant lines and the unit-isocost lines of relevant country can be used 
to see different price structure in the two countries. For the purpose, 
with our assumption of fixed coefficients between intermediate inputs and 
final output (which are assumed identical in both countries) so that Xik 
=aikXi39, i，k = l‘..n. Then, we can rewrite as 
n 
Vi = (Pi-1J1PkaiiOFi(Li,Ki,Xii,...,Xik). (5.11) 
Competitive market means that: 
Vij ^ rLaiL + n<aiK j = 1...2m, (5.12) 
where m is the number of differentiated goods in the industry i in a 
country, Vij is the value-added of variety j of industry i, aiL and aiK 
37) I adopt the method used in Deardorff (1979) for the following inference. 
38) With the special functional form of (5.9)，it is optimal to use all varieties in 
equal quantities. 
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are requirements per unit of output of labour and capital as primary 
factors, and rL and rK are the prices of labour and capital. For all 
goods actually produced the equality holds, so that prices equal unit 
costs. 
The unit-value-added isoquant is that for which 
n 
Xi = 1 / (pi-^pkaik). (5.13) 
With the assumption of unequal factor prices in equilibrium, wA>wB, where 
w = rL/rK is the wage/capital rental ratio. ‘ 
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In Figure 5.1 we may draw the unit isocost lines AA and BB， representing 
in each country the combinations of K and L that cost 1 unit； the slopes 
of the lines equal WA and WB. This means that labour is relatively cheap 
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in B. For each sector, the unit-value-added isoquant (Ai to A5 in country 
A and Bi to B5 in country B) will be tangent to the isocost line. In 
addition, we assume no transport costs. If we assume for the moment 
homogeneous product and perfect substitutability beween products of 
different countries, the cost of goods 1 and 2 are higher in B than in A； 
therefore these goods are produced only in A ； country B will import 
goods 1 and 2’ and goods 3 is produced by both. As seen by Deardorff 
(1979), at most one good can be produced by both countries, and that all 
goods with higher capital intensity than the common good will be produced 
only in the capital-abundant country, and therefore exported from that 
country. In the case, except for good 3, there will be only net trade and 
no intra-industry trade. Since in our model output from two countries of 
the same industry are close but not perfect substitute, all sectors may 
be operating simultaneously in both countries, even if costs and prices 
differ. In Figure 5.1, the distance between the A and B unit-value-added 
isoquants measures the cost and price differences between products from A 
and B. Clearly, given the difference in factor prices, the cost 
difference will be related to the factor proportions in a particular 
industry. The cost difference is small or zero for goods with 
intermediate capital intensity, but increases for very capital-intensive 
and very labour-intensive goods. Competition still ensures equality 
between price and unit cost. From the tangency condition for products in 
both countries shown in Figure 5.1， it is obvious that the more capital 
intensive the industry, the higher is the relative unit cost, and thus 
the relative price, of the products produced by B. 
In the model, patterns of trade can be related to the cost 
differentials and the elasticity of substitution, provided some 
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simplifying assumptions with regard to production and demand conditions 
are introduced. With regard to the demand side of the model, we can 
consider the case in which differentiated goods in each industry are 
demanded as final consumption goods and also"the case where they are used 
as intermediate inputs. Despite differences in the perspectives from 
which they are analyzed, the implications for trade patterns are the 
same. 
First, consider the demand for the goods produced in ith industry 
as final consumption goods. We assume the utility function is separable, 
i.e. that the marginal rate of substitution between two,products in an 
industry is independent of the level of consumption of the output of 
other industries. Then, the demand for all goods in the ith industry as a 
group, xi’ by a single consumer, is obtained by maximizing the utility 
function 
max U(xi,x2,…，xn) (5.14) 
subject to the budget constraint3® 
n 
y = Z PiXi (5.15) 
i^ l 
The price of goods in industry i，pi is an index of the product prices； 
pi A and pie which in turn indicates price of differentiated products of 
industry i in country A and B. Demand for products belonging to industry 
i supplied by country A depends on the size of the ith market and on the 
relative prices of A and B products. Given the demand for ith good, we 
39) The prices of differentiated goods of an industry are identical but different 
from those of the same industry in the other country. This is because 
differentiated products in an industry are produced with the same proportions of 
the factors as far as they are produced in a country. 
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obtain the quantity demanded for a certain variety of good j (j = I...2m) 
in industry i by minimizing the outlay to obtain a given Xi ： 
2m 
min Z pijxij (5.16) 
j — l 
subject to 
Xi = /i(xil,xi2,...,xi2m) (5.17) 
If we assume the function fi(- ) is of CES type. 
= I I xij } (5.18) 
j = i 
where, 0 {l3i � 1 and Oi = l/(l-/?i) ) 0 is the elasticity of substitution 
between any pair of products in industry i. The first order conditions 
give the following relationship between relative price and quantity 
demanded, of any pair of products j and k in industry i： 
xik f pi j -iOi 
——= (5.19) 
Xij pik J 
where Oi = 1 / ( ) ) 0 is the elasticity of substitution between any 
pairs of products in industry i. Since the prices of differentiated goods 
of an industry i produced in a country are identical4®, the quantities 
demanded for them are identical, too. Thus, for every product of industry 
i, it also is true that: 
(5.20) 
XiB 1 piA J 
40) See footnote (39). 
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The results are exactly the same in case where differentiated goods in 
industry i are used as intermediate inputs by producers. Given the amount 
of expenditure on the products of industry i by the assumption of fixed 
coefficients between intermediate inputs and final output as made above, 
the first order conditions for the cost minimization problem in relation 
with (5.9) results in the relationship (5.20), too. 
In order to clarify the relationship between the level of 
intra-industry trade and relative price, let us assume two identical 
economies for the moment. Then, due to the symmetry between them, the 
demand function and the elasticity of substitution between products from 
A and B are supposed to be the same in both countries for any given 
industry. The share of intra-industry trade of the total trade of country 
A in any industry can be defined in GL index as：( Hansson and Landberg, 
1989) 
|EiA - EiBI 
Ti = 1 
EiA + EiB 
|xiA - XiBI 
=1 (5.21) 
XiA + XiB 
2 min(XiA，XiB) 
= (5.22) 
XiA + XiB 
where Ei a is the total amount of products in industry i exported by A, 
Eie is the total amount of products in industry i exported by B, i.e. A‘s 
import from B.4D Substituting (5.20) into (5.22) we have： 
41) Since it is assumed for the moment that the countries are identical in size, 
consumer preferences, and production functions, without trade barriers and 
transport costs, the price of any product will be the same in country A and 
country B. Thus, by (5.20) XIA/XIB will be the same for each consumer or 
producer in A and B. Since per capita income and number of consumers are the 
same, the total amounts consumed of each industry's product in a country, i.e. 
xiA and XiB, i = l...n, will be the same in A and B. If Qia and MiA denote 
production and imports of the ith good in country A, it follows that 
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T； - 2 , f (Ji XiA ) XiB 
11 , where si 二 if /c oo\ 
[ P i B 广 ‘ x 1 - a i l x i A ( x i B 1 � 
^ P i A ) 
Thus’ given the elasticity of substitution Oi, the share of intra-
industry trade in industry i is a simple function of the relative prices 
of products from country A and country B, and the larger the cost 
differential between producers from A and B, hence, the larger the price 
differential, the less intra-industry trade will be as a proportion of 
total trade in the relevant industry. Without price differential, i.e. 
when piA 二 PiB, Ti will reach its maximum value 1 and all trade might be 
recorded as intra-industry trade. In Figure 5.1’ as the distance between 
the unit-value-isoquants of A and B measures the cost and price 
differences between products from A and B, since demand functions and 
elasticities of substitution are identical not only across countries but 
also identical for all goods by assumption, the intra-industry trade 
share of trade will be low for both very capital intensive industry and 
very labour intensive industry, and relatively high in the industry with 
intermediate range of factor intensity. 
For given relative product price’ we may also derive the effects 
of varying elasticity of substitution on intra-industry trade Ti by 
taking the partial derivative of (5.23) with respect to si： 
PiB isi r piB I 
2 In 
P U — ( 5 . 2 4 ) 
a s i f r P i B I 2 
J + 1 
P i A
 7 J J 
E i A = M i B = x i A = 0 . 5 Q i A : E i B = M i A = x i B = 0 . 5 Q i B . S u b s t i t u t i n g t h e r e s u l t i n t o t h e 
GL index formula, we obtain (5.21) and (5.22). 
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Substituting ai for Si gives —^ (0. That is, given relative product 
oO i 
prices, the greater the elasticity of substitution the less will be the 
share of intra-industry trade in an industry. If we assume the direct 
relationship between the extent of product differentiation and the 
elasticity of substitution, the result means that the more differentiated 
the product group is, the less is the elasticity of substitution, and the 
more intra-industry trade. 
^PLICATIONS OF THE MODEL： The model is based on the trade of 
differentiated goods which can be used as intermediate inputs as well as 
final consumption goods. Differentiated products in each industry are 
also viewed as differentiated by the place of production. They are close 
but not perfect substitues for each other whether as final goods or as 
intermediate inputs. Despite the differences in production costs between 
two countries, trade in the imperfect substitues is induced in the model 
by assuming CES type subutility function for final goods and the 
‘subproduction' function for intermediate inputs. Such type of 
specification makes it possible to model the tenet which values the 
variety of products per se. For final goods case, it can be justified by 
the existence of the tendency of ‘love of variety, as modeled by Dixit 
and Stigliz (1977), and for intermediate inputs, by considering 
‘international returns to scale' (Ethier, 1979,1982) which explicitly 
relates economies caused by introduction of more specialized components 
through international trade. In contrast with the recent models of 
intra-industry trade, in view of China's huge potential market size I did 
not direct my attention to economies of scale at firm level. 
In the model, actual level of intra-industry trade would be 
determined by the interaction of factor proportions variables and the 
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extent of product differentiation in relevant industries and countries. 
Especially for China, given its strong incentives for import substitution 
and technological development through international trade, the role of 
the elasticity of substitution in demand for the determination of 
patterns of intra-industry trade might be important. Based on the model, 
we can expect the patterns of intra-industry trade in the Chinese 
industry as follows： 
1. Intra-industry trade share would be highest in industries that 
are in the medium range with respect to factor proportions due to small 
cost differentials, and as we moves towards industries with extreme 
factor intensities because of strong incentives for inter-industry trade 
and specialization in such industries, the intra-industry share would be 
decreased. 
2. The less the elasticity of substitution between products in an 
industry, the more differentiated the product group is, and the higher 
possibility of intra-industry trade exists. 
3, In a comparison across countries from the perspective of the 
stage of development, intra-industry trade in the Chinese industry would 
be highest in trade with middle income range countries. In China's trade 
with low income countries, although there is great potential for 
intra-industry trade due to small differences in factor costs, but 
China's strong incentives for import substitution and lack of ability and 
potential for product differentiation in low income countries with 
relatively scarce capital endowments limit the extent of intra-industry 
trade. On the contrary, in trade with advanced industrial countries, the 
large gap in production cost structure limits the extent of intra-
industry trade, and inter-industry type of trade and specialization will 
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develop. In addition to the relatively smaller gap in costs structure, 
the country group in the middle range of income such as Asian newly 
industrialized economies are equipped with the ability for product 
differentiation with their comparative advantages in the industries in 
the range of intermediate capital intensity. Thus, China's trade with 
them would record higher intra-industry trade share than with other 
country groups. 
4. The model was developed in the context of bilateral trade. But, 
since China is undoubtedly a country with lower level of capital 
endowments in comparison with world economy as a whole, and China's price 
structure is still rather isolated from that of world market, the 
implications of the model still hold in China's trade with the rest of 
the world. Following economic reforms in China, as the difference in 
comparative costs between China and the rest of the world narrows, the 
share of intra-industry trade might be increasing, 
5. As far as implied patterns of intra-industry trade by the model 
are the results of the assumption of competitive market structure, the 
sectoral differences in the progress towards effectively functioning 
markets in the Chinese Industry would affect the extent of such type of 
trade in each sector considerably. 
The consistency of the model with our observations on the stylized 
facts about intra-industry trade patterns in China provides some piece-
meal evidences to our inference. However, for rigorousness, I provide 
econometric analysis in the following part of the section. 
The results of econometric analysis 
DATA AND THE INTERPRETATION OF VARIABLES： AS mentioned in the 
chapter 4 of the study, I adopt the view that the 3-digit level of 
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aggregations in the SITC correspond roughly to the concept of an 
industry. Thus, the dependent variable q, the Aquino index of 
intra-industry trade, was computed according to equation (5.3) for all 
manufacturing industries on 3-digit level of the SITC except those 
belonging to division 68 for the period of 1986-1989. The trade 
statistics are also based on the Summary Surveys of China's Customs 
Statistics (1986-1989). The explanatory variables used in the study are 
taken from the the PRC 1985 Industrial Census Data These are (for data 
see Appendix E)： 
Physical capital intensity (p): fixed capital for production per 
employee. 
Human capital intensity (h)； technical and engineering personnel as 
percentage of employee, 
The ratio of sales costs (s)； sales costs as percentage to total costs of 
production. 
Economies of scale index (e)； the value obtained by dividing the 
difference between the average net product value of large and medium size 
firms and that of small size firms by the average net product value of 
all firms and adding one to the result. 
Dummies for country groups (di,d2，d3): di stands for developing 
countries, d2 for industrialized countries, and d3 for socialist 
countries. 
The data for physical capital intensity p and human capital 
intensity h are the same with those used in the previous chapter. Since 
the model predicts higher intra-industry trade for industries in the 
intermediate range of capital intensity and lower for those in the range 
of extreme capital intensity, in order to capture the non-linear 
185 
relationship between capital intensities and the levels of intra-industry 
trade, a second degree polynomial can be utilized； 
Ti = ao + aiki + a2ki2 (5 25) 
where ai ) 0’ a2�0 , and ki indicates capital intensity in industry i. 
Sales costs of products in the 1985 Data included costs for 
packing, transportation, advertisement, and exhibition in the process of 
sales of relevant products. Sales costs accrue to the Chinese industrial 
production units are intimately related to 'pursuasive, sales promotion 
activities and ‘informative, motives due to product differentiation under 
the increasing pressure from market competition in the Chinese industrial 
sector. Therefore, I adopt the ratio of sales costs of products to total 
costs of production as an adequate proxy for the extent of product 
differentiation which depends on the elasticity of substitution in 
demand,42 
In addition, even though the model does not explicitly refer to the 
economies of scale at the firm level, because so many important 
theoretical contributions for modeling of intra-industry trade crucially 
rely on economies of scale from plant size, for comparison, I include a 
measure of the extent of economies due to firm size in China as an 
independent variable in our econometric investigation. 
Finally, in order to reflect different intra-industry levels in 
China's trade with different country groups, I make use of dummy 
42) In fact, the use of advertising-intensity measures as proxies for product 
differentiation is relatively widespread in industrial organization studies. Caves 
and Williamson (1985) also found user specificity, as well as technical 
complexity and advertising and selling costs to be related to product 
differentiation. 
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variables in the equation for the country groups of developing countries, 
industrialized countries, and socialist countries. Thus, the t values for 
the coefficients of dummy variables can be used to see whether China's 
intra-industry trade levels in trade with them can be discernible from 
that in trade with Hong Kong and Singapore which are considered as 
representing Asian Newly Industrialized Economies. 
The basic structural equation to be estimated and tested is； 
In Ti = a0 + ai In pi + a2(ln pi )2 + a3 ln hi + a4(ln hi )2 
+ as In si + a6 ln ej + di + d2 + d3 + £i, (5.26) 
where a is disturbance term and the expected signs of the coefficients 
are: 
ai’a3,a5, a6’ ) 0 
az, a4, �0 
The expected signs for ai,a2,a3， and a4 are based on the functional form 
of specification as in (5.25)a The sign for as in (5.26) is expected to 
be positive as si stands proxy for the extent of product differentiation 
in relation with the elastisity of substitution in the relevant industry. 
We expect the sign of the proxy for economies of scale at firm level ei 
to be positive. This is because, in general, the greater the relative 
cost advantage enjoyed by large firms relative to small firms, the 
greater the likelihood that minimum efficient scale of production is 
relatively large, and the more product differentiation will be subject to 
the extent of the market. In addition, since all variables are expressed 
in natural logarithms’ the resulting coefficients show the elasticities. 
The equation (5.26) was estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) 
187 
on China's trade data for each year of the period 1986-89 for 142 
manufacturing industries. The results of pooled regressions for the 
period of 1986-89 are reported too. The resulting regression coefficients 
Table 5-7 
Regression coefficients for the determinants of 
the share of intra-industry trade 
Explanatory 1986_ ExDected 
Variables 1986 1987 1988 1989 1989 Sign 
In pi 12.512" 9.674^ 8.501^ 9.585" 9 898" ( + ) 
(3.21) (2.74) (2.55) (3.00) (5.72) 
(In pi)2 -0.630** -0.492** -0.428* -0.4965^ -0.503" (-) 
(-2.98) (-2.57) (-2.37) (-2.87) (-5.35) 
In hi -0.216 0.138 0.513 0.340 0.209 ( + ) 
(-0.50) (0.34) (1.34) (0.92) (1.05) 
(In hi )2 -0.140 -0.255* -0.379" -0.264* -0.263" (-) 
(-0.88) (-1.68) (-2.74) (-1.96) (-3.62) 
In si 0.585" 0.421* 0.324* 0.322* 0.409" ( + ) 
(3.18) (2.29) (1.91) (1.97) (4.68) 
In ei -0.027 0.150 0.238 -0.04 0.079 (+) 
(-0.10) (0.54) (0.92) (-0.14) (0.59) 
di -1.594** -1.198^ -0.969" -1.065" -1.202^ (-) 
(-6.50) (-4.89) (-4.23) (-4.80) (-10.24) 
d2 -1.410^ -1.329^ -1.061** -0.933** -1.181" (-) 
(-6.02) (-5.71) (-4.87) (-4.36) (-10.53) 
d3 -1.504*=* -1.804** -I.493M -1,503#$ -1.572" (-) 
(-5.61) (-7,14) (-6.43) (-6.78) (-13.01) 
R2 0.191 0.163 0.186 0.178 0.185 
Na 472 501 510 528 2011 
Source: Computed from Summary Surveys of China's Customs Statistics 1986. 
1987.1988.1989, and from PRC 1985 Industrial Census Data. 
a The number of observation. 
** S^tatistically significant at 1%. 
* Statistically significant at 5%. 
# Statistically significant at 10%. 
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a re given in Table 5-7. Figures in brakets indicate t-values. The 
estimates of coefficients of physical capital and human capital 
intensities largely confirm our inference relying on the simple trade 
model and consistent with the stylized facts observed. 
The analysis indicates that indeed there is little intra-industry 
trade in industries with extreme values of physical and human capital 
intensity. The relatively weak result of estimates of the coefficient of 
human capital intensity relative to those of physical capital intensity 
in terms of statistical significance might be mainly due to the 
relatively poor endowments of human capital in China as was seen in the 
previous chapter. The result of analysis in chapter 4 showed that the 
pattern of inter-industry trade in the Chinese industry strongly affected 
by the differences in human capital intensity across industries and in 
human capital endowments across countries. Thus, it would be more 
difficult to trace out exact functional relationship as described in 
(5.25) between the level of intra-industry trade and human capital 
intensity than in case of physical capital intensity. And industries with 
high human capital intensity might subject to the strong tendency for 
inter-industry trade and specialization and partly offset the expected 
influence on intra-industry trade. 
The influence of sales costs (si), which stands proxy for the 
extent of product differentiation due to imperfect substitutabi1ity among 
products within an industry, on intra-industry trade share of Chinese 
foreign trade appears to be positive as expected. Among four OLS 
estimates for it, one is significant at \% level and the other three are 
also statistically significant at 5% level. 
Although the presence of the scale economies due to decreasing 
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costs in production associated with plant size is central to most of 
the° r ieS 0f ^tra-industry trade, the result conforms with our earlier 
expectation that intra-industry trade in Chinese industry would not 
exhibit strong relationship with economies of scale at firm level. 
Coefficients of dummy variables for country groups show that the 
share of intra-industry trade in China's trade with Asian Newly 
Industrializing Economies are indeed definitely higher in trade with 
other country groups. 
Finally, we note that the overall fit or explanatory power of the 
structural equation used (adjusted R2) are far from ideal. Nevertheless, 
in view of the cross-sectional nature of the analysis and considering 
problems related to the selection of explanatory variables as proxies for 
theoretical concepts, and measurement error etc., and in comparison with 
the results of other economectric studies, it does not hamper the result 
of our analysis to be convincing. 
5-6 Concluding remark 
In this chapter we reviwed the economic theories developed to 
explain intra-industry trade and examined their applicability to China's 
economy in reform process. Due to divergence in the basis on which 
intra-industry trade models are built, and variety of possible sources of 
intra-industry trade in the Chinese manufacturing sector, it is difficult 
to adopt any one dominant theory and its model to understand and explain 
such type of trade in China and to test against its trade and industrial 
data. Therefore, I attempted to understand intra-industry trade in China 
not only from the perspective of comparative costs of China and its trade 
partners but also from the viewpoint of the difference in the elasticity 
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of substitution among products due to the intrinsic features of the 
products. Then, in view of the sources of intra-industry trade in China, 
I have introduced the concepts of consumer's preference for product 
diversity and international economies of scale for consumer goods and 
intermediate inputs, respectively. Interconnection of such concepts made 
it possible to build a simple international trade model and to test it 
against China's trade and industrial data. The result convinces us that 
comparative costs and product differentiation are indeed important 
determinants of intra-industry trade in the Chinese manufacturing sector. 
In so far as intra-industry trade and specialization are the phenomena 
appear as a result of unlimited interactions of market forces, the 
confirmative results of econometric analysis based on the theoretical 
model make it possible for us to conclude: competitive pressure activated 
by the introduction of market mechanism in the Chinese economy 
undoubtedly influences the patterns of its intra-industry trade and 
specialization. In the process, it is believed that foreign-invested 
firms in China play a positive role through their demonstration effect on 
the local enterprise, 
Naturally, Inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade investiga-
ted in the previous chapter and this chapter would have different 
implications for gains from trade, and trade and industrial policy in 
China. This topic will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF INTER- AND INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE 
FOR ADJUSTMENT IN THE CHINESE INDUSTRY 
In the previous chapters we have investigated the theoretical and 
'it 
empirical aspects of inter- and intra-industry trade in the Chinese 
manufacturing industries. As argued throughout the study, the results 
show that market forces in China assume considerable role in 
determination of its foreign trade patterns in terms of inter- and 
intra-industry trade. However, the unique characteristics of the Chinese 
economy due to the historical background as a socialist 'country and the 
stage of economic development to which China belongs still appear as main 
obstacles for the economy to enjoy full benefit from the operation of 
market mechanism. 
This chapter deals with the problems of adjustment and commercial 
policy as the consequences of inter- and intra-industry trade and 
specialization in the Chinese industry. The first section briefly 
outlines the gains from international exchange of commodities for the 
cases of inter- and intra-industry trade in the context of the Chinese 
economy. Section 2 compares the adjustment costs for inter- and intra— 
industry specialization accruing to the Chinese manufacturing industries 
from inter- and intra-industry trade. Section 3 illustrates their 
implications for commercial policy in China as well as those in relation 
with the concept of effective protection. Finally, concluding remark for 
the analysis in the chapter is added. 
6-1 Gains from trade 
In the basic factor proportions model, gains from trade can be 
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separated conceptually into gains from exchange and gains from speciali-
zation. The former derives from the ability of a given economy to trade 
at a commodity-price ratio which differs from that prevailing in autarky. 
No change in the economy's output mix is required to secure these gains. 
However, if the economy responds to the change in relative prices by 
altering its output mix and specializing to benefit fully from its 
relative factor endowments, then additional gains from trade, i.e. gains 
from specialization results. 
The conventional rationale for the assessment of the gains from 
trade in a market economy is based on the concept concerning the costs of 
protection. And the empirical measurement of it relies on the concepts of 
consumer's surplus and producer's surplus which can be used for the 
measurement of the deadweight loss due to the protection.(Corden, 1974) 
In empirical works, the consumption costs of protection are measured by 
taking into account the relative price-change after liberalization in the 
industry concerned, and elasticity of demand within the relevant range of 
the demand curve, and the quantity of the product demanded before 
liberalization. Similarly, the production costs which indicate the loss 
of efficient production In protected industries are evaluated by taking 
into account the elasticity of supply within the relevant range of the 
supply curve and the quantity supplied by domestic producers before 
liberalization. But trade liberalization can also have employment and 
capital costs. The employment effects can be calculated by taking into 
account the relative price-change after the liberalization in the given 
industry group, the elasticity of supply within the relevant range of the 
supply curve, and the total employment in the industry group, under the 
assumption that the marginal product per employee equals the average 
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product in the industry. The capital costs of trade liberalization will 
be determined by the value of the eliminated production capacity and the 
rate of amortization of this capacity. From this, the sales value of 
machines which can be used in other sectors must be subtracted. 
For the purpose of comparison of the gains from inter-industry 
trade with those from intra-industry trade, one approach that can be 
attempted is to carry out the above-mentioned type of measurement for the 
industry groups in which intra-industry trade presumably takes place and 
compare them with those of industry groups for which inter-industry trade 
likely to prevail.« Although we did not directly measure and compare 
them, demand and supply elasticities of the industry groups where 
intra-industry trade prevails are likely to be higher than those sectors 
characterised by more standardised products where inter-industry trade 
dominates.2) Thus, gains from trade in terms of the consumption, supply, 
employment^ , and capital costs of protection which can be forgone as 
trade opens are likely to be larger in case of inter-industry trade than 
intra-industry trade. 
In the Chinese industry, as seen in the previous chapter, the 
1) Some problems are posed by such an approach because of its partial-
equilibrium nature and its failure to capture the gains from economies of scale 
and from dynamic effects on economic growth. 
2) de Melo and Robinson (1981) explored quantitatively the impact of trade policy 
on relative prices and resource pulls within partial-equilibrium as well as 
general-equilibrium models which incorporate product differentiation. Arguing 
that the sectoral variation in trade substitution elasticities roughly captures the 
extent of product differentiation due to differences in quality and degree of 
product homogeneity, they found that the domestic price effect of protection is 
lower in product-differentiated sectors, and that the resource pulls in the long 
run are,thus, less where domestic and foreign goods are not perfect substitutes. 
3) As a related issue, in dealing with gains from intra-industry trade between 
countries with similar factor endowments from the viewpoint of distributional 
consequences, Krugman (1981) shows that the advantages of extending the market 
will outweigh the distributional effects, and the owners of scarce as well as 
abundant factors will be better off in contrast with the income-redistributional 
effects of more conventional trade. 
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extent of product differentiation for which the ratio of sales costs to 
total production costs in the relevant industry stands proxy is 
positively related to the level of intra-industry trade. Therefore, we 
expect that the deadweight losses of protection in those sectors with 
high level of intra-industry trade are less than those in the sectors 
where trade takes place in more standardised products. This in turn would 
suggest that trade liberalization in the latter warrant and justify more 
gains from trade than in the former. 
However, in addition to the gains from exchange and specialization 
similar to those in factor proportions model, in relation with increasing 
returns to scale and product differentiation, additional sources of gains 
can be considered in case of intra-industry trade； namely, gains from 
trade due to increased product variety and expoitation of economies of 
scale. These gains may take the form of providing consumers with more 
variety of a given product (Krugman, 1979,1980), or of providing 
consumers with variety which are closer to their ideal variety 
(Lancaster, 1980， Helpman, 1981), or of providing consumers with a wider 
range of qualities (Sutton and Shaked, 1984)， and they are not mutually 
exclusive. Similar arguments can also be made for differentiated producer 
goods. In view of Ethier's (1979,1982) argument for the importance of 
product differentiation in producer goods for efficiency improvement 
through more specialized components and parts, the demand for 
differentiated producer goods is a powerful source of trade. Since large 
share of international trade comprises intermediate products4', the 
‘international returns to scale' also provides important source of gains 
4) For example, in 1983，between 50 and 60 per cent of manufactured trade of 
the EC, Japan and US consisted of intermediate products, with consumer goods 
holding a share of 20 per cent or less. (Kol and Tharakan, 1989，p.8) 
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from trade. 
Rayment (1983) and Kol and Rayment (1989) see gains from 
intra-industry trade in differentiated intermediate goods from a 
different angle based on Young's work (1928). As mentioned in previous 
chapter, Young regarded longer production runs were possible through 
fragmentation of the production process, as some fragments being taken 
over from the representative firm by specialized firms. According to Kol 
and Rayment (1989), such specialization will be furthered in pursuit of 
cost minimization but it is made possible by economies of scale due to an 
expanding market. 
On the other hand, Rosenburg's (1976) case for the importance of 
learning process involved in machinery production highlights the 
importance of dynamic economies of scale in the capital goods sector 
arising from focussing the technological efforts in firms on a narrow 
range of products. And the concept also can be applied to assess gains 
from intra-industry trade especially for developing countries such as 
China for which technological consideration plays important role in 
decision making for foreign trade. 
Although there still exist enormous obstacles on the way, empirical 
investigation of the patterns of inter-industry trade in the Chinese 
industry in chapter 4 of the study indicates that market-oriented reform 
in the economy has opened the possibility of capitalizing gains from 
trade through the exploitation of China's comparative advantage. That is, 
market-oriented reform combined with foreign trade decentralization and 
the institutional changes in the foreign trade system made it possible 
for China to realize the gains from inter-industry trade mentioned above. 
The development also backed up by the explicit recognition and 
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justification of the need for adoption of the concept of international 
division of labour among the Chinese leadership and academics for the 
implementation of intensive economic growth strategy instead of the 
extensive one in the past.幻 
Notwithstanding these favorable impacts of economic reform on the 
realizaion of the China's comparative advantage, there remain systematic 
causes which hinder the process to a considerable extent. Naturally, 
insufficiently developed market mechanism in China is most important one 
among them. It is mainly due to the rigidity of prices and exchange 
rates, the lack of matured markets for factors of production, and 
difficulties for local authorities to cooperate with one another 
horizontally to extend market forces across the regional borders. It is 
also due to enormous technological gaps in the same industry located in 
different regions as noted earlier. Specialization according to China's 
comparative advantage is hindered sometimes by internal and external 
macroeconomic imbalances which in turn make the government to take abrupt 
ad hoc administrative measures and quantitative restrictions to restore 
balance in supply and demand. In terms of the sources of gains from 
trade, the gains from inter-industry specialization is more difficult to 
realize in China, since usually such adverse influences of unreformed 
aspects of the Chinese economy tend to be more strongly felt in case of 
inter-industry adjustment than intra-industry adjustment.6) In addition, 
fierce competition among developing countries for the world markets of 
labour intensive products resulted in the declination of terms of trade 
for them. The situation makes the perspective of China's success to 
5) For the theoretical debate on the relevence of the concept of international 
division of labour among the Chinese leadership and academics, see S. K. 
Chang and T. O. Woo (1987). 
6) See the next section for the discussion about adjustment problems. 
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specialize in the industries in which China has its comparative advantage 
rather gloomy. Furthermore, the resurgence of the protectionism in 
international trade among countries and establishment of economic blocs 
aggravates the situation. 
For intra-industry trade, as noted above, the gains from trade are 
not easy to assess simply in terms of those from exchange and 
specialization.7) Considering unique features of the Chinese economy as it 
is in the course of reform makes it possible for us to identify some 
sources of gains from such a pattern of trade for China. 
In China, gains from intra-industry trade by providing consumers 
with differentiated products do not appear to be significant in their 
magnitude regardless whether they are horizontally or vertically 
differentiated goods. Import of nonessential goods and those competing 
significantly with domestic products are often subject to quantitative 
restrictions for two mixed objectives： control of the balance of payments 
and protection of domestic producers. Usually, among the products on the 
restiricted list are luxury consumer durables and their parts and 
components. Recent experience tells us that the objective of the 
government's restriction of trade appears to be balance of payments 
control rather than protection as far as consumer goods are concerned. 
But, generally higher import duty on consumer durables and strict 
restriction of nonessential goods provide considerable extent of 
protection for such commodities. Although import restrictions on 
7) In fact, the index of intra-industry only refers to the trade dimension. 
Greenway and Milner (1986，p.80) distinguish between intra-industry trade and 
intra-industry specialization and note that the two concepts are logically and 
analytically separate and separable. Nevertheless, most of the theoretical and 
empirical studies on intra-industry trade use the two concepts and measures 
interchangeably. There are some exeptions to this practice, for example, such as 
S. Jacobsson (1988). 
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nonessential consumer goods inhibit the Chinese consumers from enjoying 
variety of differentiated products imported, impact of such policies on 
the domestic economy through resource allocation may allow them to 
consume differentiated products. This is because producers would 
intensify their effort to adapt to demand structure of domestic or 
foreign consumers as far as market mechanism works. In this case, 
however, the Chinese economy should forgo gains from economies of scale 
by specialization in so far as the minimum scale of efficient production 
is relatively larger than the size of domestic market allowed for each 
variety. It also suffers from inefficiency in resource allocation due to 
the shift of resources towards low-productivity subsectors protected. The 
extent of consumer goods differentiation depends upon the pressure of 
competition and their market size which are affected by the quality and 
prices of products. 
Nevertheless, as Table 2-3 in chapter 2 has shown, in the end of 
1988， almost a half of the prices of commodities retailed were determined 
by free market. If we include those commodtities whose prices were under 
guidance plan of government, the share goes up to 70¾. Furthermore, as 
many evidences indicate, the share of commodity purchase compared with 
the share of self-sufficiency in the households consumption rapidly 
increased during 1978-89， and this implies the rapid commercialization of 
the hosehold consumption. All these trends in the Chinese economy 
guarantee the potential of gains from intra-industry trade for Chinese 
consumers as trade liberalization extends to consumer goods and their 
parts and components. 
In case of intra-industry trade8) in differentiated producer goods, 
8) In the study, the term intra-industry trade is used interchangeably with 
intra-industry specialization. 
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far-reaching implications for the Chinese industry can be derived in 
terms of productivity increase and technological development which are 
among the main objectives of economic reforms. 
Gains from intra-industry trade as a result of exploitation of 
economies of scale due to specialization and the resulting international 
returns to scale in Ethier's terminology can be readily understood in 
relation with the Chinese industrial environment. When it comes to 
productive inefficiency on the firm level, often blamed for it are the 
notorious departmentalism and regionalism based on the ideology of 
self-reliance still haunting the economy as the legacy of mandatory 
planning system and administrative resource allocation in the pre-reform 
period. As a consequence, large share of the small but comprehensive 
production units9� in the Chinese industry brings into the economy 
considerable waste of productive resources. They are financially 
profitable, but economically inefficient, and inhibit the exploitation of 
economies of scale and specialization, both of which are important 
sources of cost reduction. Under such circumstances, supply of parts and 
components with demanded quality and specification is also difficult to 
expect. In addition, continuing imbalance in productive capacity and high 
transport costs of raw materials and intermediate products made the 
opportunity cost of their production enormously high. In this context, 
increased number of components with demanded quality and specification 
as a result of intra-industry trade with greater international division 
of labour within an industry will be conducive to the productivity 
improvement in the Chinese industry through Ethier's international 
returns to scale. 
9) It is the result of regional duplication and flourish of self-sufficient small scale 
production units during prereform period. 
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Moreover, specialization in the narrow scope of differentiated 
products with greater division of labour will free part of resources 
which have been used to produce wide range of intermediate products in 
inefficient way. That is, viewing each industry as a vertically 
integrated entity from producer goods to intermediate components to final 
goods, and if some production fragments being taken over from the 
comprehesive firms in the Chinese industry by specialized firms, cost 
reduction due to economies of scale from specialization as seen by Allen 
Young (1928) is possible. This introduces another source of allocational 
efficiency from intra-industry trade in differentiated intermediate 
goods. 
Since technological advancement is one of main objectives of the 
economic reform, the impact of trade on the industrial technology upgrade 
and modernization of existing capital goods sector are as important as 
that on the improvment of allocational efficiency to assess gains from 
trade in China. China is virtually unique among developing countries in 
having full range of industry which producing nearly every product from 
machinery to final products with comprehensive industrial basis as the 
result of economic policy in the past. But, the level of technology used 
in the industrial sector lags behind that in most advanced and many less 
developed countries.101 Therefore, China also needs to upgrade the level of 
technology in nearly every industry. In relation with the technological 
aspect of foreign trade, appropriateness of the embodied technonology of 
imports in terms of relative factor intensities for their operation, and 
10) According to a study conducted earlier (Ma Hong, 1982)，only 20 percent of 
China's industrial technology was of 1960s and 1970s vintage while another 
20-25 percent is backward but could still serve, and of the remaining 55-60 
percent, 35 percent urgently needed to be renovated or scrapped because of 
excessive energy consumption, outmoded preducts, etc. and 20-25 percent should 
be gradually scrapped. 
201 
their adaptibility and diffusibility have important implications for the 
efficient productivity upgrade in the Chinese industry. 
The latest vintage technology embodied in the imported producer 
goods from advanced countries which are usually designed to save labour 
input will not necessarily lower production costs in China. Since many 
innovations in advanced countries raise productivity of labour or energy 
through higher capital cost, when they are applied to the Chinese 
industry it is difficult to expect they will create additional surplus by 
reduction of costs so that they can put it to expand output and 
employment of other products in the same or other enterprises. In 
addition, as far as the purpose of import of capital equipments embodied 
with advanced technology is to upgrade domestic industrial technology, 
the success of import policy depends upon China's own capability to 
absorb and digest the new technology. In fact, poor economic results of 
imported turnkey projects and complete plants in terms of utilization 
rates and operational results are well understood by the Chinese policy 
makers through experiences. They have been mainly due to problems in the 
availability of skilled labour, power, raw materials of complementary 
domestic components with adequate specification in China. 
With comprehensive industrial basis and enormous technological gap 
between production units within same industry in China, diffusibility of 
advance technology embodied in imported equipment is another factor to be 
considered. The new technology cannot be simply transferred or imitated 
by reverse engineering of imported equipment. Considerable effort and 
investment are needed to master the new technology used to make the 
equipment and to make adaptations for complementary production and 
management, especially for the latest vintage of technlogies embodied in 
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the products from advanced industrial countries. In this context, we can 
understand the notion that radical innovations are less important than 
subsequent minor improvements in reducing costs of production. And the 
efficiency of learning by doing in mastering appropriate industrial 
technologies as market extends over national border (Enos,1958, 
Rosenburg, 1982, chapter 1) is also clear. 
Having considered some technological aspects of foreign trade in 
China, we can justify the welfare implication of China's high 
intra-industry trade in the products belonging to the middle range of 
factor intensity and in trade with Newly Industrialized Economies in 
Asia.(See Chapter 5. ) Such features of intra-industry trade in 
manufactures provide additional source of gains from trade for China 
compared with the inter-industry trade based on factor proportions 
theoretical framework. 
Productivity growth through efficient use of the existing 
technology, i.e. x-ef f iciency113 is another source of gains from 
intra-industry trade to be expected in the Chinese industry. That is, as 
a result of specilization in the narrow range of differentiated products 
within an industry and exposure of their products to international 
competition, producers can improve their capability to adapt operations 
more efficiently to changing market circumstances to improve their 
productivity. As the Chinese economy is situated in a transitional 
period, managerial incentives for efficient operation of industrial 
enterprises are often thwarted by the behavioral inertia inherited from 
11) An enterprise is x-inefficient if it uses more inputs per unit of output than the 
best-practice enterprise using the same production technique. X-inefficiency 
should be distinguished from allocative inefficiency which results from using a 
higher cost technique of production, given input prices, but assuming production 
is x-efficient. (Leibenstein, 1966) 
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prereform period. Thus, feedback effect of international trade on the 
improvement of managerial efficiency is rather important.^ Given 
comprehensive industrial base in China, this kind of efficiency can be 
exploited more rapidly through intra-industry trade without any 
significant disruption of the existing industrial structure of the 
economy. 
As described earlier, gains from trade in terms of the costs of 
protection which can be recovered as trade opens might be larger for 
inter-industry trade than intra-industry trade. However, in the case of 
intra-industry trade, in addition to its market extending effect, as a 
source of productivity improvement through specialization in a narrow 
range of products in an industry, technological upgrade， and exploitation 
of potential x-efficiency, it has more diversified sources of the growth 
of returns to factor inputs* Therefore, in order to obtain a more 
concrete view about the consequences of inter- and intra-industry trade 
for the adjustment in the Chinese industry, it would be helpful to 
compare the costs involved in the two different types of trade in the 
China's context. For the purpose of the analysis in the study, the 
comparison is conducted in the next section, 
6-2 Cost of adjustment in the Chinese industry 
Intrinsically, foreign trade entails structural adjustment in an 
economy； that is, reallocation of resources and redistribution of income 
12) Although foreign-invested firms in China assume minor role in the 
determination of intra-industry in manufactures (SITC 5-8)，their demonstration 
effect on the management of the local enterprises and the role as a conduit for 
world market information stimulates intra-industry trade indirectly. (See chapter 
5 of the study.) 
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between industries and firms. For inter-industry and intra-industry trade 
and specialization the process would imply adjustment costs or adjustment 
problems of different kinds. Notwithstanding the benefit of efficiency 
improvement and technological upgrade, growing market forces in China due 
to the market-oriented economic reforms combined with foreign trade 
decentralization poses similar problem of structural adjustment. 
In a traditional neo-classical model of international trade, 
markets are perfectly competitive, factors of production are homogeneous 
and perfectly mobile between sectors, production techniques in terms of 
factor intensities are identical for all firms in an industry, and factor 
prices are perfectly flexible. A change in the determinants of the 
pattern of trade and production due to changed relative goods prices or a 
change in relative factor endowments at home or abroad will generally 
lead to excess demand for some factors and excess supply of others. In 
the model, there will be adjustment problems only in the sense that as a 
result of the change in factor prices there will be a redistribution of 
income from one factor to the other. When factor prices are rigid, 
changes in prices of goods will in general lead to unemployment of the 
factors used in the sector with falling relative prices. 
If an increase in international trade takes the form of intra-
industry exchange rather than inter-industry trade and specialization, 
and if factors of production used in an industry are perfectly 
homogeneous and there is perfect intra-industrial factor mobility, and if 
all production units in an industry use factors in identical proportions, 
as supposed by the most of intra-industry trade models, then a balanced 
increase in trade in an industry will cause no adjustment problems 
neither through income redistribution nor unemployment. This is because 
205 
there will be no net change in the demand for any factor. Therefore, the 
proposition that intra-industry specialization is costless depends on the 
crucial assumptions of intra-industry factor mobility and equality of 
factor requirements. 
Nevertheless, the above conclusions are off-springs of the highly 
abstract modeling process for international trade theory. Thus, for the 
purpose of comparison of relative difficulties of structural adjustment 
in the Chinese industry in the cases of inter- and intra-industry, 
restatement in a simple-minded manner is meaningless. As we relax the 
restirictive assumptions of the theoretical models, relative difficulties 
of adjustment in the process of inter- and intra-industry specialization 
crucially depend upon the country specific variables. These include the 
degree of homogeneity of industries in terms of the relative requirements 
of factors on the level where intra-industry trade is measured, the 
extent of inter- and intra-industry mobility of the productive resources 
and flexibility of the prices, and the homogeneity of factors among and 
within industry groups. To answer the question in the China's context, 
features characterizing the industrial environment as a result of the 
reform process or as the legacy of economic system which dominated the 
economy in the past should be superimposed on those variables. 
The fact that industries at the 3-digit level of SITC seem to be 
rather heterogeneous with respect to factor proportions means that we 
cannot rule out the possibility that recorded intra-industry trade may be 
explained by comparative advantage according to the factor proportions 
theory. If it is the case, there is little difference in the adjustment 
process for inter- and intra-industry specialization in terms of the 
changes in factor proportions. Since direct measurements of 
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intra-sectoral dispersion of factor proportions are difficult to obtain, 
most empirical studies dealing with the problem of categorical 
aggregation have used proxy variables such as the number of subgroups on 
a lower level of the SITC as in our study (see section 3 of the chapter 
5) or the number of tariff positions in an industry to indicate the 
heterogeneity of products on the supply side.« Despite some ambiguity 
involved in the proxy�the result of our study in chapter 5 indicates 
there is little relationship between the number of subgroups on a one 
step lower level of classification of trade data and the level of 
intra-industry trade. Hence, it was argued that explanation other than 
'categorical aggregation' is needed for intra-industry trade in the 
Chinese industry.la 
In our study, lack of detailed industrial data with consistent 
classification does not allow us to conduct direct comparison between 
intra-industry and inter-industry dispersion of factor proportions in the 
Chinese industry. However, the empirical results and understanding 
obtained in the previous chapters make it possible to provide a 
qualitative judgement on the problem at hand. As shown in chapter 5 of 
the study, intra-industry trade in China is largely consistent with 
theoretical models in the sense that differentiation in products is 
13) See, for example, Pagulatos and Sorensen (1975),Loertscher and Wolter (1980)， 
Caves (1981), Greenway (1983). 
14) It is by no means clear that intra-industry variation in factor proportions will 
be reflected in the possibility of more detailed statistical classification, and the 
economic interpretation of these variables are ambiguous as the same variables 
have also been used to measure product differentiation on the demand side in 
some econometric studies. 
15) Lundberg and Hansson (1986) calculated the correlation between the coefficient 
of variation of the wages' share of value added as a proxy of variation of 
factor proportions and the index of intra-industry trade at the four-digit level of 
Swedish industrial classification to find that the correlation was negative and 
significant. The result indicates that even though there is considerable variation 
in factor proportions within an industry as defined by the study, it cannot be 
considered as an explanation for intra-industry trade. 
207 
conducive to it. But, there are relatively strict import control for 
consumer goods and strong incentives to import technologically advanced 
‘ producer goods and components in China. Thus, it is natural to infer 
large share of intra-industry trade is conducted in the area of 
vertically differentiated intermediate goods for which division of labour 
in Young's sense!® is important. Therefore, not to speak of the problem of 
categorical aggregation, there is the possibility that intra-industry 
trade in the Chinese industry might be intensive in the industry groups 
with rather large dispersion of factor proportions than in the industry 
groups where goods are differentiated according to embodied characteris-
tics. Another reason for our expectation of relatively large dispersion 
of factor proportions in the Chinese industry is the wide gap of the 
technological level between production units in the same industry as 
noted earlier. Coexistence of the large scale state-run enterprises and 
small scale local firms in the same line of business means that their 
industrial technology in terms of factor proportions and scale is 
considerably different from each other. 
Nevertheless, a large intra-sectoral differences of factor proport-
ions do not imply that we have nothing to say about relative difficulties 
in the adjustment process for inter- and intra-industry specialization in 
the Chinese industry. First, although there is considerable intra-
industry variation among measures of factor intensity, in common sense, 
it will be smaller than inter-industry variation.171 Second, as noted 
16) The concept is explained in chapter 5 of the study. 
17) For US manufacturing industries, Finger(who is one of the extreme sceptics 
about intra-industry trade)(1975) found that the intra-industry variation among 
measures of physical-capital intensity and human-capital intensity accounted for 
39 percent of the total variation. Similarly, Rayment (1976) observed that 
intra-industry variation among factor intensities in UK manufacturing industries 
was almost as large as inter-industry variation. Contrary to the intention of the 
authors, the results of these studies shows on average, intra-industry variation of 
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above’ high extent of dispersion of factor proportions'® in an industry do 
not necessarily mean high intra-industry trade index for that industry. 
Thus, merely in terms of the variation of factor proportions, the 
adjustment costs for intra-industry specialization will be less than that 
for inter-industry specialization. 
Factor mobility is another source of adjustment costs to be 
considered in relation with trade and specialization. Usually in the 
theoretical extentions of the neo-classical model, the impact of factor 
immobility is investigated in relation with price flexibility. If factors 
are immobile, but factor prices are flexible, the results will be 
essentially the same with the case in which factors are supposed to be 
mobile. Changes in world-market prices will lead to changes in the income 
distribution and the real income of factors, but full employment will 
remain. When factor prices are rigid, changes in goods prices will in 
general lead to unemployment of the factors used in the sector with 
falling relative prices. Even if factors are mobile, factor price 
rigidity may lead to unemployment of the factor used intensively in that 
factor.(Chacholiades, 1978, Neary, 1985) Such analysis mainly shows the 
results of comparative statics with changed combinations of basic 
assumptions of the model. However, our major concern for the assessment 
of relative adjustment costs of inter- and intra-industry trade and 
specializtion in China lies in the relative easiness of the factor 
movement among and within industry groups in China (especially for 
capital, land, and labour), which is discussed below. 
Although there has been a great progress since reform process 
factor intensity smaller than inter-industry variation. 
18) In the study, the number of subgroups on a lower level(4-digit) of SITC 
standed for the proxy of the variation of factor proportions in an industry. (See 
section 3 of chapter 5.) 
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started, the mobility of capital in the Chinese industry is still limited 
compared to that in market economy. The introduction of profit retention 
and greater enterprise autonomy with respect to obtaining and using 
funds’ and the growing availability and diversity of financial assets, 
have attached greater significance to the enterprise's financial 
decisions. But compartmentalization of the manageable funds and 
impediments to horizontal flows of funds remain a serious bottleneck. 
Although some innovative and new means to finance the need of capital 
have emerged in China气 they are still very much at the fringe of China's 
industrial capital financing system. Enterprises are restricted by the 
types of financial assets they can hold and by their ability to diversify 
into new product line. The banking system, still heavily influenced by 
administrative controls, is not yet functioning as a true financial 
intermediary either. Thus, still embryonic capital markets in the Chinese 
industry lag far behind the development of goods markets. 
In the midst of such a financial environment, low depreciation rate 
for existing capital stock due to distored view of depreciation is one of 
main obstacles for inter-industrial capital mobility. In the accounting 
system of the Chinese industrial enterprises, depreciation allowances are 
put into special fund (some retained by enterprises, some controlled by 
supervisory authorities), which are to be used to replace or expand 
existing fixed assets.a) However, the average depreciation rate of the 
industrial sector has been low and is supposed to be based on the 
19) They include; trade credit to finance investment and support partner 
enterprises, equity joint ventures between the Chinese firms, issuance of stocks 
to individuals, leasing, and various forms of compensation trade among the local 
production units. 
20) In principle, depreciation funds are devided into two categories; the basic 
depreciation fund for use in replacement investment, and major repair fund 
which is supposed to be used for major overhauls and repairs of equipment. In 
practice, however, this stipulation is sometimes violated. 
210 
Physical, not economic, lifetimes of the asset concerned. Although the 
aV6rage depreciation rate for the industrial sector in the eighties went 
up a little bit2D’ the increase was far below that of general price level 
and particularly that of industrial raw materials prices in the eighties, 
especially after 1984. Thus, the enterprises were even unable to have 
complete replacement of the worn-out capital with depreciation funds 
determined on the bases of the official depreciation rate and original 
value of fixed assets. (Hsueh and Woo, 1991’ pp. 81-85) Under the 
circumstances, enterprises may be encouraged to expand the existing fixed 
asset rather than to replace facilities or start in the, other line of 
business according to their comparative advantage, and inter-sectoral 
capital adjustment according to economic criterion is hindered. 
Although the Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy was enacted on a trial 
basis by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in 
December 1986， the difficulty for inefficient firms to close down is 
another obstacle for inter-industry capital adjustment. In China, most 
large enterprises in trouble, as well as a great many smaller enterpri-
ses, can be rehabilitated by measures less drastic than bankruptcy. This 
in combination with the virtual absence of a market for secondhand 
equipments in China hinders enterprises from selling or scrapping 
obsolete equipment and make it difficult to close down inefficient 
production unit and the relatively disadvantageous line of business. 
Differences in the flexibility of prices among and within industry 
groups in China is another important issue in relation with the 
adjustment problem from the perspective of the capital mobility. In the 
21) According to the calculation of Hsueh and Woo (1991)，the average rate of 
depreciation during 1953-1979 was 3.92%, during 1976-1980 was 4.12%, and was 
4.28% in 1989. 
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area of pricing policy, especially since 1984, considerable extent of 
liberalization has been proceeded. Extension of free market for consumer 
goods and adoption of two-track price system for producer goods improved 
the role and flexibility of price adjustment for resource allocation in 
China enormously. Nevertheless, although the Chinese government put great 
effort to correct the distortion of price structure among industrial 
sectors, the room for reform measures has been constrained by the 
cautious approach of the Chinese policy-makers who still put the 
macroeconomic stability and output targets of basic commodities at the 
head of various policy objectives. Therefore, the coexistence of prices 
supervised by the government and those determined by the market forces 
made the variation of prices within an industry more flexible than that 
among industrial sectors. Under such circumstances, for production units 
it is more beneficial to make intra-industrial adjustments through 
increasing output or varieties and improving quality or styling than to 
make inter-industry adjustments. 
Related problem to be considered is the labour mobility. As one of 
the unique characteristics of the economy, relatively strict restriction 
on the allocation of labour, especially for the movement from rural area 
to urban area, has significant implications for the structural adjustment 
problem as a result of inter- and intra-industry trade and specializa-
tion. Similar to other area of the economy, since the economic reform 
process was put into its orbit, China's labour allocation system has been 
loosening up, but the extent is relatively lag behind of the process in 
other areas of the economy. In addition to the fact that the local labour 
bureau usually has control over job assignments within an overall quota 
set by the Ministry of Labor, since residence permits, the right for 
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access to subsidized grain, and job-linked welfare benefits® restrict 
labour mobility as well, quitting job or dismissing worker is not the 
usual practice in the Chinese industry. Although the availability of 
contract or temporary workers outside the plan and introduction of labour 
contract system22 increased the mobility to some extent, the flexibility 
was used to expand the labour force in the relevant unit than to reduce 
it. With the rather widely accepted practice of hiring children and other 
dependents of workers by granting the right to inherit the job of 
retiring workers or by setting up collectives, Chinese enterprises could 
further increase their flexibility to expand employment. Chinese 
enterprises also are able to get around restrictive labour quotas through 
mergers and associations between them. However, in general, the 
activities for expanding employees by setting up collectives or by 
mergers and associations among enterprises are generally conducted to 
gain from the forward or backward integration of relevant stages of 
production or to expand the parent enterprises' market share. Thus, we 
can conclude that the increased flexibility in Chinese industrial 
enterprise's labour employment is favorable to the within-industry 
adjustment. 
Administrative delays and difficulties for transfer of land to 
industrial enterprises2^ in need and lack of operating market for land 
22) Chinese workers depend on the enterprise for housing, pensions, and many of 
their medical and educational benefits. 
23) Under the system, new workers allocated under quota are given a fixed-term 
contract rather than permanent employment. But, in many cases it has proved 
nearly as difficult to avoid renewing contracts when they expire as it was to 
dismiss a permanent worker. 
24) In the framework of administrative allocation of land in China, even though 
state-owned institutions and rural collectives do not pay adequate rent for the 
land they occupy, implicit property rights for urban land held by enterprises and 
institutions appear to be well established, and it is extremely difficult to take 
occupied land away from the holder without the latter's agreement, which 
usually requires satisfactory compensation without operating market for 
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appear to be as further constraints to the inter- and intra-industry 
specialization and adjustment in the Chinese industry. According to Byrd 
and Tidrick (1987, pp.78-79), there are several ways for industrisal 
enterprises to ease or get around such land constraints. First, overstate 
the original request for land when a factory is first set up, and this is 
easiest to do in the process of urbanization, when large amounts of land 
are shifted from agricultural to urban industrial use and particular 
factories usually are not individually responsible for compensation. A 
second way is to direct land acquisition through administrative process. 
But， this method has become increasingly difficult, especially for urban 
area, and only very rarely does it result in an appropriate site. A third 
way is to move part of the production process out of the original site by 
means of subcontracting, often with smaller, rural factories that have 
considerable space and labour available. The feasibility of 
subcontracting depends greatly on the technical character of production. 
A fourth way, and apparently the most common is to merge or set up joint 
ventures with other enterprises, and the land-occupiers are compensated 
for providing land usually in terms of the employment opportunity or 
other forms of economic benefit. With no market mechanism for transfer 
that would improve the distribution of land, profit-oriented enterprises 
have strong incentives to circumvent land constraints, increasingly 
through mergers and joint ventures, particularly between urban and rural 
enterprises. Therefore, in spite of various ways to give some flexibility 
for enterprises to make adjustment in their rigid land endowments as a 
factor of production, horizontal transfer of land according to economic 
land.(Byrd and Tidrik，1987) 
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criterion is still restricted. In this context, the incentives and 
methods to circumvent land constraints in China are also in favour of 
intra-industry adjustment. 
In this section, we have seen that Chinese industrial environment 
situated in the transition period makes structural adjustment to foreign 
trade in the country less costly in case of intra-industry than in case 
of inter-industry trade. Therefore, in spite of the greater gains from 
trade in terms of the amount of deadweight loss it can remove from the 
economy, the cost of adjustment involved in inter-industry trade is 
relatively higher than in case of intra-industry trade’ §iven the unique 
institutional arrangement in China's economy and political economic 
objectives. In this context, we can even imagine the situation in which 
the political economic costs and needed assistence for the adjustment to 
inter-industry trade and specialization in China actually prohibit the 
economy to make full structural adjustment according to its comparative 
advantage in the traditional international trade theoretic framework. 
Considering the additional benefits from intra-industry trade and 
specialization due to the introduction of variety of products, 
exploitation of economies of scale, and efficiciency improvement in 
technological and dynamic aspects of the economy, in terms of cost and 
benefit accrue to the Chinese economy, superiority of intra-industry 
trade over inter-industry trade is a genuine possibility. 
6-3 Implications for Commercial policy in China 
Notwithstanding the profound changes in China's economy by market-
oriented reforms in combination with foreign trade decentralization, the 
practices in foreign trade are still far from those based on full 
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recognition of the benefits from competition between their own products 
and foreign goods in domestic market or international market. Policies 
for protection of domestic production and for export promotion through 
trade planning, pricing, licensing and tariffs have been widely adopted. 
In the past, distortions arising from tariff and non-tariff interventions 
may not have been a major problem in China, since important micro- and 
macro-economic decisions have been made administratively. However, 
China's economic reform made the issue more important, as marktet force 
was granted greater role for enterprise's decision-making in pricing and 
investment. 
The foundations to the analysis of commercial policy interventions 
in the neo-classical trade model of market-based economy can be founded 
in the work of Meade (1955). And the classic contributions to the 
literature are widely regarded as being Bhagwati(1971) and Johnson(1965), 
with comprehensive and intuitive treatment being Corden (1974). These 
studies and many other contributions in the field have generated a number 
of fundamental propositions relating to commercial policy which are 
widely accepted among the profession. First, it is generally acknowleged 
that where a country is a small open economy, and where there are no 
market distortions, unrestricted trade is the first best in the sense 
that intervention in markets for traded goods can only worsen welfare. If 
some distortions exist in product or factor markets, then there may be an 
argument for intervention of some form to correct the distortion. Thus, 
the theory of optimal intervention established the second widely accepted 
principle which states that the appropriate instrument of intervention is 
unlikely to be a tariff, and invariably some form of direct measure at 
the source of distortion such as subsidy will be a more efficient means 
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Of intervention than a tariff or quota. A third broadly recognized 
proposition which is implicit in such work on commercial policy in an 
traditional factor proportions structure of international trade is that 
import substitution and export promotion cannot be simultaneously 
achieved by a single policy instrument. 
In conjunction with intra-industry trade, given the diversity of 
market structure and technological conditions modeled and types of 
methodologies can be found in related works as they moved away from a 
world of perfect competition and constant returns to scale, general 
evaluation of the impact of commercial policies is almost impossible. But 
out of these works there appears to have emerged several challenges to 
some of the fundamental tenets of commercial policy developed in the 
context of the factor proportions trade model. Lancaster(1984), for 
example, contends that an import tariff can be welfare-improving even 
where the tariff-levying country is a small open economy； Curtis(1983) 
has argued that in some circumstances a tariff may be superior to a 
subsidy as a means of intervention； Krugman (1984) has argued that import 
protection can also be export promotion. In addition, Greenway and 
Milner(1989) explores both positive and normative aspects of the 
effective protection concept in a variety of settings where intra-
industry trade is likely to be important, and shows that welfare-
improving non-zero effective protection is possible in the presence of 
intra-industry specialization and exchange. 
Since market mechanism in China is still situated in its 
developing stage, and because of the unique features of the Chinese 
industry in various aspects of resource allocations, it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to assess the exact impact of its 
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commercial policies in general framework. If we accept the results of 
normative analysis of welfare implications of neo-classical world, there 
is nothing much to say in relation with the Chinese authorities' 
interventions in foreign trade, and we can only repeat the principle of 
free trade and that of optimal intervention. Therefore, the rest part of 
this section is devoted to the investigation of applicability of 
commercial policies in the context of imperfect competition and scale 
economy and their implications for the Chinese economy. 
In China, tariff and non-tariff interventions in trade are mainly 
aimed at three policy objectives； to keep the balance of payments in 
balance, to have rent-snatching effect on some products in relation with 
monopolistic market structure, and to protect domestic producers and 
industries. Among various types of commercial policies aimed at control-
ling the balance of payments are； the import control of nonessential 
final goods and related intermediate products (prominently luxury 
consumer durables and their parts and components) through tariff system 
and quantitative restrictions such as import licensing and ad hoc 
prohibitions’ and export promotion through tax incentives. Sometimes, in 
order to prohibit excessive competiton among domestic exporters from 
deteriorating terms of trade of their products which in turn will 
adversely affects its balance of payments, the Chinese authority uses 
quite tight administrative control such as export licence scheme for 
relevant products. Differential import tariffs are used for the purpose 
of import protection and reduction of the monopoly profit by 
rent-snatching. 
Import licensing system has been chosen as the administrative 
instrument to regulate imports into China, and the purpose of the 
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regulation is control of the balance of payments and protection of 
domestic producers. As prices are made more flexible and the scope for 
decision-making by economic agents is increased by the economic reform 
process, import licensing influences the economy through two major 
effects: effect on domestic prices of the importables, and on the 
availability of imports to individual enterprises directly. The 
restrictions cause the domestic price to rise above the foreign supply 
price in the open market or in the unofficial market if prices or 
distribution are controlled. And when it is easier to obtain licenses for 
imports of some products than other products, the system creates 
incentives that favor production of the more restricted goods. This can 
be applied to the products of different industries and to those of 
different stage of production in the same industry. Nevertheless, one 
unique aspect of China's licensing structure is that, unlike that of many 
other countries, it is a rare practice to distinguish the stages of 
production within an industry, but usually tends to be integrated along 
lines of activity.29 In case that the purpose of import licensing is to 
protect domestic industry, the tendency is intensified as development of 
the relevant industry might have strategic importance to the China's 
economy. To the extent that the import licensing system boosts 
inter-industry specialization, high adjustment costs and difficulties are 
involved in it in the context of China's economy as noted in the previous 
section. Thus, not to mention about the difficulties and shortcomings of 
licensing system as it is a quantitative restriction of trade flow, from 
the viewpoint of welfare implications, the impact on the economy is 
25) For example, as a result of the investment boom in colour TV, imports of 
assembly lines for it grew quickly. In response, in September 1985，import of 
colour TV related products - regardless final goods or capital goods for 
production - were banned. 
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negative. 
On the other hand, with the launching of the open door policy and 
decentralization of foreign trade, the Chinese government began to use 
taxes as one of economic levers in guiding foreign trade. The tax system 
is also expected to guide the responses of consumers and producers under 
the economic environment with more flexible prices which reflect relative 
scarcities and greater scope for producers to respond to those prices20. 
At present, all imports into China are subject to customs tariffs(進口 
税)，the consolidated industrial and commercial tax (工商統一税)，and 
product tax (産品税）扔，and selected imports are also subject to import 
regulatory tax (進口調節税）.For the customs tariff, the minimum customs 
tariff schedule (進口最低税率）has a range of zero to 150 percent； the 
general tariff schedule (進口普通税率）a range of zero to 180 percent28, 
and customs tariff rates and the import regulatory tax combined result in 
import duties of 0-200 percent (combined general schedule 0-230 
percent).(PRC Customs Regulations 1988) 
In general, the manufacturing sector has higher duties than the 
agricultural and mining sectors which usually consist of essential 
imports. Manufacturing also has the widest range of duties. Within this 
sector, the duties are lower for intermediate and capital goods. For over 
two-thirds of them, the rates fall between 0-40 percent. Within the 
26) Starting in 1984, the Chinese Government undertook a major reform of the 
tariff system in order to facilitate the open door policy. The reform adressed 
customs tariff both on imports and exports. The system went into effect on 
March 10，1985，and the revised version on July 1, 1987. 
27) The consolidated industrial and commercial tax, and product tax apply to both 
imports and their domestically produced substitutes, and the rate of taxation is 
supposed to be the same between them. 
28) The customs tariff of China has two schedules: a minimum and a general one. 
The minimum tariff schedule applies to imports originating in countries with 




intermediate goods category, heavy intermediates or capital goods 
category, parts and components tend to have lower rates. In contrast, 
d u t i e s fo r consumer goods are generally higher and are more widely 
dispersed. Among consumer goods, essentials such as cereals, flour, and 
vegetable oils enter at low duty rates, while nonessentials or items 
viewed as luxuries, such as some processed foods, textile articles, and 
household articles, carry substantially higher rates. Luxury consumer 
durables, such as household appliances, carry the highest rates. 
Protection and promotion of domestic production are the principal 
policy objectives underlying the new customs tariff system in China. As 
the reform of the pricing system and of enterprises progresses, the 
function of the tariffs as economic lever has been intensified. Tariffs 
raise the domestic price of imports directly and provide protection to 
domestic producers, and allow them to raise their price above the 
duty-free foreign supply price. In addition to the differential customs 
tariff rates among imports, the import regulatory tax also serves for the 
purpose. In relation with tariff intervention for protection and 
promotion of domestic production within a neo-Hotelling monopolistic 
competition setting, Lancaster (1984) concluded that import protection 
serves to lower the price of domestic varieties and to increase product 
variety which in turn results in the average distance between goods on 
the spectrum being smaller, and the small open economy can increase 
welfare by imposing a unilateral tariff. This result crucially depends on 
whether or not the imposition of tariff is unilateral, and on the 
arrangement of imported and import-competing varieties on the product 
spectrum®. However, the policy implication of the result is interesting 
29) Lancaster (1984) distinguishes ‘split’ and ‘interleaved，arrangement of product 
varieties, and the welfare improving import protection in a small open economy 
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since unilateral tariff imposition can never be welfare-improving in the 
neo-classical model unless the tariff-imposing country is a large open 
economy and can levy an optimal tariff, or unless some other distortion 
exists which the tariff serves to correct. Such a consideration makes it 
possible to apply the rationale used in the analysis to the Chinese 
context. As China's price system changes to be a more flexible one, and 
as consumers and producers become increasingly responsive to it, with 
less serious within-industry adjustment problems and with the tendency 
for product differentiation under more competitive environment, product 
differentiation with lower price via import protection is possible. 
Especially, for consumer goods and intermediate products which can be 
produced with medium range of factor intensities, the possibility of 
welfare-improving import protection is higher. This is because for such 
products categories, the fixed cost needed for the product 
differentiation is relatively lower and the possibility for the 
interleaved arrangement of product differentiation is rather high. 
In this context, the consideration of fixed costs of new product 
development is important. As Scherer (1980) has demonstrated, increased 
variety can only be expected to raise welfare in the event that any gain 
in consumer surplus offsets the fixed costs of introducing the new 
variety. Therefore, if product differentiation needs very large amount of 
fixed cost for an industry, the possibility of welfare-improving import 
protection will be lowered considerably. Usually, for a developing 
is possible only in case of 'interleaved' product varieties. A 'split’ case 
describes a situation where one part of the product spectrum is dominated by 
imported varieties whilst another part is dominated by domestically produced 
varieties, while a ‘interleaved’ case depicts a situation where home and imported 
varieties alternate on the product spectrum. For 'interleaved' case, the 'home' 
and ‘import，markets cannot be separated, and foreign varieties continue to be 
imported and their specifications alter such that they remain interleaved with 
home varieties. 
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country such as China, product differentiation in technologically 
advanced industries needs enormous efforts in research and development, 
and that in capital intensive industries often costs more than gains in 
consumer surplus obtained from them. Thus, sufficient assessment 
prodedure should be taken before practical application of the concept of 
welfare-improving import protection of Lancaster's work. 
On the other hand, James and Stewart (1981), and James(1983) insist 
on the importance of appropriateness of product varieties to be 
introduced for the assessment of their welfare-implication. From such a 
viewpoint of product varieties, import tariff serves to restrict the 
number of varieties in the neo-Hotelling setting of intra-industry trade. 
Therefore, it may be that one can identify an optimal level of import 
tariff as one which produces the socially desirable degree of product 
variety. Such a concept is not unfamiliar to the Chinese policy-makers, 
and is applied rather strictly in practice for restriction of import of 
luxury consumer goods, and to some extent for the control of import of 
intermediate inputs and capital goods. They believe that there exists 
some appropriate level of varieties in such products from the viewpoint 
of egalitarian ideology or from that of appropiate techonology for 
China's industrial environment. To some extent, such a practice in China 
can be justified with the rationale used for the argument of the 
existence of the socially desirable degree of product variety. 
In contrast, the implication of the neo-Chamber1inian models is 
that import protection via an import tariff raises the prices of imported 
varieties vis-a-vis domestic varieties and results in a contraction of 
imports. Moreover, since domestic consumers increase their consumption of 
domestic varieties, exports fall by a commensurate amount. Thus, the unit 
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costs may also increase, depending on the specification of the production 
function. In the case, despite the existence of distortions in the form 
of preference diversity, and possibly decreasing costs, import protection 
has effects which are analogous to those in the neo-classical model and 
from a normative standpoint Import protection is unambiguously 
welfare-reducing. 
In China, consideration of the balance of payments is frequently 
binding constraint for foreign trade policy-making. Thus, keeping the 
balance of payments in balance is another major objective of its 
commercial policy. Its foreign trade plan is now driven more by export 
possibilities than by import requirements, and strong incentives such as 
foreign exchange retention right are offered for exporting enterprises. 
In addition, comparing with the practices in the past, China's current 
economic system permits the volume and composition of imports and exports 
to be determined by market forces to a sign if leant degree. But, the 
Chinese import tariff system described above is one that offers 
considerable protection for domestic industry and, possibly creates high 
degree of anti-export bias whithin the economy. In this context, 
Krugman's model (Krugman, 1984) which demonstrates how import protection 
via a tariff may also result in export promotion in the internationally 
oligopolistic market is interesting. It is assumed in the model that home 
and foreign markets are segmented3® and that there are decreasing costs in 
production. On the assumption of the passive reactions of foreign firm to 
any trade intervention (i.e. reacts in a Cournot fashion to any trade 
intervention), if a tariff excludes the foreign firm from all or part of 
the domestic market, this permits the domestic firm to raise its output, 
30) The implication of the assumption of segmented market is that even where 
prices differ between the two markets arbitrage does not occur. 
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Which in turn lowers its marginal cost, and simultaneously, foreign 
marginal cost increases. As a consequence, protection has given the 
domestic firm greater scope for scale economies, whilst reducing the 
scale economies available to the foreign firm, hence, import protection 
is also export promotion for the industry concerned.3« Although the result 
of the simple model crucially depends on the assumption of Cournot 
behavior of firms and, thus, the practical applicability of the model is 
limited, we can derive some useful insight into the importance of 
exploitation of scale economy and resulting lower price for export 
promotion in intra-industry trade framework. For an industry under 
consideration, if China's domestic market is relatively large and it has 
considerable potential for price reduction due to economies of scale, we 
can imagine the situation in which import protection via tariff is 
actually conducive to export increase. 
With the introduction of the concept of effective protection, an 
interesting extension of the argument is possible. In their application 
of the concept of effective protection for the analysis of commercial 
policy implications in intra-industry trade setting, Greenway and Milner 
(1989) show that the argument for import protection via import tariffs 
as export promotion is still valid. What happens is that a tariff on 
output allows the domestic firm to expand its sales to the home market, 
and as a result, decrease in marginal costs may be facilitating increased 
penetration into the export market. An input tariff, in the absence of 
31) Explicit behavioural assumptions made for the result are that either firm's 
output is a function of its expected marginal cost while its actual marginal cost 
is a function of output. Since both firms can supply both markets, there is 
interdependence in their cost schedules - each firm's marginal cost is negatively 
related to the other. For example, a higher marginal cost for the foreign firm 
means a lower output for that firm, a larger output for the domestic firm and 
therefore a lower marginal cost. 
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output tariff, would have the reverse impact. An input tariff would shift 
the firm's marginal cost schedule upwards thereby shifting its reaction 
f u n c t i o n inwards- The domestic producer of the final good would therefore 
lose sales in both the domestic and overseas market. Import protection of 
the input results in import promotion and export contraction of the 
output. In a situation where both input and output tariffs are levied the 
final effect on domestic production of the finished good depends upon 
whether the effective tariff is positive, or negative.边 In turn this 
determines the welfare implications of the intervention. If the domestic 
and imported products are identical, and domestic output expands, both 
consumer and producer surplus should increase. 
Like many other developing countries, China also tends to levy high 
rates of import duties on consumer goods and low rates on raw materials, 
intermediates, and capital goods for the objectives of accelerating 
economic development.® In 1986, for example, the nominal protection rates 
32) In fact, most production processes are multi-stage, where the given producer 
can be seen as the final link in the chain of production. In the case, the 
effective protection which is given to this producer is dependent not on the 
nominal tariff per se, but on the extent to which a nominal tariff on the firm's 
output affects its value added. Thus, according to the relative magnitudes of the 
nominal rates of tariff on inputs and outputs, the effective protection for the 
producer can be either negative or positive. Typically the negative effective 
protection arises because the exportable activities use imported inputs which are 
subject to tariffs, but receive no offsetting subsidy on their final good, and vice 
versa for the positive effective protection. Therefore, in the the analysis, 
negative effective protection is identical to input tariff, and positive effective 
protection to ouput tariff. 
33) Such a tendency of import tariff structure is concretely stated in a set of 
guidelines established for the 1985 tariff reform. They also provide the 
framework which has been used in adjusting the tariff rates since then.(World 
Bank, 1988，pp. 148-49) 
(a) Tariff exemptions or low tariff rates should be applied to goods 
needed for national development or to consumer essentials that are 
either not produced domestically or are in short supply. 
(b) Tariff rates for raw materials should be lower than for manufactured 
goods and even lower for those materials that cannot be developed 
quickly in the short term because of natural constraints. 
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for the subsectors of Chineses economy are as follows (unweighted mean in 
percent ad volarem)； intermediate goods, 27.2¾； capital goods 31.1¾； 
consumer goods 62.6%； whole economy, 38.4¾ (World Bank, 1988’ p.149) 
Therefore, at least from the theoretical point of view of intra-industry 
trade and specialization, cascading structure of China's import tariffs 
is consistent with the concept that import protection is of export 
promotion. 
In the same theoretical framework, if we consider the case in which 
one of the countries is also a supplier of the input, the possible 
implications become interesting. In particular, export taxes on the input 
would become a potentially powerful instrument of intervention. For 
example, where input is supplied by the home-countryt an export tax on it 
would serve to drive up the input prices of foreign producers of final 
goods whilst depressing the input prices of domestic producers of final 
goods. Thus, export tariff on input can be thought as a way to boost 
exports of final goods produced by home producers. It also can be 
regarded as an instrument for rent-snatching in the sense that it may 
redistribute profits from foreign firms to domestic firms or to the 
government. For China, we suppose the case where there exists consider-
able differences between foreign demand prices and the domestic prices 
for some inputs as a result of price control or by the difference in 
(c) Tariff rates should be low for parts and components of machinery and 
equipment that are neither produced domestically nor produced at 
acceptable standards of quality, and these rates should be lower than 
the rates for the corresponding complete machinery and equipment. 
(d) Relatively high tariff rates should be applied to goods that can be 
supplied domestically and to consumer nonessentials. 
(e) Even higher tariff rates should be applied to goods whose domestic 
production requires protection. 
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factor endowments, and China's exports have a large share of the world 
market for the inputs. Then, such a strategy described above can shift 
the terms of trade in favor of China, and increase total revenue of the 
industry from exports. In some extreme cases it might also be conducive 
to the export of final goods made of the inputs subject to the export 
tariff through improved price competitiveness. 
In relation with the rent-snatching effect, we can see the 
additional role of import tariff on inputs as a mean of reducing domestic 
monopoly power in the production of final products using imported inputs. 
Here, as in the case of inter-industry trade setting, the symmetry 
between tariffs on final goods and inputs is evident. That is, the former 
act as subsidies to the production process while the latter act as taxes. 
Considering increasingly important role of Chinese tariff system as a way 
to raise revenue for the government, and prevalence of the windfall 
profits envolved in foreign trade due to still deficient domestic price 
structure and restrictions in foreign trade in China, such a 
rent-snatching effect of import tariffs on inputs may provide the 
government with an additional degree of freedom in the policy sphere. 
6-4 Concluding remark 
In the chapter, we attempted to compare the consequences of two 
different patterns of trade for the adjustment in the Chinese economy. 
For the purpose of the analysis, we adopted the approach of the cost and 
benefit analysis. In the theoretical framework in which traditional trade 
theories are molded, gains from trade as inter-industry trade opens are 
believed to be larger than those as intra-industry trade opens. But, we 
observed the additional gains from intra-industry trade due to the 
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international returns to scale and dynamic efficiency as seen by Young 
and RosenburS' especially for China. This made the comparison in terms of 
gains from trade inconclusive. On the other hand, given China's unique 
industrial environment as it is situated in a transitional period, the 
costs involved in the adjustment process for inter-industry specializa-
tion is possibly much higher than those for intra-industry specializa-
tion. Moreover, it may be the case that the political economic costs and 
needed subsidy for the inter-industry adjustment in China are 
prohibitive. Such considerations provide the economic rationale for the 
Increasing share of intra-industry trade in the Chinese industry as 
market mechanism expands. We also noted that, in the context of 
intra-industry trade, some current practices of commercial policy in 
China could get the support of economic theories. The economic theories 
based on the variety of intra-industry trade models see the possibility 
of welfare-improving tariffs, import protection as an export promotion, 
and rent-snatching effect of tariffs. These aspects of inter- and 
intra-industry trade and specialization in the Chinese industry may break 




This dissertation has analyzed the impact of the market-oriented 
reform in the Chinese industrial sector on its external commodity trade. 
The study dealt with the theme from the perspectives of the determination 
of inter-industry and intra-industry trade and their implications for 
the adjustment in the economy. For the purpose of the analysis, it also 
looked at the extent to which market mechanism is operating in the 
economy and the changing role of foreign trade in line with the expanding 
role of markets. This chapter will summarize the major findings of the 
dissertation and provide conclusions of the study. 
With its historical background and economic reality which imposed 
imperativeness of the market-oriented reform on the economy in the end of 
1970s, China took reform measures to reduce the role of mandatory plan 
and facilitate the operation of market forces in supply, production, and 
marketing of industrial products. Fragmentary evidences show that there 
are operating markets in the Chinese economy indeed. Logical coherence of 
reform measures due to the three decades of experience in the adaptation 
of the Soviet type central planning to the Chinese economy and highly 
experimental character of reform process brought about general progress 
towards effectively functioning markets, which includes； (1) a certain 
degree of enterprise autonomy in economic decision-making in production, 
purchase, and marketing； (2) introduction of economic incentives at the 
enterprise and individual level; (3) substantially flexible price system； 
(4) limited but increasing freedom for entry and exit by circumventing 
constraints for factor mobility； (5) relative prevalence of buyer's 
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market for industrial products and the government's attitude conducive to 
its stability. Although the progress still fall short to meet the 
restrictive assumptions for stable market equilibrium in the neoclassi-
cal economic system, it laid the foundation for effectively functioning 
markets conducive to dynamic industrial growth and development through 
efficiency improvement in China. My preliminary analysis shows that 
substantial extent of competitive pressure from market is felt by Chinese 
industrial enterprises, and they are engaged in various competitive 
activities. Given unique features of the Chinese industry, activities 
related to product differentiation are prevalent. 
Foreign trade decentralization and the breakdown of the 
institutional apparatuses for the insulation of the Chinese economy from 
world market in combination with market-oriented general economic reform 
have significant implications for the development of efficient industrial 
environment in China. The analysis in chapter 3 convinces us that the 
foreign trade reform is one of the aspects of ongoing enterprise reforms 
in the sense that it was started in the hope that the efficient use of 
external trade in conjunction with domestic technology will lead to a 
better use of avilable resources than following autarkic development. 
Interrelationsip between China's domestic economy and external trade via 
the operation of market forces was inferred to be exist based on the 
preliminary examination of the pattern and trend of aggregate exports and 
imports and macroeconomic conditions of the economy. 
In the analsis of inter-industry trade in China, for the generali-
zation of the law of comparative advantage, I adopted the approach which 
requires only the tenet holds in the sense of appropriate average. Then, 
the study utilized relatively robust methodology for empirical testing of 
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factor proportions theory in the sense that it includes the measures of 
all three relevant varialbles (factor abundance, fator intensity, and 
trade flows). As a result, we obtained the conclusion that the pattern of 
China's inter-industry trade in manufactured products is largely 
consistent with the prediction of factor proportions theory. In 
particular, there is a strong tendency for China to import human capital 
intensive products from industrially advanced countries and export labour 
intensive products. On the contrary to the general expectation, the 
impact of capital intensity differentials between China and its trade 
partners on the determination of inter-industry trade pattern is not so 
strong. It is conceived that the result is partly due to the 
comprehensive industrial bases developed in China and the large gap 
between its urban economy and rural economy in capital equipment for 
production in terms of quantity and quality. 
In consistent with the general view of the complementary character 
of inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade, the result of the study 
shows increasing share of intra-industry trade in China's manufactures 
trade. In so far as we accept the view that intra-industry trade is 
mainly the result of the operation of market forces, this indicates that 
market-oriented reform in the Chinese industry has been more conducive to 
intra-industry trade then inter-industry trade in manufactures (SITC 
5-8). In the process, foreign-invested firms in China seem to played 
subtantial role through their demonstration of the advanced managerial 
skill and by providing informations about world market for the local 
firms. The average level of intra-industry trade in the Chinese 
manufacturing industries is seen to be still higher than that of other 
developing countries on average. Among country groups, recorded 
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intra-industry trade in the Chinese manufactures is highest in trade with 
Hong Kong and Singapore which are regarded as representing Asian Newly 
Industrialized Economies. Also found was the share of intra-industry 
trade tends to be higher in the Chinese industries with intermediate 
range of physical and human capital intensity and to be lower in the 
industries with the extreme intensity. On the basis of our observations 
and considerations on the sources of intra-industry in the Chinese 
industry, we provided a simple international trade model, where 
difference in comparative costs between countries and the elasticities of 
substitution among differentiated products in an industry are major 
determinants of intra-industry trade. The results of econometric test 
against China's industrial data revealed the consistency of the 
hypotheses based on the model and China's intra-industry pattern in 
manufactures. Since the model is based on the well functioning market 
mechanism, the results convince us that market forces in the Chinese 
industry is operating to determine its intra-industry trade through 
comparative costs and the elasticity of substitution among differentiated 
products. Our analysis showed that, given economic conditions in China, 
the rationale of the model qan be interpreted in the Chinese industry in 
terms of the technological efforts and efficiency gains from 
intra-industry specialization. 
The study also has been advanced further into the problems related 
to the consequences of inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade for 
the adjustment in the Chinese economy. Viewing higher elasticity of 
supply in differentiated goods for which intra-industry trade seems to be 
prevail, gains from trade in terms of the recovered deadweight loss are 
expected to be larger in case of inter-industry trade. Nevertheless, 
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there are additional sources of gains from trade in the case of 
intra-industry trade, which include： the international returns to scale 
for intermediate inputs, efficiency gains from the fragmentation of 
production process and specialization, more easier adaptation and 
diffusion of advanced technology, improvement in the x-efficiency, and 
increased product variety. Considering reform objectives and constraints 
China is faced with, further sources of gains from trade due to 
intra-industry trade make the comparison in favour of intra-industry 
trade. 
In relation with the adjustment costs and problems, the 
disscussion conducted was mainly relying on the relationship between 
intra-industry share and the variation in relative factor requirements 
among and within industries and the industrial structure and factor 
mobility in the Chinese economy. Evidences indicate that adjustment costs 
due to the variation in relative factor requirement would be smaller in 
case of intra-industry specialization. In particular, considerations 
about still limited factor mobility between industries in China and the 
fact that various ways for industrial enterprises to circumvent such 
constraints are in favor of intra-industry specialization suggest 
relatively low adjustment costs would be involved in intra-industry type 
of trade in the Chinese industry. 
On the basis of the diversified theoretical models for the analysis 
of the policy implications of intra-industry, the dissertation could 
identify some implications of intra-industry trade for China's commercial 
policy. In contrast with the tenets for commercial policy developed in 
the context of the traditional factor proportions trade model, they 
raised some possibility for the Chinese economy of the welfare-improving 
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import tariff, import protection as an export promotion, and welfare-
raising effective protection. Even the assumptions and conditions of the 
relevant theoretical models cannot be expected to be exactly consistent 
with economic conditions in China, it is argued in the study that, at 
least, they can provide the Chinese government with an additional degree 
of freedom in the policy sphere based on economic rationale with the 
changed role of foreign trade in the country. 
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Appendix D： China's intra-industrv trade in manufactures (Aquino index) 
China's prereform industrial planning system, which still has its 
legacies in the economy, had the following main features： 
(a) Decision-making authority was excessively concentrated on 
central government and ministries. Therefore, the center not 
only possessed the power for macroeconomic control, but it also 
determined the mandatory guidance line for microeconomic 
decisions. 
(b) Major adjustment mechanism was administrative control rather 
than indirect control through economic levers and market adjust 
mechanism. In compliance with mandatory planning, unified 
allocation system of industrial goods by quantity at fixed 
price comprises major part of material allocation system, 
(c) China's planning system was organized along the economic and 
line agencies (administrative ministry) and by levels of 
government (regional administrative units). Therefore, more 
often than not, there exist conflicts between regionalism and 
departmental ism, and the situation was conducive to the 
cellularization of China's economy which is far from a complete 
and integrated soviet style central planning. 
(d) The Chinese planning is highly aggregated, covering a much 
smaller number of products than in the other soviet style 
economies. So targets and quotas set by the planning system 
must be disaggregated into meaningful operational directives 
for production, which left some room for adjustment of 
agencies, and also contribute to shortage or imbalance of 
specific goods in the allocation system.1) 
1) According to Wong (1986，p.261), even at the peak of centralized control in 
China, the unified allocation by central planning authority had been extended to 
only some 500 materials, but in the Soviet Union, some 5,000 centrally planned 
materials allocated by ministries. 
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Appendix D： China's intra-industrv trade in manufactures (Aquino index) 
The Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT) was established in 1952, and 
in conjunction with State Planning Commission (SPC) it was directly 
responsible for the centralized planning and control of foreign trade. 
The principal functions of MOFT were： 
(a) To set the rules and procedures that govern foreign trade. 
(b) To participate in the preparation and negotiation of trade 
treaties and agreement. 
(c) To draft the overall foreign trade plan for the examination and 
approval of the central planning organs, and oversees the 
implementation of plan directives. ‘ 
The key element in the Ministry's control over foreign trade was its 
exclusive power to issue the necessary trading authorization to all 
organizations engaged in such trade‘ 
In China, while the principle of state monopoly of foreign trade 
was thus established early, it could not be fully implemented until 1956. 
As the socialization completed by 1956, all foreign trade transactions 
became to be conducted solely through intermediaries of government 
organs, and empowered for the purpose were the fifteen Foreign Trade 
Corporations (FTCs) established in 1953.1) MOFT was in charge of control 
of FTCs, each of which had monopoly power over the import and export of a 
specific group of commodities. The FTCs were the only units under the 
MOFT allowed to sign foreign trade contracts and conduct foreign trade 
before the organizational changes for reforms. 
Institutions for foreign trade were organized according to the 
principle of overlapping responsibilities. Each province, autonomous 
1) In 1973, in accordance with the change in the foreign trade policy of Chinese 
government, the number of Foreign Trade Corporations reduced from 15 to 11. 
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regions and centrally administered municipality had a Foreign Trade 
Bureau (FTB), and many localities had FTB branch officies. These lower 
level foreign trade administration and planning bodies were vertically 
under auspices of MOFT, but they also received guidance, supervision and 
assistance from the regional government. In parallel, the FTCs maintained 
branches in most provinces and local offices in areas where trade in 
their product lines was particularly important. These local branches and 
offices had traditionally been under the vertical leadership of their 
respective FTCs, but they also received guidance, supervision and 
assistance from the regional or local FTBs. In this dual leadership 
system, the influence of central organs in charge such as MOFT and FTCs 
was dominant. 
In conformance with the foreign trade plan, the FTCs procured goods 
domestically and sold them abroad, surrendering the foreign exchange 
earned to the Bank of China. The FTCs also purchased goods abroad for 
production and other purchasing units, under import licenses issued by 
the MOFT according to the foreign trade plan. Foreign exchange for these 
purchases was allocated by the Bank of China and the State General 
Administration for Foreign Exchange Control according to the foreign 
exchange budget. The FTCs engaged directly in foreign trade were 
"independent accounting units”， and the monopoly trading power of FTCs 
has been the main factor in the close central control over the level, 
direction and composition of exports and imports. 
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Appendix D： China's intra-industrv trade in manufactures (Aquino index) 
According to the World Bank (1988, p.106), there are four essential 
elements that differentiate command plan exports from guidance plan 
exports: 
(a) All producers of command plan exports are provided with 
production inputs through the materials allocation system at 
fixed state prices. Depending on the province , guidance plan 
commodities may or may not be so covered. 
(b) Command plan exports are specified in quantities, as would be 
expected with products included in the materials allocation 
system. Guidance plans are specified in values, expressed in US 
dollars. Expected values of command plan exports and expected 
quantities of guidance plan exports are specified, but 
provinces are expected to achieve the quantity targets of 
command plan exports and the value target of guidance plan 
exports. 
(c) The command plan targets are very specific, and for several 
commodities, such as textiles and coal, the provincial targets 
are for procurement to fill centrally-negotiated contracts, as 
in the pre-1978 system. For guidance plans, provinces are at 
liberty to change the planned composition of exports provided 
they fulfill the overall target. 
(d) To accompany element (a) producers have no choice over 
supplying command plan commodities to specified FTCs. For 
guidance plan commodities, it varies from province to province, 
but there is nothing in the system to compel producers to 
supply FTCs. In some provinces, it is reported that guidance 
plans were translated into command plans, including materials 
allocation and compulsory export supply at fixed prices. In 
other provinces FTCs compete with domestic purchasers for 
supply. For commodities where above production plan output can 
be sold on the free market, producers have to weigh the 
relative benefits of higher domestic prices or of access to 
foreign exchange retention rights. 
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Appendix D： China's intra-industrv trade in manufactures (Aquino index) 
SITC 1986 1987 1988 1989 
511 0.345 0.311 0.188 .0.277 
512 0.613 0.661 0.648 0,754 
513 0.704 0.542 0.611 0.644 
514 0.995 0.579 0.363 0.424 
515 0.801 0.831 0.816 0.834 
516 0.919 0.969 0.83 0.78 
522 0.621 0.639 0.555 0.596 
523 0.963 0.949 0.928 0.905 
524 0.076 0.09 0.034 0.032 
531 0.748 0.863 0.924 0.6 
532 0.667 0.754 0.988 0.718 
533 0.77 0.832 0.958 0.95 7 
541 0.505 0,678 0.827 ,0.67 
551 0.268 0.295 0.325 0.249 
553 0.263 0.304 0.347 0.246 
554 0.595 0.881 0.923 0.907 
562 0.038 0,019 0.018 0.016 
572 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.006 
582 0,083 0.067 0.082 0.06 
583 0.087 0.093 0.064 0.116 
584 0.377 0.395 0.451 0.644 
585 0.44 0.405 0.307 0.309 
591 0,844 0.968 0.598 0.499 
592 0.66 0.952 0.902 0.617 
598 0.911 0.88 0.934 0.833 
611 0.482 0.539 0.57 0.566 
612 0.655 0.515 0.597 0.426 
613 0.644 0.841 0.889 0.889 
621 0.575 0.794 0.91 0.962 
625 0.251 0.467 0.473 0.357 
628 0.464 0.836 0.679 0.522 
633 0.078 0*253 0.265 0.312 
634 0.058 0.023 0.023 0.041 
635 0.595 0.362 0.297 0.272 
641 0.432 0.379 0.474 0.461 
642 0.401 0.626 0.747 0.771 
651 0.732 0.541 0.723 0.791 
652 0.163 0.258 0.248 0.314 
653 0.603 0.746 0.775 0.762 
654 0.213 0.277 0.275 0.273 
655 0.599 0.785 0*529 0.498 
656 0.755 0.935 0.934 0.96 
657 0.616 0.368 0.359 0.334 
658 0.048 0.074 0.081 0.092 
659 0.092 0.083 0.075 0.116 
661 0.328 0.664 0.934 0.771 . 
662 0.721 0.895 0.766 0.693 
663 0.603 0.736 0.81 0.75 
240 
Appendix D： China's intra-industrv trade in manufactures (Aquino index) 
SITC 1986 1987 1988 1989 
664 0.264 0.559 0.529 0.778 
665 0.541 0.564 0.511 0.445 
666 0.013 0.01 0.015 0.018 
667 0.561 0.977 0.926 0.929 
671 0.311 0 .868 0.3 0.574 
672 0.002 0.01 0.228 0.639 
673 0.042 0.07 0.208 0.299 
674 0.001 0.014 0,106 0.058 
675 0.02 0.024 0.083 0.09 
676 0.001 0.109 0.184 0.969 
677 0.89 0.827 0.41 0.557 
678 0.072 0.162 0.202 0.255 
679 0.586 0.352 0.495 -0.33 
691 0.119 0.128 0.375 0.383 
692 0.069 0.071 0.111 0.27 
693 0.267 0,423 0.706 0.9 
694 0.078 0.074 0.854 0.104 
695 0.246 0.275 0.285 0.27 
696 0.103 0.094 0.107 0.12 
697 0.349 0.301 0.419 0.45 
699 0 . 625 0 . 568 0.651 0.583 
711 0.005 0.009 0.063 0.162 
712 0.057 0.001 0.001 0.231 
713 0.472 0.446 0.473 0.589 
714 0.009 0.086 0.18 0.283 
716 0.639 0.642 0.454 0.34 
718 0.896 0.764 0.31 0.46 
721 0.157 0.283 0.291 0.318 
722 0.274 0.876 0.959 0.811 
723 0.022 0.065 0.142 0.181 
724 0.097 0.119 0.155 0,165 
725 0,049 0.027 0.112 0.127 
726 0.064 0.064 0.148 0,203 
727 0.078 0.099 0.143 0.112 
728 0.01 0.043 0.064 0.092 
736 0.269 0.341 0.474 0.606 
737 0.028 0.031 0,034 0.05 
741 0.051 0.06 0.114 0.095 
742 0.146 0.121 0.284 0.361 
743 0.078 0.064 0.083 0.106 
744 0.145 0.234 0.419 0.479 
745 0.074 0.055 0.117 0.149 
749 0.451 0.465 0.695 0.77 
751 0.969 0.841 0.907 0.783 
752 0.003 0.067 0.171 0.253 
759 0.117 0.208 0.39 0.505 
761 0.404 0.951 0.873 0.755 
762 0.565 0.383 0.222 0.362 
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SITC 1986 1987 1988 1989 
763 0.607 0.743 0.907 0.739 
764 0.265 0.276 0.322 0.434 
771 0.208 0.253 0.468 0.583 
772 0.348 0.385 0.496 0.617 
773 0.228 0.369 0.654 0.609 
774 0.011 0.02 0.038 0.07 
775 0.515 0.731 0.938 0.857 
776 0.181 0.083 0.084 0.163 
778 0.863 0.749 0.799 0.922 
781 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.024 
782 0.069 0.034 0.125 0.129 
783 0.001 0.029 0.013 0.133 
784 0.082 0.113 0.204 0.251 
785 0.688 0.851 0.795 0.749 
786 0.95 0.724 0.276 0.177 
791 0.034 0.031 0.083 0.113 
792 0.288 0.079 0.063 0.044 
793 0.167 0.89 0.885 0.553 
812 0.752 0 »817 0.867 0.781 
821 0.423 0.353 0.366 0.361 
831 0.018 0.019 0.04 0.025 
842 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 
843 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 
844 0 0.001 0,001 0,003 
845 0.006 0.019 0.02 0.015 
846 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 
847 0.035 0.036 0.032 0.041 
848 0*013 0.017 0.021 0.028 
851 0.007 0.003 0.004 0,005 
871 0.198 0.337 0.543 0,972 
872 0,313 0.398 0.411 0.754 
873 0.457 0.679 0.757 0.888 
874 0.074 0.101 0.165 0.264 
881 0.195 0.537 0.667 0.82 
882 0.166 0.125 0,364 0.243 
883 0.819 0.83 0.875 0.865 
884 0.206 0.216 0,517 0,849 
885 0.77 0.942 0.759 0.758 
892 0.297 0.42 0.357 0.557 
893 0.954 0.875 0.945 0.765 
894 0.374 0.289 0.32 0.289 
895 0.028 0.281 0.256 0.229 
896 0.001 0.005 0.017 0.004 
897 0.001 0.24 0.36 0.162 
898 0.084 0.536 0.655 0.936 
899 0.175 0.237 0.213 0.227 
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SITC p(Yuen) h(%) s《％) e 
511 12862 4.42 0.42 1.64 
512 25967 5.84 0.28 2.06 
513 12862 4.42 0.42 1.64 
514 12862 4.42 0.42 1.64 
515 25967 5.84 0.28 2.06 
516 13607 4.62 0.62 2.06 
522 10392 3.37 0.68 1.75 
523 7761 2.5 0.83 1.37 
524 10392 3.37 0.68 1.75 
531 9708 4.34 0.65 1.68 
532 9708 4.34 0.65 1.68 
533 5865 3.81 1.11 , 2.3 
541 7574 5.68 1.57 1.43 
551 6672 1.22 0.73 2.86 
553 6806 3.18 1.28 1.68 
554 8290 3.68 0.9 1.53 
562 16328 3 . 28 0.92 2.86 
572 3914 1.22 1,33 1.32 
582 55663 T.32 0.24 1.59 
583 21610 5.72 0.37 1.48 
584 16121 3.74 0.38 1.28 
585 28653 6.09 0.36 1.59 
591 7958 4 1.08 1.13 
592 7604 2 . 79 1�,03 0.93 
598 6806 3.18 1.28 1.68 
611 7591 1.48 0.38 1.19 
612 2050 0.61 1.05 1.7 
613 3830 0.86 1.41 1.84 
621 5746 2.45 1 2.32 
625 11499 4.12 0.95 1.91 
628 5746 2.45 1 2.32 
633 2700 0.73 1.95 1.75 
634 8666 2,43 0.72 1.86 
635 2635 0.7 2.03 1.8 
641 9886 2.13 0.5 1.86 
642 2715 0,39 0.99 2.7 
651 5069 1,48 1.08 1.64 
652 5482 1.65 0.35 1.6 
653 29506 5.25 0.38 0.13 
654 5054 1.46 0.59 1.61 
655 4012 1.15 0.8 1.91 
656 4012 1.15 0.8 1.91 
657 5069 1.48 1.08 3.28 
658 5069 1.48 1.08 1.64 
659 5069 1,48 1.08 1.64 
661 10062 1.74 6.51 2.04 
662 6125 1.75 1.34 1.8 
663 6515 3,15 2.4 1.72 
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SITC p(Yuen) h(%) s (%) e 
664 5674 1.93 1.17 1 93 
6 6 5 4859 1.62 0.89 1;87 
666 3653 1.12 1.28 1.37 
6 6 7 5131 1.23 2.81 1.27 
671 11411 2.96 0.37 1.56 
672 11411 2.96 0.37 1.56 
673 21423 4.68 0.43 1.33 
674 21423 4.68 0.43 1.33 
675 21423 4.68 0.43 1.33 
676 9436 5.88 0.18 1.43 
677 7153 2.13 0.32 2.27 
678 7153 2.13 0.32 '2.27 
679 4603 2.1 1 1.34 
691 3813 1.82 1.02 1.46 
692 3921 1.53 1.02 1.52 
693 4801 1.44 0.69 1.82 
694 4883 3.77 1.36 0,89 
695 3913 1.54 1,15 2.62 
696 6266 4.63 3.31 1.27 
697 3491 1.4 1.49 1.68 
699 3491 1.4 1.49 1.68 
711 7153 5.77 1.06 1.53 
712 4840 4.03 1 . 15 1.12 
713 9215 7.01 1.36 1.42 
714 20162 11.45 1.51 1.51 
716 11934 8.97 0.84 1.13 
718 8158 6.05 1.29 1 .39 
721 5446 3.75 1.06 1.03 
722 9383 6.16 0.94 1.29 
723 7487 5.24 1.17 1.27 
724 5734 4.05 0.86 1.38 
725 7969 5.21 1.03 1.17 
726 7969 5,21 1.03 _ 1.17 
727 7969 5.21 1.03 1 . 17 
728 9667 6.01 0.91 1.13 
736 8633 7, 63 1.56 1 . 17 
737 7310 6 1.4 1.24 
741 5941 4.97 1.43 1. 59 
742 5203 4.08 2.09 1.32 
743 6798 4.62 1.02 1.14 
744 6849 5.22 1.22 1.46 
745 6266 4.91 1.42 1.46 
749 5528 3.22 1.57 1 .25 
751 5938 6.76 1 .94 1.16 
752 7882 16.42 1.95 0.95 
759 5938 6. 76 1.94 1 .16 
761 8844 8.84 1.03 1.69 
762 4797 7.04 1.02 1.78 
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SITC p( Yuen) h(%) s(%) e 
763 6643 12.12 1.05 1.18 
764 7402 12.74 1 1.26 
771 6226 5.48 1.59 1.52 
772 4631 5.21 1.64 1.79 
773 6069 3.27 0.87 1.94 
774 5913 8.01 1.84 1.05 
775 4067 2.55 1.45 2.08 
776 10895 9.23 1.02 1.55 
778 5163 4.02 1.3 1.68 
781 5968 4.69 0.92 1.5 
782 13924 7.72 0.56 1.43 
783 7315 4.61 0.78 4.84 
784 6601 3.87 0.65 1.14 
785 4140 3.98 1 . 33 1 . 7 
786 3921 1.53 1.02 1 .52 
791 9436 5.88 0.18 1.43 
'792 8253 5. 79 0.63 1 .39 
793 10793 5.98 0.12 1.28 
812 3733 1.93 1.35 1.36 
821 2803 0.7 1.47 1.95 
831 5136 1.39 1. 1 2.52 
842 1691 0.47 0.96 2.01 
843 1691 0.47 0.96 2.01 
844 1691 0.47 0.96 2.01 
845 1691 0.47 0.96 2.01 
846 1691 0,47 0.96 2.01 
847 1691 0,47 0.96 2.01 
848 1691 0.47 0.96 2.01 
851 2150 0.52 0.38 1 
871 7540 5,36 1.91 1.45 
872 4386 4.73 1.73 1.7 
873 5626 5.09 1.91 1.27 
874 5678 7.91 1.84 1. 1 
881 7540 5 . 36 1.91 1.45 
882 7322 8.62 1.9 1.65 
883 16532 8 . 77 0. 95 1.68 
884 7540 5.36 1.91 1.45 
885 8261 3.68 2.02 1.99 
892 4968 0.83 0.99 2.16 
893 5136 1.39 1.1 2.52 
894 3503 1.43 1.67 3.11 
895 3503 1 .43 1.67 3.11 
896 1875 0.78 1.33 1.51 
897 1875 0.78 1.33 1.51 
898 3503 1.43 1.67 3.11 
899 1875 0.78 1.33 1.51 
245 
Appendix D： China's intra-industrv trade in manufactures (Aquino index) 
Country Hj H,j/Hc Gj Gj/Gc 
BURMA 0.24 0.9 628 0.48 
H.K. 0.61 2.28 24458 18.78 
INDIA 0.37 1.38 1371 1.05 
INDONE 0»32 1.21 2954 2.27 
JAPAN 1.08 4.06 58912 45.25 
MALAYSIA 0.47 1.79 12192 9.36 
PAKIS 0.2 0.75 1481 1.14 
PHILIP 0.71 2.68 2948 '2.26 
SINGAPO 0.56 2.11 45013 34.57 
THAI 0.47 1.76 3305 2.54 
EGYPT 0,62 2.33 6426 4.94 
BELGIUM 1.02 3.85 50186 38.55 
DENMARK 1.05 3.94 48846 37.52 
U.K. 0.99 3.74 31189 23.95 
GER.FR 1.02 3.85 59182 45.45 
FRANCE 1.02 3.85 56721 43.56 
ITALY 1.02 3.84 40972 31.47 
NETHER 1.04 3.93 56757 43.59 
SPAIN 1.04 3.94 33026 25.37 
CSZECH 0.54 2,05 19729 15*15 
GER.DR 0.75 2.85 33798 25.96 
HUNGARY 0.61 2.31 12085 9.28 
POLAND 0.58 2.19 14486 11.13 
ROMANIA 0.66 2.51 16940 13.01 
SWEDEN 1.1 4.14 48119 36.96 
SWITZ 0.73 2.76 73519 56.47 
USSR 0.84 3.16 19589 15.05 
BRAZIL 0.27 1,02 6403 4.92 
CUBA 0.76 2.88 10060 12.87 
CANADA 1.32 5 47286 36.32 
USA 1.28 4.82 46838 35.97 
AUSTRAL 0.88 3.33 51366 39.45 
CHINA 0.27 - 1302 -
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Group 
Code No. Description 
511 Hydrocarbons and their derivatives 
512 Alcohols, phenols, phenol-alcohols, and their derivatives 
513 Carboxylic acids and their derivatives 
514 Nitrogen-function compounds 
515 Organo-inorganic and heterocyclic compounds 
516 Other organic chemicals 
522 Inorganic chemical elements, oxides and halogen salts 
523 Other inorganic chemicals； organic and inorganic compounds of 
precious metals 
524 Radio-active and associated materials 
531 Synthetic organic dyestuffs, etc. 
532 Dyeing and tanning extracts, and synthetic tanning materials 
533 Pigments, paints, varnishes and related materials 
541 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 
551 Essential oils, perfume and flavour materials 
553 Perfumery, cosmetics and toilet preparations and aqueous solutions 
of essential oils 
554 Soap, cleansing and polishing preparations 
562 Fertilizers, manufactured 
572 Expolsives and pyrotechnic products 
582 Condensation, po1ycondensation and polyaddition products 
583 Polymerization and copo1ymerization products 
584 Regenerated cellulose and related products 
585 Other artificial resins and plastic materials 
591 Disinfectants, insecticides, fungicides, weed killers, anti-
sprouting products, rat poisons and similar products 
592 Starches, inulin and wheat gluten; albuminoidal substances; glues 
598 Miscellaneous chemical products, n.e,s. 
611 Leather 
612 Manufactures of leather or of composition leather n.e.s. 
613 Furskins, tanned or dressed 
621 Materials of rubber 
625 Rubber tyres, tyrecases, interchangeable tyre treads, inner tubes 
and tyre flaps, for wheels of all kinds 
628 Articles of rubber, n.e.s. 
633 Cork manufactures 
634 Veneers, plywood, ‘improved' or reconstituted wood, worked 
635 Wood manufactures 
641 Paper and paperboard 
642 Paper and paperboard, cut to size or shape, and articles of paper 
or paperboard 
651 Textile yarn 
652 Cotton fabrics, woven 
653 Fabrics, woven, of man-made fibres 
654 Textile fabrics, woven, other than of cotton or man-made fibres 
655 Knitted or crocheted fabrics 
656 - Tulle, lace, embroidery, ribbons, trimmings and other small wares 
657 Special textile fabrics and related products 
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Group 
Code No. Description 
658 Made-up articles’ wholly or chiefly of textile materials 
659 Floor coverings, etc, 
661 Lime, cement, and fabricated construction materials 
662 Clay construction materials and refractory construction materials 




667 Pearls, precious and semi-precious stones, unworked or worked 
671 Pig iron, spiegeleisen, sponge iron, iron or steel powders and 
shot, and ferro-alloys 
672 Ingots and other primary forms, of iron or steel 
673 Iron and steel bars, rods, angles, shapes and sections 
674 Universals, plates and sheets, of iron or steel 
675 Hoop and strip, of iron or steel, hot-rolled or cold-rolled 
676 Rails and railway track construction material, of iron or steel 
677 Iron or steel wire, whether or not coated, but not insulated 
678 Tubes， pipes and fittings, of iron or steel 
679 Iron and steel castings, forgings and stampings, in the rough 
state, n. e.s. 
691 Structures and parts of structures, n.e.s., of iron, steel or 
aluminium 
692 Metal containers for storage and transport 
693 Wire products and fencing grills 
694 Nails, screws, nuts, bolts, rivets and the like, of iron, steel or 
copper 
695 Tools for use in the hand or machines 
696 Cutlery 
697 Household equipment of base metal, n.e.s. 
699 Manufactures of base metal, n.e.s, 
711 Steam and other vapour generating boilers and parts 
712 Steam or other vapour power units， whether or not incorporating 
boilers: and parts thereof 
713 Internal combustion piston engines and parts 
714 Engines and motors, non-electric 
716 Rotating electric plant and parts thereof, n.e.s. 
718 Other power generating machinery and parts thereof, n.e.s. 
721 Agricultural machinery and parts thereof, n.e.s. 
722 Tractors, whether or not fitted with power take-offs, winches or 
pulleys 
723 Civil engineering and contractors' plant and equipment and parts 
724 Textile and leather machinery and parts 
725 Paper mill and pulp mill machinery, paper cutting machines and 
other machinery for manufacture of paper articles 
726 Printing and bookbinding machinery, and parts thereof, n. e_ s. 
727 Food-processing machines and parts 
728 Other machinery and equipment specialized for particular indus-
tries and parts 
736 ,Machine-tools for working metal or metal carbides and parts and 
accessories 
737 Metalworking machinery and parts 
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Group 
Code No. Description 
741 Heating and cooling equipment and parts 
742 Pumps for liquids, liquid elevators of bucket, chain, screw, band 
and similar kinds； parts 
743 Pumps (other than pumps for liquids) and compressors； fans and 
blowers； centrifuges； filtering and purifying apparatus； and parts 
thereof 
744 Mechanical handling equipment and parts 
745 Other non-electrical machinery, tools and mechanical apparatus, and 
parts 
749 Non-electric parts and accessories of machinery, n.e.s. 
751 Office machines 
752 Automatic data processing machines and units thereof 
759 Parts, n.e.s. of and accessories suitable for use of 751 or 752 
761 Television receivers 
762 Radio-broadcast receivers 
763 Gramophones, dictating machines and other sound recorders or 
reproducers ‘ 
764 Telecommunications equipments, and parts and accessories 
771 Electric power machinery and parts 
772 Electrical apparatus for making and breaking electrical circuits 
773 Equipment for distributing electricity 
774 Electric apparatus for medical purposes and radiological apparatus 
775 Houshold type, electrical and non-electrical equipment, n.e.s. 
776 Thermionic, cold cathode and photo-cathode valves and tubes 
778 Electrical machinery and apparatus 
781 Passenger motor cars 
782 Motor vehicles for the transport of goods or materials and special 
purpose motor vehicles 
783 Road motor vehicles, n.e.s. 
784 Parts and accessories of the motor vehicles 
785 Motorcycles, motor scooters and other cycles, mortorized and 
non-motori2ed 
786 Trailers and other vehicles, not motorized 
791 Railway vehicles and associated equipment 
792 Aircraft and associated equipment and parts 
793 Ships, boats and floating structures 
812 Sanitary, plumbing， heating and lighting fixtures and fittings 
821 Furniture and parts 
831 Tarvel goods, shopping bags, handbags, and similar containers of 
leather, artificial plastic sheeting, or textile fabric 
842 Outer garments, men's or boy's, of textile fabrics 
843 Outer garments, women's or girl's, and infants‘, of textile fabrics 
844 Under garments of textile fabrics 
845 Outer garments and other articles* knitted or crocheted 
846 Under garments, knitted or crocheted 
847 Clothing accessories, of textile fabrics 
848 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories of other than textile 
fabrics 
851 Footwear 
871 Optical instruments and apparatus 
872 Medical instruments and appliances 
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Code No. Description 
873 Meters and counters 
874 Measuring, checking, analysing and controlling instruments and 
apparatus and their parts and accessories 
881 Photographic apparatus and equipment 
882 Photographic and cinematographic supplies 
883 Cinematograph film, exposed and developed 
884 Optical goods, n.e.s. 
885 Watches and clocks 
892 Printed matter 
893 Articles, of materials of the kinds described in division 58， 
n. e. s. 
894 Baby carriages, toys, games and sporting goods 
895 Office and stationery supplies, n.e.s. 
896 Works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques 
897 Jewellery, goldsmiths' wares, and other articles of precious 
materials 
898 Musical instruments and parts and accessories 
899 Other miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s. 
n.e. s = not elsewhere specified. 
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